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It is now a few years since Switzerland enacted the Federal Law on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (IMAC),' in force as of January
1, 1983. The present time offers a good opportunity to survey the cur-
rent status of the Swiss substantive and procedural law of extradition.
Many questions have arisen due to the simultaneous existence of old
bilateral, and more recent multilateral, agreements that are binding
upon countries that have also enacted internal (national) laws, includ-
ing the following: 1) To what extent are the individual countries bound
by these agreements? 2) May these countries act in ways beyond the
terms of the agreements in order to combat international crime? and 3)
How is the individual protected under these agreements?2 This article
* L.L.B., University of Geneva (1935); L.L.D., University of Cologne (1936); Visiting
Professor of Law, University of Cologne, University of Milan. The author is currently in
private practice in Switzerland.
1. Loi Federale sur L'Entraide Internationale en Matiere Penal, 1982 Sammlung der
Eidgenossischen Gesetze (A.S.) II 8467, Recueil Systematique des lois (RS) 351.1 (Switz.)
[hereinafter IMAC] Translated by Dr. L. Frei and H.P. Wyssmann, officers of the Fed-
eral Office of Police, Bern. The translation is used throughout this article.
The IMAC was enacted following similar legislation in neighboring countries, such
as Germany and Austria. Deutsches Rechtschilfe Gesetz, 1982 Bundesgesetzbatt (BGBI)
2071 (W. Ger.); Bundesgesetz uber Auslieferung und Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen, 1979
Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBI) 529 (Aus.).
2. For a brief discussion of bilateral agreements and municipal law, see infra PART
ONE § I. The shift in emphasis from the protection of individual rights to the granting of
assistance for the sake of international cooperation will be evident from the discussion
below.
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will show that Switzerland has attempted to provide the necessary as-
sistance for combatting international crime, while strictly adhering to
the principle of individual rights in a most liberal interpretation of
Swiss political and social life. Part One of this article will outline the
basic prerequisites for the extradition of suspects or convicts, and dis-
cuss the potential conflict between international and national law. Part
Two will deal with the limits on extradition, distinguishing between
mere restrictions and absolute exclusions. Part Three will focus on the
political offense as interpreted by Swiss jurisprudence and its impact
upon international humanitarian concepts in contrast to the more con-
servative approach for protecting society.
PART ONE - THE BASIC PREREQUISITES
I. JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE AND PHYSICAL SURRENDER
The IMAC covers both judicial assistance in criminal matters and
extradition. Included under the concept of assistance are the rules of
evidence, the transfer of proceedings and the execution of foreign judg-
ments. Only the problems of extradition will be dealt with in this pa-
per. The rules of evidence shall be referred to only if they help in clari-
fying extradition matters by analogy or if they are applicable to one of
the two subjects, by argumenti ex contrario. Extradition is granted ac-
cording to: 1) Multilateral conventions (for example, the European
Convention on Extradition (ECE); 2) Bilateral treaties; 3) Declarations
of reciprocity; and 4) Municipal law existing in practically all countries
(in Switzerland formerly the Extradition Law of 1892, and since 1983
the new IMAC).
A. Request
Because extradition goes one step further than mere judicial assis-
tance-it physically surrenders a person for trial elsewhere or, if al-
ready convicted, for the execution of a sentence-it necessitates
tougher and more rigid prerequisites which, at least by democratic con-
cepts, tend to protect the suspect or the convict.3 The procedure must
3. J.B. MOORE, A TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION 363 (1891):
"Extradition is an act of international judicial assistance providing, however, for the sur-
render of an individual prosecuted or sentenced from one sovereignty to another." Id.
See also Rapport Gknkral pour le Xme Congr~s International de Droit Pnal (1969)
reprinted in, H. Schultz, Les Problmes Actuels de l'Extradition, et de delit politique,
45 REVUE INT'L DE DRorr P*NAL 785, 788 (1974). [hereinafter Probl~mes de
l'Extradition]. Thus "basic prerequisites" must be examined ex officio, irrespective of
formal objections raised by the suspect (or convict). Id. Accord 2 P. GUGGENHEIM,
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exclude any potential arbitrariness, and, therefore, requires a formal
request that presents a clear-cut case, showing both facts and law4 as a
VOLKERRECHT (1948). The United States Supreme Court in Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S.
270 (1902) defined extradition as "the surrender by one nation to another of an individ-
ual accused or convicted of an offense outside of its own territory, and within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to try and punish him, demands
the surrender." Id. at 289.
Under international law there is really no substitute for extradition. Abducting a
wanted suspect from the country of his abode to where the prosecuting authority wants
him delivered might be justified under certain circumstances, but it is not a legal proce-
dure. It would not fit any Swiss concept, nor would police expulsion or forced
deportation.
Professor B.J. George, Jr. of the New York Law School in an address to the Boston
Congress of the Association of Jurists Italy-United States-Switzerland in September
1987 entitled "Problems of International Extradition-USA and Italy," presented a legal
concept for forced extradition under United States law. Professor George referred to
such cases as Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886), United States v. Toscanino, 508 F.2d
896, 900 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975).
From a strictly legal point of view, the abduction of Nazi criminal Eichmann was
just as questionable. In a resolution on June 23, 1960, U.N. Doc. 8/4349 (1960), the U.N.
Security Council stated that such acts affect the sovereignty of a member nation and
therefore are liable to cause international friction, and, if repeated, would tend to endan-
ger peace and security. The case was not carried further because of the international
consensus at the time. Switzerland, as a neutral country and not belonging to the U.N.
took no position, but Swiss scholars defended the rule "male captus, bene indicatus."
See also C. BASSlOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 133-34
(1974).
The Swiss Federal Supreme Court in In re Tezzler, Entscheidungen des Schueizeris-
chen Bundesgerichts, Amtliche Sammlung (BG) 92 I 382 (1966), granted extradition de-
spite the individual's having asylum status, but "no refoulement" to the country to
which he fled. Deportation in lieu of extradition would probably be in conflict with Swiss
public order.
4. For a discussion of the requirements for the formal document containing the re-
quest, see infra PART ONE § II, D and accompanying text.
Switzerland has decided by an Administrative Act of the Department of Justice, IX
A 133, Feb. 14, 1983, and upon a decision by the Federal Supreme Court, in In re Bagci,
BG 108 I b 301 (1982), that there can be a surrender to Italy without an actual request.
The Swiss Justice Department surrendered Turkish shipbuilder, Mehmet Cantas, to
Italy without a formal request. Cantas was regarded by the Italian and Turkish authori-
ties as a major figure in the international drug and arms trafficking scene between Eu-
rope and the Middle East. Cantas was arrested in Zurich, Switzerland upon an interna-
tional warrant of arrest. The Swiss Department of Justice stated that Cantas was
surrendered to Italy with his consent because he purportedly preferred to be surrendered
to Italy because of the more severe treatment which might have awaited him in Turkey.
Id.
Extradition without request has been made possible in Switzerland by the enact-
ment of the IMAC, wherein article 1 provides for a formless surrender upon the consent
of the suspect. IMAC, supra note 1, art. 1. The suspect, nonetheless, will enjoy all privi-
leges inherent to extradition law, including "speciality" (See infra, PART ONE § 111,
B)-and according to the European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, art. 14,
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basis for the petition of extradition. Most importantly, the legal basis
concerning the elements of the act in question must exist in both the
requesting country and the requested one.5 The requesting country
must also prove that it has the exclusive jurisdictional right to prose-
cute the offense alleged. The requesting country need not show a defi-
nite lack of jurisdiction by the requested country as this argument
would be a valid objection to be raised by the requested country itself.6
359 U.N.T.S. 274 [hereinafter ECE] and the IMAC, supra note 1, art. 39, he will not be
prosecuted in the extraditing country for anything not specified in an international war-
rant of arrest. Most important, the suspect cannot be surrendered later to a third coun-
try without the explicit consent of the Swiss authorities; such consent being subject to
review by the Federal Supreme Court upon the petition of the surrendered individual.
Cantas is also suspected of having collaborated with a certain Behir Celenk, who is
said to be one of the organizers of the attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II in May,
1981. The perpetrator of the crime, Ali Agca, in his testimony, declared that Celenk had
furnished the pistol and had promised to pay him a substantial amount for the killing.
The crime of conspiracy (in Italian: associazione per delinquere) was not alleged in the
warrant, conspiracy is not punishable in Switzerland. Accordingly, surrender on that
count would have failed due to lack of "dual criminality." Celenk fled and was tried in
absentia in Rome. The Bulgarian nationals, who were accused of being involved in the
plot and who were tried in the same proceeding, were acquitted. Celenk, though, remains
at large. It is not known how Celenk arrived in Bulgaria and managed to make his way to
Turkey, despite the tight security measures taken by the Turkish authorities. Italy, how-
ever, has not requested the extradition of Celenk by Turkey, and even if he were found
there the Turkish authorities would likely not extradite him because of his Turkish
nationality.
A surrender without a formal request must be distinguished from an "informal sur-
render," which under the IMAC is based not only on a request, but also upon consent of
the suspect (or the convict). This "informal surrender" takes place without a further
hearing. IMAC supra note 1, art. 54. Even in that case, the individual is protected
against re-extradition, and that may often be a motive to consent, fearing another re-
quest from a third country with a prospect for harsher treatment. The German Extradi-
tion Law, 1982 BGBI 2071, codified extradition by consent under the term "simplified
extradition." Id. para 41. A similar provision exists in the extradition treaty between the
United States and Italy. United States-Italy Extradition Treaty, art. XVII, No. 225, 1984
Gazetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana (Gaz. Uff.) Oct. 20, 1984.
5. The principal of nulla traditio sine lege is commonly referred to as "dual criminal-
ity" or "double punishability".
6. A country's right to prosecute a crime would normally exclude extradition. The
doctrine that asserting jurisdiction according to a country's own municipal laws might be
in conflict with granting a request for extradition has been adhered to by many leading
scholars when discussing the commitment to surrender a criminal to a foreign jurisdic-
tion. See H. SCHULTZ, DAS ScHwEIz AUSLIEFERUNGSRECHT 41 (1953); 2 D. DE VABREs, LES
PRINCIPES MODERNES DE DI{OT PfNAL INTERNATIONAL 269 (1928); LISZT, 2 ZEITSCHNFT
FOR DIE GESAMTE STmAFRECHTSWISSENSCHArr 66 (1886); 2 GUGGENHEIM, supra note 3, at
524 n.45; 4 M. TRAVERS, LE DROIT PRNAL INTERNATIONAL 555, 1 2065 (1921).
Swiss practice generally follows the rule of non-extradition when asserting jurisdic-
tion, see D. PONCET & P. NEYROUD, L'EXTRADITION ET L'ASILE POLITIQUE EN SuIssE 23
(1976), in which there is a reference made to the old extradition law RS 353.0 (abro-
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B. Dual Criminality
The prerequisite of dual criminality is essential because no prose-
cution may be initiated if the offense is not punishable. The requesting
gated). Message by the Federal Counsel, Bundesblatt (BBl) 1890 III 210. According to
article 32 of the IMAC, Switzerland may extradite an individual to another State if that
State has jurisdiction over the offense or if it accepts a Swiss request to assume jurisdic-
tion, IMAC, supra note 1, art. 32, and article 36 of the IMAC allows Switzerland to
extradite an individual for an offense which comes under Swiss jurisdiction if special
circumstances exist, especially in a situation in which there is the possibility of social
rehabilitation. Id. art. 36. This law leaves a tremendous degree of discretionary power to
the Swiss authorities and, as a consolation to the individual suspect, to Swiss judicial
authority. See also Swiss Reservations to the ECE, arts. 7-8, BBI 1967 319, indicating an
assumption of jurisdiction vis-A-vis co-signatories of the ECE as a discretionary decision
on the practicability of a country's own prosecution in leiu of extradition. In the United
States-Italy Extradition Treaty, No. 225, 1984 Gaz. Uff. Oct. 20, 1984, there is a specific
provision denying extradition if the requested State prefers to prosecute the suspect. Id.
art. VII.
Even if Switzerland initiates the prosecution, it can extradite a suspect if the offense
committed in Switzerland is of secondary importance; that is, if the important offense
was committed abroad. In re Koenig, BG 105 I b 294 (1979). The Swiss Government also
has the authority to initially prosecute in Switzerland for an act committed in Switzer-
land or an act committed abroad but having an effect in Switzerland, In re Tani, BG 101
I a 401 (1975), or if part of a crime is committed in Switzerland. In re Vervaldi, BG 103 I
a 616 (1977). The Court has also denied extradition when, although the crime was com-
mitted abroad, there was a severe effect in Switzerland, and, therefore, jurisdiction was
asserted. In re Buser, BG 81 IV 285 (1955).
The Court has also held that new facts may force review of an extradition case, but
they need not be taken into consideration if the prosecution is initiated in Switzerland
before the extradition. In re Palazzolo, BG 110 IV 118 (1984). If part of the crime is
committed in Switzerland, the Court may deny extradition, see In re Calmasini, BG (un-
publ.) (Mar. 14, 1984), but it may also surrender the suspect if the "resocialization" pro-
cess is better served there. See In re Malafronte, BG (unpubl.) (Sept. 17, 1985) (jurisdic-
tion under article 7 of the ECE and article 36 of the IMAC is Swiss, but extradition was
granted because Italy is better equipped for the social rehabilitation of an Italian
citizen).
In In re McCharra, BG 110 I b 280 (1984), the Court held that article 37 of the
IMAC did not apply, when the treaty compelled extradition and no reason for asserting
Swiss jurisdiction. Under a treaty supplement to the ECE with Germany, BBI 1970 II
241, RS 913.61, when there is a partial offense in Switzerland (and a partial offense in
Germany), the consequential question of jurisdiction may be ignored if the suspect is
already being prosecuted in Switzerland. In re Lindauer, BG (unpubl.) (Sept. 12, 1984)
(Germany asked for and was granted extradition for the other offenses).
Another recent case concerned an individual residing in Switzerland, who refused to
support a dependent residing in Austria. The Court held that Austria had jurisdiction in
the matter because the creditor was domiciled there and because the offense (non-pay-
ment of support) was punishable in both countries. The Court granted extradition based
on Austrian jurisdiction, and on the fact that the effect of the offense was in Austria. In
re Hechenberger, BG (unpubl.) (Nov. 8, 1984).
With regard to other municipal laws, the Austrian extradition act explicitly denies
19861
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country has no right to prosecute an innocent individual, and the re-
quested country has no right to surrender that individual unless the
offense in the request is punishable.7 In cases of doubt, the law of the
requested state will always prevail because it is that state which de-
cides on the requested surrender. Here, there is no question of guilt or
innocence (a question of fact), but rather an argument that the facts
asserted in the request-with or without prima facie evi-
dence-constitute the elements of an offense (a question of law).'
Nearly all treaties have adhered to this principle in the past, and the
ECE has confirmed it unequivocally.9
extradition if Austria asserts jurisdiction. BGBI 529, para. 16(1). Austria may grant a
petition for extradition, however, if the requesting country can demonstrate primary ju-
risdiction. Accord Loi relatif A l'extradition des etrangers, arts. 5(3)-(4), 1927 J.O. No.
2068.
7. A lengthy discussion was held in 1969 at the Tenth Congress of Criminal Law in
Rome on whether double punishability (or dual criminality) was derived from the princi-
ple of reciprocity or had its own raison d'etre. That discussion, however, was purely
theoretical and served no practical purpose. That the accused person, after surrender, is
found innocent in the requesting country, has no bearing on the question of dual crimi-
nality. See Report by Curt Markees to the Tenth International Congress on Penal Law,
reprinted in 40 REvuE INTERNATIONALE DE DRorr P9NAL 742, 748 (1968); Schultz, Report
General Provisoire sur la Question IV Pour le X Congres International de Droit Pknal,
40 REvUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROrr PtNAL 785, 801 (1968) (hereinafter Schultz Report].
The Congress did recommend certain modifications to the ECE.
8. See Schultz, Principles of Traditional Extradition Law in EUROPEAN COMMITrEE
ON CRIME PROBLEMS: LEGAL AsPECTs OF EXTRADITION 12-13 (1970) [hereinafter Tradi-
tional Extradition Law].
9. Under article 2, paragraph 2 of the ECE an offense must be punishable in both
countries. ECE, supra note 4, art. 2, para. 1. Historically, however, Scandinavian coun-
tries have not required dual criminality. See Norwegian Extradition Law of June 13,
1908, as amended, June 16, 1922, 24 Norsk Loftvidende 154/08 & 26/290/1; Swedish
Extradition Law of June 4, 1913, 68 Svensk Forfattnings-Sammling, 124/30 (1913). See
also Mettgenberg, Reziprozitaet im Deutschen Auslieferungsrecht, 25 AREHIV F6R OF-
FENTLICHES RECHT 114 (1909); G. DAHM, VOLKERRECHT 281 (1958).
The provisions of the Scandinavian laws referred to do not insist on the criminality
of the offense concerned in the requested country, but only in Sweden and Norway, re-
spectively. See Traditional Extradition Law, supra note 8. For a more thorough account
of the Scandinavian approach, see KARLE, EUROPEAN COMMITrEE ON CRIME PROBLEMS:
LEGAL ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION 52-55 (1970). Karle asserts that according to article 28,
paragraph 3 of the ECE, extradition between Denmark, Sweden and Norway must take
place on the basis of the uniform laws of these countries. Article 4 of the Swiss Extradi-
tion Law of 1892, SR 353.0, provided an exception to the requirement of dual
criminality:
L'extradition pourra etre accordee pour une infraction comprise dans
l'enumeration de l'art. 3 et punissable d'apres la loi de I'Etat requerant, lors
meme quelle ne sevait pas specialement prevue par le droit du canton de ref-
uge-ou de droit federal-se cette omission provient uniquement de circon-
stances exterieures, telles que la difference des situations geographiques des
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A more fundamental discussion among legal scholars, however, has
centered on whether the terminology and the elements of the crime
must be identically defined in the law of each country.10
deux pay.
Id. art. 4. The IMAC has strictly provided for the principle of dual criminality. IMAC,
supra note 1, art. 35.
10. Various scholars have reached different conclusions on this question. Some inter-
pret the requirement of dual criminality quite liberally, see ScHuvLTz, supra note 6, at
325; 1 GUGGENHEIM, supra note 3, at 325, while others treat the requirement literally. See
PONCEr & NEYROUD, supra note 6, at 21. See also In re Gillette, BG 911 130 (1965); In re
Hornig, BG 88 I 37 (1962); The Federal Supreme Court in In re von Petersdorf, BG 39 I
390 (1913), followed the Swiss-German Extradition Treaty of 1874, A.S. 1 1882 (abro-
gated), and rejected extradition because of a lack of accurate terminology in the request.
The IMAC, in article 35, paragraph 2, states:
In determining if an act is punishable under Swiss law, special degrees of
guilt and conditions of punishability shall not be taken into account, not even
with respect to the personal and temporal scope of application of the provisions
of the Swiss Military Penal Code [SR 321.0] concerning violation of public inter-
national law in case of armed conflicts and wartime looting as well as pillaging.
IMAC, supra note 1, art. 35, para. 2b. Similarly, under the ECE, which upon ratification
has become Swiss law, extradition will be granted for offenses punishable under the laws
of the requesting and the requested state by a deprivation of liberty of at least one year.
ECE, supra note 4, art. 2, para. 1. Thus, the terminology of the offense (once explicitly
enumerated, as in the United States-Switzerland Extradition Treaty of 1900, A.S. 12/
267) has been superseded by the elements of the facts required to constitute and deline-
ate an offense.
The Federal Supreme Court has waived the correct qualification of the offense so
long as it was punishable. In re Mifsud, BG 101 I 410 (1975) (that perjury was punisha-
ble in England only upon testimony of two witnesses deemed irrelevant, because it is
procedural not substantive). Likewise, in BG 101 I 592 (1975), the Court ruled that the
different qualifications of the elements of fact were not sufficient to deny extradition. In
fact, the Court stated that extradition would be granted if, according to both laws, the
factual elements constitute a crime, no matter what the offense was labeled. See also In
re Peruzzo, BG 77 I 55 (1951); In re Lazzeri, BG 87 I 200 (1961); In re Kroeger, BG 92 I
115 (1966).
In a more recent decision, the Court reaffirmed a liberal interpretation: "Les Nle-
ments punissables dans l'Etat requarant ne doivent pas conformer i lesquelles d'Etat
requis." In re Panamex, BG 109 1 b 161 (1983). Apparently this interpretation is in ac-
cord with a prior decision, see In re Bohm, BG 108 I b 296 (1982), which granted an
extradition request to Austria, despite the fact that under Austrian law fraud requires no
profit motive (objective elements suffice), whereas Swiss law deems motive relevant. Dual
criminality was affirmed, nonetheless, because the Court found that the Austrian concept
of fraud corresponded to an offense punishable under Swiss law, which was extraditable.
In In re Gelli, BG 109 I b 312 (1983), the Court held that, even though Switzerland
does not recognize an offense for a "fraudulent bankruptcy prior to bankruptcy proceed-
ings being initiated," Italian law does recognize such an offense. Id. at 317. Hence, the
elements of the offense were held to be satisfied prior to the initiation of the bankruptcy
proceedings. See also In re Maurel, BG 109 I b 165 (1983); In re Suarez, BG 108 1 b 525
(1982) (conspiracy although not a crime under Swiss law held to be an extraditable of-
fense, irrespective of the terminology used, because the crime, although committed in the
198r.]
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C. Extraditable Offenses
The question of the legal terminology of offenses plays an ex-
tremely important role in judicial relations between countries, not only
United States, was for the purpose of committing a drug trafficking offense under the
International Drug Trafficking Convention and article 2 of the United States-Switzer-
land Extradition Treaty of 1900).
In an interesting case of dual criminality, in which the preparation or instigation to
perpetrate a crime took place in Switzerland but the actual crime was committed else-
where (the purchase of drugs in Spain, their transportation through Germany and their
sale in Norway), Germany asked for and was granted extradition, although it had no
jurisdiction over the instigator. In re Klingenbrunner, BG (unpubl.) (Sept. 5, 1984).
In two recent decisions, the Court did not require identical norms because only judi-
cial assistance and no extradition was requested. Thus, a liberal interpretation was war-
ranted. See In re I.C.C. Management Services S.A., (non-publ.) (July 7, 1984); In re
Banque des Depots et des Gestions, BG (unpubl.) (March 7, 1984). Nonetheless, the
Court has waived the requirement of a strict duplication of norms. See In re Marsman,
BG 110 I b 187 (1984); In re Cauchie, 107 I b 264 (1981); In re Cicchelero, BG 103 I a
218 (1977).
The most interesting question, and one affecting political relations between the
United States and Switzerland, arises in connection with securities fraud in the form of
insider trading, which is punishable in the United States but is not a crime in Switzer-
land or most other European countries. Insider trading is not considered fraud, nor un-
faithful management, nor a false business declaration. The problem arises when United
States citizens, having insider information buy or sell securities using Swiss banks, and
when discovered hide behind the Swiss bank secrecy laws. See Schueizerisches
Bankgesetz, art. 47, 1934 A.S. 10 I 337, 71 1808, RS 952.0.
A United States district court has ordered a Swiss bank to disclose the names of its
clients to the Securites and Exchange Commission, despite the fact that such a disclos-
ure might subject the bank to criminal sanctions under Swiss law, because the court
found that the bank had purchased American securities in bad faith. SEC v. Banka della
Svizzera Italiana 92 F.R.D. 111, 1981 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,346 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
16, 1981). In ordering disclosure, the court was influenced by the fact that the bank had
executed the transaction fully expecting Swiss law to shield it from the reach of United
States securities law, and by the Swiss Government's failure to either object to the dis-
covery or suggest that it be halted. Id. at 119. The court stated that it would be a trav-
esty of justice to permit a foreigner to invade American markets, violate its law, with-
draw profits and resist accountability for himself and his principals by illegally claiming
their anonymity under foreign law. Id.
If, by virtue of this controversial judgment, a request for judicial assistance in crimi-
nal matters is made under the United States-Switzerland Extradition Treaty of 1900, see
infra note 26, and in accordance with the IMAC, the United States would not have to
show probable cause that the inside information, and the resulting illicit gain, would
come under one of the offenses mentioned above and covered under the Swiss Penal
Code, because probable cause is not required under Swiss law. In In re Santa Fe, BG 109
I b 47 (1983), however, the Court initially had to deny assistance because insider trading
is not punishable in Switzerland. Elements of fact could possibly have been covered
under "unfaithful management," Schueizerisches Strafgesetzbuch (STGB), art. 159, A.S.
3/203, RS 311, "fraud," STGB, art. 148, or a "violation of business secrets." STGB, art.
162, provided that the insider had passed the information to a "tippee," who had com-
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because of the different systems of law, but also because of differing
meanings in languages.
There is no doubt that the procedure of extradition requires a
grave offense.11 What is considered a grave offense in one country,
however, might be considered quite trivial in another. Arab countries,
for example, have considered the "violation of a harem" or "drinking
in public" grave offenses while some Latin American countries insist
upon the extradition of bigamists. Because international law has no es-
tablished yardstick as to the gravity of an offense, the simple solution
appears to be to let the requested State make the determination as to
gravity. Some scholars and judges, however, view this as a position,
which is too unilateral and one which results in a potential violation of
the obligation to surrender."
pleted the transaction. All the above was considered insufficient by the Court in its first
examination of the Santa Fe case. It was only when a second request was made by the
United States, alleging a violation of business secrets and a passing of such information,
that the Court granted assistance. In re Santa Fe, BG (unpubl.) (Nov. 30, 1983).
American legal opinion has not been as strict concerning dual criminality. See
George, supra note 3, wherein Professor George suggests that requiring too strict a
double criminality standard would inhibit the usefulness of international treaties. In-
stead, Professor George advocates a relative analysis. European opinion originally re-
jected this line of thought but has gradually come to accept it. Thus, although the ECE
in article 1 is very explicit, the European Convention on Assistance in Criminal Matters,
art. 1, para. 1, BBI 1966 I 457/75, RS 351.1, enacted only two years later, speaks only of
offenses which are punishable under the law of the requesting country. Switzerland, al-
though adhering to that Convention, made a reservation as to punishability. The main
reason for the stricter rule may be the lack of a probable cause examination, and satis-
faction with the formal correctness of a request and its assertion of an offense to be
investigated.
The Court has adopted the American approach in In re Schulte, BG (unpubl.) (Nov.
4, 1984), and In re Chevarria Garcia, BG 110 I b 173 (1984). The Court has been more
liberal in granting requests for judicial assistance and more strict in extradition requests.
In two of the most recent insider trading cases, the Court upheld judicial assistance. See
In re Musella, BG (unpubl.) (July 16, 1985); In re Chiaramonte & Rapaport (Ellis A.G.),
BG (unpubl.) (Oct. 3, 1985).
The German Extradition and rlssistance Law, para. 3, BGBI 1982 2071 explicitly
allows a liberal interpretation by granting extradition if the offense is punishable under
German law or if it is punishable according to the sense of the law. Accord United
States-Italy Extradition Treaty, art. 2.
An interesting example concerning terminology appears in the differing definitions
of "larceny" under Swiss and German law. Under the German penal code, theft is de-
fined as "taking a mobile thing with an intent to wrongfully appropriate." STGB, para.
242. The Swiss penal code, however, defines theft as "taking a mobile thing in order to
wrongfully enrich oneself." STBG, art. 137. Hence, Switzerland would not extradite a
German "thief" who had enriched a third person and not himself in Germany, because
the elements of fact are not sufficient to establish dual criminality.
11. See infra PART Two § I, C and accompanying text.
12. In Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933), the Supreme Court of the United
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To some extent the problem has been solved in the past simply by
listing the extraditable offenses. The United States has always adhered
to this rule."' Domestic laws have also tended toward enumerating the
offenses in question.1 4 Italy, for instance, has tried to combine the enu-
meration with a system of exclusion, 5 which eliminates those offenses
that are non-extraditable. Most modern agreements and treaties, in-
cluding the IMAC,1 s stipulate only those offenses with maximum sanc-
States affirmed the reversal of a decision of the District Court for Northern District of
Illinois which had applied British law (the requesting country) because the offense of
receiving money fraudulently obtained was unknown in the Illinois criminal laws. The
Supreme Court's decision was highly criticized as being too liberal an interpretation of
the treaty and as too easily overriding technical considerations.
13. See, e.g., Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, United
States-Great Britain, 8 Stat. 116, T.S. No. 105; Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, Aug.
9, 1842, United States-Great Britain, 8 Stat. 572, T.S. No. 119; Extradition Convention,
July 12, 1889, United States-Great Britain, art. I, 26 Stat. 1508, T.S. No. 139; Extradi-
tion Treaty, Dec. 22, 1931, United States-Great Britain, art. III, 47 Stat. 2122, T.S. No.
849; Treaty for the Extradition of Criminals, May 14, 1900, United States-Switzerland,
art. II, 31 Stat. 1928, T.S. No. 354 - The Extradition Treaty of 1900 between the United
States and Switzerland listed murder, arson, robbery, counterfeiting, forgery, alteration,
embezzlement by public officials and salaried employees, larceny, obtaining money by
false pretenses, receiving stolen, embezzled and fraudently obtained goods (at a mini-
mum of 1000 francs), fraud, breach of trust, perjury, abduction, rape, kidnapping of mi-
nors, bigamy, abortion and willful destruction of a vessel, as extraditable offenses. Id. at
art. II.
14. See, e.g., British Extradition Act of 1870, 24 & 33 Vict., ch. 52, sched. 1. By
Order-in-Council the British system is to extend this act to all countries with which a
treaty has been entered. Thus, the British avoided the difficulty by listing in the act
offenses for which extradition can be sought. Treaties could not expand this list. The old
1892 Swiss extradition law enumerated extraditable offenses and maintained this rule in
reservations to various treaties and conventions. See infra note 16.
15. In the Extradition Treaty of 1868, Switzerland-Italy, 1868 BBI III 448, certain
offenses that were unpunishable in Switzerland, such as associazione per delinquere
(qualified conspiracy) if committed by three or more persons and preceeding the com-
mission of a crime, became extradictable.
Although the ECE has abandoned the enumeration system, Italy, a signator of the
ECE, in its domestic law, refers to crimes subject to extradition which are not enumer-
ated and not excluded elsewhere. C.P. art. 13, para. 2, 28 Gaz. Uff. X 253 (1938). The
United States-Italy Extradition Treaty of 1983, Oct. 13, 1983, art. II, No. 225 Gaz. Uff.
(1984) permits extradition for more than one offense, if one of the offenses is punishable
by imprisonment of one year or more. The other offenses, though extraditable, are
minor.
16. The enumeration system is now obsolete. Although prior treaties did enumerate
offenses, nearly all modern international accords and municipal laws specify the severity
of punishment for the crime, mainly imprisonment of one year or more, as controlling.
See, e.g., Bundesgesctz 6ber Auslieferung and Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen, para. 11(1),
1979 BGBI 529 (incarceration of more than one year in both countries); Loi relatif A
l'extradition des estrangers, art. 4, 1927 J.O. No. 2068 (punishment of the act in the
requesting country and incarceration for at least two years in France); ECE, supra note
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tions, thus eliminating all other offenses.
4, art. 2, para. 1:
Extradition shall be granted in respect of offenses punishable under the
laws of the requesting Party and of the requested Party by deprivation of liberty
or under a detention order for a maximum period of at least one year or by a
more severe penalty. Where a conviction and prison sentence have occurred or a
detention order has been made in the territory of the requesting Party, the pun-
ishment awarded must have been for a period of at least four months.
Id. If a request has been made for more than one offense, one of which is not extradita-
ble under article 2, the requesting Party is provided a faculative right to extradite for a
lesser offense. Id. at para. 2. Any signatory, however, may exclude such a lesser offense
from extradition. Id. Article 2 further permits any Convention signatory to make reser-
vations listing the offenses that such signatory wishes to consider extraditable. Id. at
para. 4. In fact, Switzerland had always adhered to the system of enumeration-see
Swiss Extradition Law of 1892, 3 Bundessammlung (BS) 509 (abrogated). The enumera-
tive system had an important restrictive effect in that it made crimes not extraditable,
even on basis of reciprocity, if these crimes were not explicitly enumerated. See PONcET
& NEYROUD, supra note 6, at 21. When ratifying the ECE, Switzerland made certain
reservations, BBI 1976 319, and as an annex to these reservations, enumerated all of-
fenses extraditable in accordance with the then still valid 1892 extradition law. The an-
nex lists the commission, the attempted commission or being an accomplice to the com-
mission of the following offenses:
Offenses Against Persons: Voluntary homicide with premeditation, volun-
tary or culpable homicide. Infanticide and abortion. Exposure or abandonment
of children and defenseless persons. Injuries resulting in death or lasting infir-
mity or inability to work for 20 days or more. Participation in an affray with
that result. Mistreatment of parents by their issue and vice-versa or by persons
under whose authority the children had been placed.
Offenses Against Freedom of Persons and Family Rights: Abduction by
force, menace or fraud. Unlawful restraint, kidnapping of minors. Violation of
domicile. Menacing to attack persons or property. Falsification or destruction of
documents regarding a civil status.
Offenses Against Morality: Rape, indecent assault by force or against a de-
fenseless or mentally incapacitated person. Indecent acts on children or on any-
one under the offender's care. Corruption of minors by parents, guardians or
others entrusted with their care. Professional procuring and trafficking in women
and children. Acts of indecency resulting in a public scandal. Incest. Bigamy.
Offenses Against Property: Piracy, extortion, theft and receiving stolen
goods. Misappropriation and breach of trust. Willful damage to property. False
pretenses, fraudulent bankruptcy, and fraud in connection thereof.
Offenses Against the Public Faith: Counterfeiting or forging coin, money,
stamps, bonds, shares, other securities issued by the government or corporations
or individuals. Introduction and issuing into circulation thereof with intent to
defraud. Forgery of seals and misuse thereof. Forgery of documents and using of
such documents with the intent to defraud. Misuse of blank-signed paper or
moving boundary signs, with intent to defraud.
Offenses Causing a Public Danger: Arson, misuse of explosives, flooding by
intent or gross negligence. Destroying railroads and damaging thereof, intention-
ally or by gross negligence, also steamboats, postal and electrical installations
and equipment with the intent to endanger their use for the public or individu-
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In addition to prosecuting a suspect for an offense, extradition
laws and treaties also contain the conditions for extraditing a convicted
offender. The sentence pronounced, however, must be of some gravity.
als. Acts liable to ground a boat or destroy it. Spreading of contagious diseases
by intent or gross negligence. Impairing of springs, wells or other resources en-
dangering the public. Intentional adulteration and imitation of foodstuff endan-
gering human health or animal health. Selling such foodstuffs concealing their
harm. Drug trafficking if punishable by imprisonment.
Offenses Against the Administration of Justice: False accusation. Perjury
or misrepresentation under solemn promise. False evidence, false expertise, false
translation. Subordination of witnesses, experts and interpreters.
Offenses Concerning the Exercise of Official Duties: Bribery of officials, ju-
rors, arbitrators and experts. Misappropriation and extortion by public officials.
Abuse of authority as a result of such bribery or with fraudulent intent. Destruc-
tion of postal matters and violation of postal secrets by Post Office employees.
Sec. 154 of the Fed. Act of Sept. 23, 1953 [1967 A.S 319, RS 170.32]. Shipping
under Swiss flag provides extradition for offenses under that Act that are pun-
ishable by one year or more in jail, such as intentional or negligent acts, thus
endangering vessel, shipping, etc., failure to give assistance, abandonment of ves-
sel in peril, abuse of authority, drunkenness, disobedience, smuggling, misuse of
flag, registration, fraud and improper transfer.
Swiss Reservations to the ECE, 1967 BBI 319.
Upon filing these reservations, Switzerland had no obligation to surrender suspects
for offenses not listed therein. The IMAC replaced the enumeration of offenses with the
general maxim stipulated in article 35, which permits extradition for offenses punishable
by deprivation of liberty of one year or more. IMAC, supra note 1, art. 35. An additional
limit set by the IMAC regards the importance of the offense as such. See infra PART ONE
§ III, C. It may be debated that the list annexed to the reservations has not automati-
cally been superceded by the IMAC. This does not appear to be the case, however, be-
cause the ECE is an international obligation while the IMAC is a voluntary measure; a
matter of pure comity. To what extent an individual may be affected is, of course, an-
other matter which will be discussed in PaT ONE § II, C. The message of the Federal
Council reporting the draft to Parliament, 1976 BB1 .033, does not explicitly cover the
matter.
In In re Miller, BG 107 Ib 274 (1981), the Court decision was in favor of extradition
if there was suspicion of drug trafficking, irrespective of whether the crime was men-
tioned in the treaty. See also In re Grosby, BG 97 I b 372 (1971).
The Second Additional Protocol to the ECE of April 1978, opened for signature as
of March 17, 1978, extends extradition to "offenses which are subject only to pecuniary
sanctions." Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition,
Mar. 17, 1978, -ch. 1, art. 1, Europ. T.S. No. 98 (1978) [hereinafter ECE Second Protocol].
Individual suspects would then have no protection if the requested country decided to
grant extradition upon a request from abroad. This protocol has been ratified by most of
the ECE signatories. Switzerland is one of these signatories but with a reservation as to
article 2, regarding fiscal matters, and effective June 1, 1985.
If execution or extradition is requested for a pronounced final sentence, it is up to
the requested State to choose. Whatever decision is made, however, the requesting State
must clearly assert what portion of the sentence remains to be served, and this may
influence the decision. See In re Bonascossa, BG (unpubl.) (June 19, 1984).
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Thus, the ECE stipulates for a minimum of four months imprison-
ment,1 7 while the IMAC speaks simply of any sanction with depriva-
tion of liberty. s The principle is laid down in article 94 of the IMAC,
whereby final and enforceable criminal judgments rendered in another
jurisdiction may be executed in Switzerland under certain conditions,
for example residence in Switzerland or practicability.' If these condi-
tions do not exist, however, then extradition applies by argumentum
ex contrario.
D. Probable Cause
United States law requires a certificate of probable cause by a
judge associated with the executive authority authorizing the surren-
der.2 0 Such a certification, is based upon facts constituting a prima fa-
cie case. In Europe, on the other hand, with the exception of Great
Britain, a prima facie case is not required.21 This often creates conflicts
because Europeans-following Roman law in this respect-have no
counterpart to the probable cause requirement of the Anglo-Saxon ex-
tradition law. European petitions thus must withstand an examination
of the facts presented, whereas American or British requests are not so
examined.2 2 The underlying reason for the different approach most
probably lies in the concept of absolute sovereignty, the degree of con-
fidence or its lack thereof in the allegations of the foreign authority,
and the greater respect for the rights of the individual by the Anglo-
Saxon system of law. In Europe, except in England, the individual has
very little protection against arbitrary allegations by a government offi-
cial-unless he is a national of the requested country; then he gener-
ally enjoys "immunity"-emanating from abroad.
This great difference in approach to individual rights played an
important part in negotiations for a new Italian-United States Extradi-
tion Treaty of 1983, in which, during the course of combatting interna-
tional and organized criminality, the United States "caved in" to de-
mands by the Italians to waive the probable cause requirement, in
order to gain some kind of compromise between a judicial certification
and a simple allegation by prosecuting authorities. The result was a
17. ECE, supra note 4, art. 2(1).
18. IMAC, supra note 1, art. 32.
19. Id. art 94, paras. a - c.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982).
21. See the Treaty for Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals, Nov. 26, 1880, Great
Britain-Switzerland, 157 Parry's T.S. 214, in which Switzerland acceded to the Anglo-
Saxon requirement of probable cause.
22. This possible dilemma is referred to in the Message of the Federal Council re-
garding the Swiss Extradiction Law of 1892. 1890 BBI III 360.
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statement of facts, "pertinent evidence" and conclusions furnishing a
"reasonable base" to believe that the individual had committed the of-
fense. Thus, it appears that no judicial certification is required for sur-
render; instead, the "magistrate's word" is taken.23 It is now the sus-
23. The Swiss Supreme Federal Court in Fiorini v. Federal Public Ministry, BG 101 I
592 (1975), declined to examine the facts and stated that a petition would be rejected
only for obvious mistakes, thus changing the burden of proof. Under the IMAC, a re-
quest is refused "if tainted with grave defects." IMAC, supra note 1, art. 2, para. d. The
Swiss Court will examine only concrete criminality. See In re Herren, 57 BG 1 15 (1931).
Professor Hans Schultz supports this standard of review. See SCHULTZ, supra note 6, at
234; contra, 1 GOGGENHEIM, supra note 3, at 325.
In In re Panamex, BG 109 I b 158 (1983), the Swiss Federal Supreme Court rejected
the necessity of examining criminal qualifications of facts presented in the request, ac-
cording to United States law. The Court only allows such an examination when there is
an obvious error or contradictory statement. See In re Chiaramonte & Rapaport (Ellis
AG), BG (unpubl.) (Oct. 3, 1985). The Court has also ruled that a suspect's guilt is not a
matter to be examined by Swiss authorities, rather this is to be reserved for the prose-
cuting or judicial authorities of the requesting State. See In re Federici, BG 109 I b 60
(1983). The exception is set forth in article 53 of the IMAC, i.e., when the suspect asserts
an unequivocal and uncontested alibi. IMAC, supra note 1, art. 53. The Court has af-
firmed this exception, irrespective of the ECE. See In re Gelli, BG 109 I b 367 (1983).
For a discussion of the scope of examination, see, e.g., In re Schlegel, BG 101 I a 610
(1975) (limits examination to determine whether requesting documents allege an extra-
ditable offense; In re Leoment, BG 103 I a 326 (1977) (proof of personal identity is a
matter of due course); In re Hornig, BG 88 I 37 (1962) (request rejected only because of
an obvious error).
Requests often need not be accompanied by evidence. See, e.g., In re Charles Mc-
Vey-Credit Suisse, BG (unpubl.) (Feb. 8, 1984); In re Gutzwiler, BG (unpubl.) (Jan. 11,
1984); In re Schlumpf, BG 106 Ia 260 (1980); In re Sternberg, BG 103 Ia 210 (1977). The
Court also often refuses to examine the nature of foreign prosecution. See In re Kruell,
BG (Unpubl.) (May 11, 1984) (waives examination as to whether foreign law requires
prosecution upon a complaint only, or whether such prosecution takes place ex officio);
In re Marsman, BG 110 I b 187 (1984) (waives examination of defaults in foreign prose-
cution intended to be initiated after surrender); see also In re Knevels, BG (unpubl.)
(Mar. 7, 1984); In re Baskaya, BG 109 1 b 164 (1983); In re Interdean, BG 107 lb 254
(1984).
The Court has held that neither details of the offense nor the facts of the case need
be examined. See In re Meyro, BG (unpubl.) (Oct. 24, 1984). In In re Beck, BG (unpubl.)
(Nov. 26, 1984), the Court went so far as to state that a suspect's knowledge or ignorance
regarding the illicit origin of fraudulently obtained funds was irrelevant. See also In re
Amos Calmasini, BG (unpubl.) (Mar. 14, 1985). In In re Trust and Investment (arndt),
BG (unpubl.) (Mar. 18, 1985), although the Court declined to examine questions of
United States law in granting judicial assistance to the United States, the Court indi-
cated that it would not be so generous if it were confronted with a request for extradi-
tion. The Court has declined to discuss the purpose of the request as long as there is an
allegation of a criminal act and the intent by a foreign sovereign to initiate a criminal
proceeding. See In re Gelbard, BG (unpubl.) (Feb. 20, 1985). (Feb. 20, 1985). See also In
re Macchara Seamus, BG (unpubl.) (Oct. 31, 1984) (possession of explosives need not be
proved by Ireland and the intent of an illicit use thereof is assumed, hence a suspect
[Vol. 6
SWISS ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION
pect that must prove that he is innocent, as has been the rule on the
European Continent. There, as in Switzerland, the only proof admitted
is the physical absence from the scene of the crime-an alibi.2 4
must prove a contrary intent because possession alone is not an extraditable offense).
Accord Deutsches Rechtshilfe Gesetz, para. 10, 1982 BGBI 2071 (no proof necessary,
only an assertion of an offense by a foreign prosecuting authority is sufficient).
In 1987, the Fourth Congress of the Association of Jurists, Italy-United States-Swit-
zerland adopted a resolution calling for a revised treaty between the United States and
Italy (the Swiss representatives abstained) and especially called for a modification of
article V requiring "probable cause" for extradition. United States-Italy Extradition
Treaty, Oct. 9, 1975, art. V, No. 632, 1975 Gaz. Uff. This probable cause requirement was
revised in the 1983 extradition treaty between Italy and the United States. United
States-Italy Extradition Treaty, Oct. 13, 1983, art. X, No. 225, 1984 Gaz. Uff. Article X
calls for a request with documentation of the identity of the person, a statement of facts,
available proof and conclusions furnishing reasonable grounds to believe that the offense
was committed by the suspect. This statement must be made by the prosecuting author-
ity. Article X could be termed a modified probable cause clause because some proof is
still required, possibly more than prima facie evidence. Italy applied this requirement in
denying extradition of the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization gang which
killed the crippled American, Leon Klinghoffer, while seizing the Achille Lauro in Octo-
ber 1985. There has been, as yet, no case concerning an Italian request for extradition to
the United States that has been examined by the United States courts.
The distinguished Italian Scholar Professor Paolo Mengozzi has written an excellent
commentary on the new United States-Italian Treaty, especially with regard to the prob-
able cause and prima facie requirements. Mengozzi, Rassegna dei Trattati Internazion-
ali de Interesse Privatissimo, 8 LE NuovE LEGGI CIVILI COMMENTATE 610 (1985). The
"due process clause" rule formerly required of the certification, that there exist a proba-
ble cause to believe that the offense had been committed by the individual over whom
extradition was sought. Thus, the Italian authorities were unable to reciprocate upon a
United States request. Solely for reasons of better combatting international crime, ter-
rorism and organized crime operations, including drug trafficking, the United States
Government was prepared to modify the clause. Mengozzi cites the fact that, in the ten
years preceeding 1981, the United States granted three requests for extradition, whereas
Italy conceded 90 requests. The new treaty was supposed to bring a drastic change.
According to Mengozzi, to whose opinion most Italian lawyers adhere, the probable
cause requirement under article V of the old United States-Italian extradition treaty has
been replaced by article X of the new treaty. Mengozzi interprets the causa probabile
under United States law when the United States is the requested State as being replaced
by the prima facie evidence required under Italian law. Mengozzi, however, expresses
doubts as to the correct interpretation and application of Italian jurisprudence by
United States courts. The sponsors of the resolution, adopted by the Fourth Congress of
the Association of Jurists, see supra, apparently had other ideas. It appears that they did
not sufficiently consider basic American rules, which could hardly have been modified.
The "reasonable ground to believe" that the suspect to be surrendered has in fact com-
mitted the offense, which still must be certified by the judge, is certainly somewhat less
than a "probable cause" showing. The idea that an Italian prosecuting officer would re-
place the United States judicial authority seems far-fetched. Who is presenting the re-
quest for extradition seems less relevant than who ultimately decides the request.
Mengozzi, supra at 618.
24. See IMAC, supra note 1, art. 53 (when an alibi is presented, an investigation is
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II. DOMESTIC LAWS-TREATIES-CONVENTIONS
A. Obligation and Comity
Domestic or municipal laws governing extradition exist in nearly
all countries today. These laws set forth the conditions for the surren-
der of an illeged offender. In some countries the rules are enacted as
part of a code.25 Because adherence to domestic laws is a matter of
comity, these laws impose no obligation on the requested State to ex-
tradite, nor do they confer a right to demand extradition and interna-
tional cooperation. Such rights are exclusively conferred by treaties or
conventions.26 The general rule is that multilateral conventions prevail
necessary); In re Sifoni, BG 109 IV 174 (1983). See also In re Zahn, BG 109 I b 174
(1983) (the Court discusses ex officio examination of alibi); In re Gabardi, BG (unpubl.)
(Mar. 6, 1984); In re Zaka Ullah, BG (unpubl.) (Feb. 22, 1984) (proof of physical ab-
sence); In re Beck, BG (unpubl.) (Nov. 26, 1984) (no proof of physical absence in case of
bribery).
25. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982); Codice Penale (C.P.) art. 13, in conjunction with
Codice di procedura penale (C.P.P.) art. 661; Deutsches Rechtshilfe Gesetz, 1982 BGB1
2071 (W. Ger.); Bundesgesetz uber Auslieferung und Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen, 1979
BGB1 529 (Aus.); British Extradition Act of 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 52; IMAC, supra
note 1.
26. Switzerland has concluded 23 treaties of extradition listed hereunder:
Agreement: Supplement to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance on Crime,
Nov. 13, 1969, Switzerland-Germany 1977 BBI 97 RS. 351.913.61; Convention for Extra-
dition of Criminals, Nov. 21, 1906, Switzerland-Argentina, 12 A.S. 59, RS. 353.915.4, 203
Parry's T.S. 147; Extradition Treaty, July 23, 1932, Switzerland-Brazil, 12 A.S. 77, RS.
353.919.8, 145 League of Nations Treaty Series [L.N.T.S.] 167; Treaty of Peace, Estab-
lishment and Commerce and Extradition Convention, Oct. 30, 1883, Switzerland-Salva-
dor, 12 A.S. 77, RS. 353.932.3, 162 Parry's T.S. 475; Treaty of Extradition and Judicial
Assistance in Criminal Matters, Nov. 19, 1937, Switzerland-Poland, 12 A.S. 207, RS.
353.364.9, 195 L.N.T.S. 297; Extradition Convention, Nov. 17, 1873, Switzerland-Russia,
12 A.S. 251 RS. 33.977.2, 146 Parry's T.S. 455; Extradition Treaty, Feb. 27, 1923, Swit-
zerland-Uruguay, 12 A.S. 258, RS. 353.977.6, 63 L.N.T.S. 207; Extradition Treaty, Nov.
28, 1887, Switzerland-Yugoslavia, 12 A.S. 149, RS. 353.981.8; Exchange: Extradition,
Sept. 21, 1965, Switzerland-Uganda, 1966 A.S. 931, RS. 353.96.8. Exchange: Extradition,
Nov. 28, 1955, Switzerland-Pakistan, 1955 A.S. 1146, RS. 353.962.3; Exchange: Extradi-
tion Under 1874 Belgian-Swiss Convention, June 30, 1971, Switzerland-Rwanda, 1971
A.S. 1813, RS. 353.966.7; Exchange: Extradition, Sept. 28, 1967, Switzerland-Tanzania,
1968 A.S. 163, RS. 353.973.2. Agreement: Completion of 1959 European Convention on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 13, 1972, Switzerland-Austria, 1974 A.S.
1997, RS. 353.916.31. Extradition Convention, May 13, 1874, Switzerland-Belgium, 12
BBI.196, RS. 353.917.2, 147 Parry's T.S. 455; Treaty of Amity, Establishment and Com-
merce and Provisional Extradition Arrangement, June 22, 1888, Switzerland-Equador, 12
BBI. 94 RS. 353.932.7 171 Parry's T.S. 95; Extradition Treaty, August 31, 1883, Switzer-
land-Spain, 12 BBI. 229, RS. 353.933.2; Extradition Treaty, May 14, 1900, Switzerland-
United States, 12 BBI. 267, RS. 353.933.6, 11 U.S.T. 904, [hereinafter United States-
Switzerland Extradition Treaty of 1900]; Extradition Convention, July 9, 1869, Switzer-
land-France, 12 BBl. 96, RS. 353.934.9 Parry's T.S. 377; Treaty for the Mutual Surrender
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over treaties, and treaties prevail over domestic laws."7
of Fugitive Criminals, Nov. 26, 1880, Switzerland-Great Britain, 12 BB. 114, RS.
353.936.7 157 Parry's T.S. 213 [hereinafter Great Britain-Switzerland Extradition Treaty
of 1880; Extradition Treaty, Mar. 10, 1896, Switzerland-Austria-Hungary, 12 BBI. 184,
RS. 353.941.8, 182 Parry's T.S. 336; Extradition Convention, Dec. 10, 1885, Switzerland-
Monaco, 12 A.S. 168, RS. 353.956.7 167 Parry's T.S. 73; Extradition Convention, June 30,
1906, Switzerland-Paraguay, 12 A.S. 199, RS. 353.963.2 202 Parry's T.S. 127; Extradition
Convention, Oct. 30, 1873, Switzerland-Portugal, 12 A.S. 216, RS. 353.965.4 146 Parry's
T.S. 437.
Several agreements have been concluded between Switzerland and successor coun-
tries to some of the original signatories to the above treaties, like the Fiji Islands, Fid-
schi, Ireland, Mandates of Africa (for Great Britain) Jordan, Solomon Islands, Indonesia,
New Guinea (Great Britain) and a few African countries (France). The only convention
to which Switzerland is a signatory is the ECE.
27. The IMAC states: "[P]rovided that international agreements do not provide oth-
erwise, this act shall govern all procedures of international cooperation in criminal mat-
ters ...... IMAC, supra note 1, art. 1. The ECE provides:
1. This Convention shall, in respect of those countries to which it applies,
supersede the provisions 'of any bilateral treaties, conventions or agreements
governing extradition between any two contracting Parties.
2. The contracting Parties may conclude between themselves bilateral
agreements only in order to supplement the provisions of this Convention or to
facilitate the application of the principles contained therein.
3. Where, as between two or more contracting Parties, extradition takes
place on the basis of a uniform law, the Parties shall be free to regulate their
mutual relations in respect of extradition exclusively in accordance with such a
system notwithstanding the provision of this Convention ....
ECE, supra note 4, art. 28. This general rule permits a signatory to go beyond what it is
obligated to concede under an agreement, but never to concede less.
For a discussion of the rule that treaties supercede municpal law, see SCHULTZ, supra
note 6, at 134; A. BILLOT, TRAITRt DE L'ExTRADMON 123 (1874); F. VON MARTITZ, INTER-
NATIONALE RECHTSHILFE 525 (1897).
Regarding decisions by the Swiss Court giving treaties precedence over municipal
law, see In re Maurel, BG 109 I b 165 (1983); In re Grosby BG 97 I 387 (1971); In re
Gilette, BG 91 1 127 (1965); In re Ktir, BG 87 1 134 (1961). The Court has given Swiss
authorities the right to take measures outside a treaty if there is no apparent conflict
between the treaty and the municipal law, or if the municipal law provides for more
concessions to the requesting State. See In re Miller, BG 107 I b 276 (1981). The latter
rule is limited to assistance and does not apply to extradition requests; however, even in
cases of assistance, the rule appears controversial. See de Capitani, Internationale
Reehtshilfe-eine Standortsbeshimmung, 100 ZErrsCHNFr FBR SCHWEIZENSCHEs RECHT
384 (1981). Clearly, though, the IMAC can supplement a treaty if that treaty is silent on
a given matter, notwithstanding the preeminent status of the treaty. See In re Gutzuiler,
BG (unpubl.) (1984). Likewise, the IMAC will control when there is no applicable treaty.
See In re I.C.C. Management Service S.A. BG (unpubl.) (Mar. 7, 1984); In re Chabbah,
BG (unpubl.) (Apr. 17, 1985).
In some States treaties are self-executing. See, e.g., Bundesgesctz fier Auslieferung
und Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen, para. 1, 1979 BGBI 529 (Aus.). Compare the "Austrian
theory" established by Lammasch, H. LAMMASCH, AUSLIEFERUNGPFLICHT UND ASYLRECHT
614 (1887) with the principle: "A treaty may limit the commitment to extradite, but
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B. Reciprocity
Reciprocity is really a contract involving a particular case of extra-
dition, and as a result there are no definite rules of reciprocity with
regard to extradition laws. The notion that sovereignty demands an
assurance of equal treatment by the requesting country in the future,
prior to granting extradition, is long obsolete. Extradition is not an in-
strument of political power but one of judiciary decision. The assis-
tance given to a foreign State, although primarily in the interest of
that State, is no longer a sacrifice for the requested State. Therefore,
reciprocity loses its meaning, as far as the judicial process is con-
cerned.2 8 Hence, unless a treaty provides otherwise Switzerland does
not require a reciprocity when it grants assistance to a requesting
state."
never the right to do so." This principle offers no protection whatsoever to the individual
but soley stipulates the right and obligation of sovereign States to each other.
France is not explicit in its law; it simply determines the application of the law when
no treaty exists. See Loi relatif A l'extradition des etrangers, art. 1, 1927 J.O. No. 2068:
"En absence de traite, les conditions, la procedure et les effets de l'extradition sont
determines par les dispositions de la present loi."
28. Schultz, quotes the old maxim adopted by the Institute of International Law at
Oxford in 1880, article 5: "[T]he condition of reciprocity ... may be governed by poli-
cies, it is not required by justice." Traditional Extradition Law, supra note 8, at 10. The
idea of equality among contracting States might well play a role in deciding upon a re-
quest for reciprocity when such a request for extradition is made and when no treaty
exists. An obligation undertaken by Switzerland is based upon that idea. See PONCET &
NEYROUD, supra note 6, at 27. A declaration of reciprocity does not, however, confer a
right to grant extradition; the grant of extradition must be compatible with Swiss law,
irrespective of any declaration of reciprocity or a government's acceptance thereof. See
In re Zahabian, BG 89 I 200 (1963).
29. Under the IMAC: "As a rule, a request shall be granted only if the requesting
State guarantees reciprocity." IMAC, supra note 1, art. 8. This article of the IMAC in no
way confers upon an individual the right to demand denial of the request for extradition
to a country not guaranteeing reciprocity. This problem might arise in cases of extradi-
tion proceedings brought by countries with whom Switzerland has no agreements (trea-
ties or co-signatories of conventions), expecially if the political system differs from that
of (Western orientated) Switzerland. As far as countries that extradite only on the basis
of a treaty, like Benelux or Anglo-Saxon countries, it is doubtful whether reciprocal ar-
rangements can be made at all. Such agreements are concluded with treaty partners. See,
e.g., Supplemental Treaty, Switzerland-Great Britain, AS 51/450 (1935) on certain tech-
nical and legal problems in the procedure. In the treaty with Great Britain, Switzerland
reserved the right to deny a request for the extradition of Swiss nationals. Britain did
not reserve such a right and, in fact, will surrender its own subjects. When presented
with a request for extradition from Switzerland, Britain will apply the rule of probable
cause. In other words, reciprocity is no ius cogens and Switzerland could extradite with-
out it. See PoNcar & NEYROUD, supra note 6, at 27 n.34. The lack of reciprocity is rele-
vant, however, with regard to the concept of a political crime. See In re Morlacchi, BG
101 I a 602 (1975). United States law explicitly conditions extradition upon a treaty, and
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In the ECE, the principle of reciprocity appears respected in arti-
cle 2, paragraph 7 and article 26, paragraph 3. 0 *
This is not to say that Switzerland will not be interested in receiv-
ing assurances of reciprocity from other countries with regard to the
interpretation of fiscal and political offenses, inasmuch as they may be
the subject of judicial assistance in the future. Professor Hans Schultz,
in his treatise La Convention Europ~enne, believes that reciprocity
also applies to the interpretation of terms like "political," "military,"
"fiscal offense;" and that Switzerland can and ought to demand a guar-
anty from the requesting State that a term in question be equally in-
terpreted by that State in the future upon a Swiss request. 1 The fail-
does not require or allow extradition outside the specific dictates of an applicable treaty,
whether that treaty is reciprocal or not. See Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker,
299 U.S. 5 (1936).
The German and Austrian extradition laws are similar to article 8 of the IMAC. See
DEUrSCHEs RECHTSHILFE GESETZ, § 5, 1982 BGBI 2071; BUNDEGESETZ 6BER AUSLIEFERUNG
UND RECHTSHILFE IN STRAFSACHEN, para. 5, 1979 BGBI 529.
30. "Any Party may apply reciprocity of any offenses excluded from the application
of the convention under this article" ECE, supra note 4, art. 2, para. 17 (referring to
extraditable offenses): "A contracting Party which has made a reservation in respect of a
provision of the Convention may not claim application of the said provision by another
Party save in so far as it has itself accepted the provision." Id. art. 26, para. 3. Thus,
States that, do not require reciprocity under their own domestic law, are able to extra-
dite without such reciprocity. They are, however, not obligated to do so in the absence of
such provision.
31. The request for such assurance of reciprocity has a valid purpose for the applica-
tion of extradition for offenses that may or may not be excluded, according to the inter-
pretation of the legal elements of the offense. There may be an interest in assuring that
the requesting state will behave likewise in the future. A Swiss declaration of reciprocity
has thus been given to Austria on certain matters of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Ex-
change of Notes, Austria-Switzerland, 42 A.S. 172, 1767 BBI II 249-50 (1926). The partic-
ular offense may not be in the treaty, or the signatories of the treaty might not agree on
the terminology of a certain offense, its legal qualifications or its factual elements. Swit-
zerland will make such declarations on the basis of its Constitution, Bundesverfassung
[B. Verf], art. 102, para. 8 (Switz.), imposing upon the Federal Council the duty to pro-
tect Swiss interests in foreign affairs. The 1892 extradition law empowered the Federal
Council to give such declarations even in case of a treaty, provided such treaty did not
enumerate the offenses. 1892 Extradition Law, BS 3/509 art. 1, para. 2 (abrogated). But
see United States-Switzerland Extradition Treaty of 1900, supra note 26. This restric-
tion no longer exists under IMAC; the debates on the limits of State power in this re-
spect are thus eliminated. See W. BURCKHARDT, KOMMENTAR DER SCHWEIZERISCHEN
BUNDESVERFASSUNG 657 (1931); GUGGENHEIM, supra note 3, at 64; 2 J. BERNARD, TRIT
THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE L'EXTRADITION 65-66 (1890); A. BILLOT, TRAITE DE
L'EXTRADITION, 302 (1874). Nonetheless, even with the IMAC's authority, it is questiona-
ble whether the Federal Council could adversely affect individual rights by granting reci-
procity. An offender who has escaped to a certain country relying upon an existing treaty
and its protection cannot and should not be exposed to an unexpected process and sud-
denly be confronted with a declaration of reciprocity that would lead to his extradition.
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ure to obtain such declarations on interpretations may result in the
denial of extradition even though it may be in the interest of the re-
quested State to grant it.8 2
C. Individual Rights and State Liability
Although the IMAC, in accordance with article 1, paragraph 1,
confers no rights upon a foreign country to demand judicial assistance,
it definitely provides for the ample protection of individual rights in
favor of the suspect or the convict whose extradition is being sought.
Section 2 of chapter 1 of the IMAC (exclusion of requests) and Section
2 of chapter 3 of the IMAC (protection of rights) in fact furnish the
complete "bill of rights" for his defense. 3 In view of the precedence
taken by international agreements over the IMAC, the problem arises,
In England, a reciprocal deal would be illegal if the law of the other country excludes
extradition without a treaty. See British Extradition Act of 1870, 24 & 33 Vict., ch. 52.
The United Kingdom-Switzerland Extradition Treaty of 1880, supra note 6, has been
extended and extradition may be granted only if the offense is extraditable in both coun-
tries. See 51 A.S. 450 (1935); cf. Netherlands Extradition Act of 1875, Staatsblad voor
het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [Stb.] No. 39 (1967).
32. H. SCHULTZ, LA CONVENTION EUROP1.ENE 321 (1971). This treatise was published
in Liege, Belgium, in honor of the famous lawyer Jean Constant. It seems that it is im-
possible to obtain assurances of identical interpretations of legal terms involving fiscal
offenses (and possibly other "economic offenses") because various Western democracies
have very different concepts of these terms. Compare France and Italy with Switzerland.
Likewise, it is unlikely that Western nations will agree on an identical definition of a
"political offense."
33. In Morlacchi v. FPM, 101 BG I a 602 (1975), the Swiss Supreme Federal Court
granted extradition after rejecting a political offense exception, notwithstanding the fact
that Italy would give it a different interpretation. The Court followed the rule that for-
eign law interpretation is irrelevant for an extradition request, but in effect the decision
was a waiver of reciprocal agreements for political offenses. A similar result was reached
in Milsud, BG 101 Ia 410 (1975), which concerned the unfortunate lack of reciprocity in
the examination of the factual elements of a crime, because of the failure to legislate
something like a "probable cause" test with countries that use such a test as a basic
prerequisite for extradition.
The need for a declaration of reciprocity is not so relevant in cases of judicial assis-
tance only. In In re Chavaria Garcia, BG 110 I b 173 (1984), the Court ruled that a
declaration of reciprocity does not necessarily have to be received when judicial assis-
tance and not extradition is requested. Thus, article 8, paragraph 2 of the IMAC allows
for a waiver of reciprocity. Of course, reciprocity is not needed when there is a treaty.
See In re Gelbard, BG (unpubl.) (Feb. 20, 1985) (Treaty with Argentina). In a situation
in which there is no treaty, Switzerland will insist on a declaration of reciprocity. See In
re Chebbah, BG (unpubl.) (Apr. 17, 1985). In a recent decision, however, the Court ap-
parently reversed itself by ruling that, whether or not a treaty was in effect, Switzerland
could demand a declaration of reciprocity, although it was not obliged to do so. The
suspect to be extradited may not invoke the clause. See In re Boccardi, BG (unpubl.)
(June 14, 1985).
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however, of an individual's being adversely affected by such an interna-
tional agreement.3
4
The doctrine that public international law does not establish a re-
lationship between the authority and the individual but only between
sovereign states-signatories of treaties and conventions-must gradu-
ally yield to a more liberal maxim conveying a proper standing to the
individual vis-a-vis the sovereign State." Switzerland, therefore, fol-
lowing the British example," and with a view toward avoiding such
34. The IMAC lists possible procedural defects, IMAC, supra note 1, ch. 1, § 2, art. 2,
limits extradictable offenses based on their nature, id., ch. I, art. 3, and mandates that
the offense must be serious. Id. ch. 1, § 2, art. 4. Procedural rights (such as the right to
counsel) are also set forth in the IMAC. Id., ch. 3, § 3.
35. The rule that treaties take precedence has been established by the Swiss Federal
Supreme Court. See Hachette v. Societe Cooperative d'Achat et de Distribution des Ne-
gotiants en Tabaca, Journaux et Consorts, BG 93 11192 (1967); Thareau v. FPM, BG 100
I a 407 (1974); Lanusse v. FPM, BG 102 I a 317 (1976); Veraldi v. FPM, BG 103 I a 616
(1977). It has been argued that, if treaties take precedence, the extradition law goes be-
yond the obligation to grant assistance and should never be applicable against the inter-
ests of the individual when he can rely upon the more favorable provisions of a treaty. It
is debatable, however, whether there would be any such adverse effect on the interests of
the individual. Many Swiss authors, though, differ and question the ability of the IMAC
to grant to foreign states what they do not receive on the basis of a treaty or convention.
See 100 Zeitschrift ffir Schweizerisches Recht 495-602 (Swiss Law Association Meeting,
September 26, 1981, at Saint Gall). Dr. W. De Capitani has argued that the IMAC
should be subrogated to a treaty in which the treaty favors the individual affected. de
Capitani, supra note 27, at 386-90.
36. See generally Pollock, Terrorism as a Tort in Violation of the Law of Nations, 6
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 236, 247-52 (1982-83). Is a treaty containing provisions conferring
rights on individuals-citizens of contracting states-self-executing? The answer is yes
when the treaty "prescribes rules by which private rights may be determined, and only
when it may be relied upon for the enforcement of such rights." Dreyfuss v. von Finck,
534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976). Accord. Cohen v. Hattman,
490 F. Supp. 517, 519 (S.D. Fla. 1980), afj'd, 634 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981). In Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884-85 (2d Cir. 1980), the court held that international law may
address a relationship among individuals thus conferring "fundamental rights upon all
people vis-fI-vis their own governments." Id. Filartiga, no doubt, implies a private cause
of action contrary to preceeding decisions. The United States courts have asserted that
international law, as a constantly evolving process, is reflected in a growing body of
agreements and defines norms of international behavior. This view allows for the incor-
poration of universally accepted principles into common law, enforceable everywhere,
without explicitly providing for a private cause of action. Thus, there is an implicit rec-
ognition of the main and basic task of international law: the safeguard of individual
rights. Swiss doctrine has not yet arrived at a similar conclusion, but the absolute nega-
tion of such rights in international law, prevailing heretofore, is receding. See GUGGEN-
HEIM, supra note 3, at 212. 1 DAHM supra note 9, at 54. Swiss Supreme Court cases
indicate a similar trend. See In re Thareau, BG 100 I a 416 (1974); In re Lanusee, BG
103 I A 206 (1976). The IMAC is too recent to have been "tested" against the ECE or
any other treaty that may conflict with its provisions in a situation in which the IMAC
concedes a right that the treaty or convention denies.
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conflicts, has always explicitly legislated treaties and conventions into
domestic (municipal) law, by special acts of Parliament."7
Treaties and conventions, therefore, with regard to the position of
the individual, have equal status with domestic law. There is a valid
argument, that whatever conflict might arise must be resolved in favor
of the suspect or the convict. Consequently, the State might be held
liable for damages sustained by an individual in cases where the au-
thorities disregard the more favorable clause, be it in the treaty or in
the domestic law. This applies, of course, only if the governmental de-
cision is reversed by the Court (upon appeal or any other legal remedy
provided for in the law). Most countries, therefore, will leave the final
decision on extradition to the courts, and, thereby, avoid potential
damage suits. This will apply equally to all judicial assistance affecting
the rights of individuals. Hence, the government can only improve an
individual's situation vis-A-vis a judicial decision. 8
III. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
There is disagreement among countries as to whether the judicial
or the executive branch of a State should have the final decision on
extradition. Generally, there are three different systems, which will be
referred to as: the restrictive system, the facultative system and the
Swiss judicial system. These systems may of course vary also among
themselves because control over the whole extradition procedure is a
matter of domestic (municipal) law.3 9
37. See infra PART ONE § If, A & B.
38. United States-Switzerland Extradition Treaty of 1900, supra note 26; ECE, supra
note 4. See supra note 26 for the citations to all treaties as ratified and enacted. Domes-
tic law makes the State liable to the treaty's partners to adhere to the treaty, because the
treaty itself has become domestic law. Thus, indirectly, individual rights may be
involved.
39. The ECE permits the prosecution of a suspect for offenses committed before his
surrender, other than the offense for which he is extradited, subject to the consent of the
requested State. ECE, supra note 4, art. 14. This might have serious results as discussed
in detail infra, PART Two § I, B, and is, in fact, subject to petitions for reform of the
Convention in that respect. See, e.g., TRADITIONAL EXTRADITION LAW, supra note 8, at 46.
A very important problem under Swiss law is the protection of the third party,
which, of course, might be irrelevant for an extradition procedure but is essential in
matters of judicial assistance. Article 10, paragraph 1 of the IMAC provides that infor-
mation is to be granted only if it appears imperative to establish the facts and only if the
seriousness of the offense would justify it. The Court has held that disclosure of a crime
is admissible information. See In re Gutzniler, BG (unpubl.) (Jan. 11, 1984). No third
person, who has a power of attorney or is counsel to a suspect, can claim the status of a
"non-involved individual third person in order to receive protection from disclosure, see
In re Banque de Scandinavie, BG (unpubl.) (Feb. 8, 1984), neither can an intermediary
in a business transaction for the suspect claim the privilege. See In re Banque Keyser
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A. The Restrictive System
Most Western European countries practice what could be charac-
terized as a restrictive system of extradition. Upon appeal by an indi-
vidual, these countries bring the case before the court of venue, and if
that court refuses extradition, the government is bound by that deci-
sion. If the court grants extradition, however, the government is still
free to deny it according to political expediency.4
B. The Facultative System
The second system is referred to as "facultative." In France, the
court, upon an appeal by an individual, will issue an "opinion" which
does not bind the government in any way. According to Anglo-Saxon
practice, including that in the United States, the court will also rule in
the first instance, but the Secretary of State, representing the execu-
tive branch is bound by a denial. The Secretary of State can refuse
extradition, however, even if the Court has granted it.4
Ullman, BG (unpubl.) (Sept. 5, 1984). Likewise, there is no protection for the spouse of
an account holder. See In re Acampora Megrelli, BG (unpubl.) (Sept. 18, 1984); In re
Geiger Bechter, BG (unpubl.) (Nov. 28, 1984). The suspect is never entitled to request
protection for the third person. All he may do is inform the third person of his potential
involvement. See In re Schulte, BG (unpubl.) (Nov. 7, 1984).
A third person is deemed to be involved, and hence cannot claim protection under
the IMAC, if there is a direct relationship between him and the offense for which assis-
tance has been requested. See In re Jean Leon Steinhauslin et Banque Pictet, BG (un-
publ.) (Oct. 31, 1984) referring to In re Raytheon, BG 105 I b 429 (1979). In a recent
decision, the Court has allowed authorities free discretionary power to examine the in-
volvement of a third person in order to determine the applicability of protection under
the IMAC. See In re Tirnovali, BG (unpubl.) (June 5, 1985).
A wrong decision by the police authorities as to the involvement of a third person is
to be treated as any other mistake by the government or its institutions. Switzerland has
codified a statute regarding state liability toward the individual entitled the Federal Act
Concerning the Responsibility of the Confederation and its Officials. Bundesgesetz Ober
die Verantwortung des Bundes und seiner Behoerdenmitglieder, RS 170.32 (1958). This
law is based on article 117 of the Constitution and covers members of Parliament, the
legal authority, employees of the government and all government officials, excluding the
military. The government is liable for damages sustained by any individual, irrespective
of guilt; id., art. 3, but if an official is found guilty nonpecuniary damages can be
awarded, including moral damages. The Swiss Federal Court has jurisdiction over dam-
age claims. The act establishes criminal liability for officials committing offenses abroad,
if the offense is one enumerated by the Swiss Government in its reservations to the ECE.
Id. art 16. If the Government must pay damages to an individual it may, thereafter, seek
indemnification from the responsible official. This legislation is clearly one of the great
achievements in the protection of individual rights against the state.
40. SCHULTZ, supra note 6, at 221; P. FELCHIN, DAS POLITSCHE DELIKT 253 (1979).
41. See C.p.P., art. 661. In Italy, the competent executive authority is the Minister of
Justice, but a final court ruling is required. Id. See also Netherlands Extradition Act of
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C. The Swiss Judicial System
Finally, the Swiss system, upon appeal by an individual, leaves the
final decision to the Court. The executive branch, the Office of Police
at the federal level or the Cantons are bound by the judiciary's deci-
sion. For political offenses, the government is bound to pass on the
matter, ex officio, to the Supreme Federal Court, whose decision is
final."2
1. Switzerland as the Requesting State
The extradition request is to be initiated by the competent prose-
cuting authority-which, in almost all cases is the Canton. Article 343
of the Swiss Penal Code provides that prosecutions for all offenses not
specifically within the jurisdiction of the Federal authorities is a mat-
ter for Cantonal competence. Federal authorities prosecute only a few
offenses, such as crimes involving explosives."3 The execution of
1875, Stb. No. 39 (1967), art. 8, paras. 2 & 14-15. German Extradition Act of 1929, art.
26, 1933, BGBI 1618.
42. Under the French Extradition Act of 1927: "[Lie juge d'extradition ne doit pas
perdre de vue qu'il n'est pas maitre de l'opportunite de la decision .... Le Gouverne-
ment conserve a cet egard un pouvoir de I'appreciation plus large que le juge .... "
Loi relatif A l'extradition des estrangers, art. 4, para. 1, 1968 Bulletin lbgislatif Dalloz
[BLD] 194. Under the terms of the British Extradition Act of 1870:
A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the offense in respect of
which his surrender is demanded is one of a political character (a), or if he
proves to the satisfaction of the police magistrate or the Court before whom he
is brought on habeus corpus, or to the Secretary of State, that the requisition for
his surrender has in fact been made with a view to try or punish him for an
offense of a political character ...
24 & 33 Vict., ch 52, sec. 3(1).
However, "[i]f the Secretary of State is of the opinion that the offense is one of a
political character, he may . . . at any time order a fugitive criminal . . . convicted of
such offense to be discharged from custody." Id. sec. 7.
Thus, the Secretary of State can overrule notwithstanding the nonappealability of
the probable cause ruling. Simultaneously, the question of right and the question of fact
are being decided by two separate authorities, judicial and executive. A recent note, Po-
litical Offense Exception, 5 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 565 (1982), discusses, in great depth and
with great incite, the interpretation of the statute and the treaty, which led to the nega-
tive decision in In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. (S.D.N.Y.), habeas corpus denied, 668
F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981), in which the question of whether the court should make a deter-
mination on the political nature of the crime was raised, and the court concluded that
the political offense exception was within the scope of the extradition hearing. Id. at 42-
43. The government had argued that the statute granted the court jurisdiction only to
determine the existence of probable cause. Id. at 36. The political character of the of-
fense was found to be irrelevant as to whether the evidence sustains the charge. Id.
43. The IMAC provides that "[tihe Federal Office (which is part of the Department
of Justice] shall render the decision on extradition." IMAC, supra note 1, art. 55, para. 1:
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sentences is also exclusively Cantonal business, but the Federal Office
of Police is more than a mere forwarding authority. The Office of Po-
lice will examine the request for formal correctness, the motive, the
description of the suspect, the facts, the warrant of arrest (or the judg-
ment) and the qualification of the offense according to the Swiss
Code." It will also assure that requests to Anglo-Saxon countries, be-
cause of the probable cause examination at the other end, contain a
statement of evidence of guilt.
43
2. Switzerland as the Requested State
In the case of requests emanating from signatories of treaties and
the ECE, the above rules apply mutatis mutandis. There is, however,
no documentation of any evidence of guilt requested by Anglo-Saxon
countries, and, moreover, the IMAC applies to all requests coming
from countries with whom Switzerland has no treaties. Because, under
Swiss law, procedure is an exclusive matter of the requested State,
Swiss authorities may also apply the rules of the IMAC vis-a-vis treaty
partners, unless such rules would conflict with such treaties.6
If IMAC rules are violated, the suspect may object. The requesting
If the person pursued claims to be charged with a political offense, or if the
investigation reveals serious reasons to believe that the offense is of a political
nature, the Federal [Supreme] Court shall decide the case. The Federal Office
shall send the file to the Court with its proposal. The person pursued shall be
given the opportunity to take position.
Id. art 55, para. 2. The government is bound by whatever the Court decides. Thus, deci-
sions on the political character of an offense is a matter pertaining to the law only. Note
that in non-political matters, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court takes the case on appeal
and in political matters, the government is responsible for presenting the case to the
Federal Supreme Court.
44. Most conventions and treaties demand only these basic documents. See, e.g.,
ECE, supra note 4, art. 12. If an act is committed abroad that comes under Swiss juris-
diction, it must be specified as such.
45. By treaty, a judge's signature certified by Bundleskanzlei, and a certified copy of
the corresponding article in the Swiss code is required. See United States-Switzerland
Extradition Treaty of 1900, supra note 26, art V.(2); Great Britain-Switzerland Extradi-
tion Treaty of 1880, supra note 26, art VI A. England further requires a statement as to
the punishability in Great Britain, id., art. VI A. If judgment has been rendered, a certi-
fied copy of the sentence is required. Id. Judgment in absentia is not recognized. Id., art.
V C. For passing the probable clause examination, all Anglo-Saxon laws require certified
copies of depositions or other evidence upon the basis of which the warrant was issued,
an accurate statement of the offense charged with an indication of time and place of
commission, and accurate evidence necessary to establish the identity of the person.
United States-Switzerland Extradition Treaty of 1900, supra note 26, art. V. For Provi-
sional Detention, a sworn complaint must be presented. Id. art. VI.
46. The Federal Office selects appropriate procedure, ECE, supra note 4, art. 16, and
makes decisions on provisional measures. Id.; IMAC, supra note 1, arts. 44-45.
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State, however, may not."' Article 17 of the IMAC provides that the
Federal Office shall receive requests from abroad and initiate examina-
tion by the competent Cantonal authorities, unless "compliance with
the request is obviously inadmissible. '48 The Cantonal authorities will
examine exceptions and most restrictions, either ex officio or upon the
objections raised by the individual.49 There are some special obliga-
tions imposed by treaties on the examination of the request, 0 which
can be expressed by the following maxim: Don't let a request fail for
mere reasons of formality; lack of formality can be healed."
47. See In re Gelli; BG 109 I b 223 (1983), wherein the Court assumed discretionary
power to order the detention of a suspect, in as much as it can assert this power "when-
ever circumstances permit." In so holding, the Court disregarded article 5(1) of the Euro-
pean Human Rights Convention. BGBI 1952 II 685, BGBI 1956 11 1879. The Gelli deci-
sion, although contestable, is consistent with prior determinations by the Court. See In
re Carzon, BG (unpubl.) (Oct. 6, 1981); In re Bartolai, BG (unpubl.) (Nov. 7, 1975).
Provisional arrest is the rule, not the exception. IMAC, supra note 1, art 44. Hence,
there is no right to be released unless special circumstances are shown. See In re Cuevas
Capeda, BG (unpubl.) (Oct. 15, 1985). The request for an arrest must clearly state an
offense; it is not sufficient that the foreign authority simply state that the suspect is a
member of a criminal group. See In re Yasar Kisacik, BG (unpubl.) (Oct. 11, 1985). The
burden of showing an improper arrest is on the suspect. See Capeda BG (unpubl.) (Oct.
15, 1985). A request must be specified within 40 days, otherwise the suspect will be re-
leased. See In re DeCarli, BG (unpubl.) (Oct. 22, 1985). Provisional arrest is not counted
toward the jail sentence. See In re Riggio, BG (unpubl.) (Oct. 17, 1985). This is because
of the principle of comity on which the IMAC is based. ECE signatories and treaty part-
ners may object to procedural faults. See, e.g., ECE, supra note 4, art. 22.
48. IMAC, supra note 1, art. 17. A mistake or incomplete information can be reme-
died at any time. There is no res judicata in administrative matters, as in extradition or
judicial assistance. See, e.g., In re Santa Fe, BG (unpubl.) (Nov. 30, 1983) (following the
well-known decision of In re Santa Fe, BG 109 I b 47 (1983), concerning insider trading
and not a violation of business secrets under'STGB art. 162). The possibility of cor-
recting a mistake is recognized in In re Schulte, BG (unpubl.) (Nov. 7, 1984). The exami-
nation of the default is only superficial.
49. A suspect is entitled to be represented by an attorney of his choice or otherwise
by officially appointed counsel without fees paid by the suspect. See In re Chatelain, BG
107 I b 80 (1981); see also SCHULTZ, supra note 6, at 161-67. There may be no examina-
tion of the suspect without a hearing by a judge or an official of the Political Department
(Swiss State Department).
Although there are no Miranda-type obligations in Switzerland, article 22 of the
IMAC compels the authority to notify the suspect of his legal remedies. If such notice is
not given, however, the resulting decision is not invalid, unless the suspect can show a
disadvantage. See In re Banque des Depots et des Gestions, BG (unpubl.) (Mar. 7, 1984).
Concerning the obligation to appoint ex officio counsel, see In re Ursino, BG (unpubl.)
(Mar. 21, 1984).
50. If admissible, treaties provide for possible corrections and time for additional in-
formation. See, e.g., Great Britain-Switzerland Extradition Treaty of 1880, supra note 26
art. V(7).
51. Article XI of the United States-Italy Extradition Treaty, supra note 4, permits
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3. Form of Request
Article 12 of the ECE requires that written request be communi-
cated through diplomatic channels. Other means of communication,
however, may be arranged bilaterally.5" The IMAC also requires a writ-
ten request containing the identification of the individual, a summary
of relevant facts, the text of regulations applicable to the place and
time of commission, and a legal qualification, in one of the three offi-
cial languages (German, French or Italian). This last requirement could
pose a problem when the request eminates from a country whose lan-
guage is less well-known.5"
4. Costs
The ECE, the IMAC and all treaties, except the extradition treaty
between Switzerland and the United States, stipulate that all costs are
to be borne by the requested State.
5. Provisional Arrest Pending Request
The ECE permits provisional arrest in article 16. However, the
necessary documents-warrant, details of offense, legal qualification
and details on the individual-must follow within eighteen days. The
IMAC follows this rule in article 44."
6. Postponed Surrender
Article 58 of the IMAC allows a postponement of extradition if the
wanted person is being prosecuted in Switzerland for other offenses, or
if he is serving a jail sentence. Article 19 of the ECE also follows this
incomplete documentation in a request to be remedied within a reasonable time specified
by the requested State. If the requested information is not thereafter provided, the sus-
pect will be released. See also id. art. XII.
According to Swiss practice, even a provisional arrest is not affected by a temporary
lack of information. See In re Stephani, BG 32 I 317 (1906). The proposition is quite
contestable. Provisional arrest, however, is the rule, see IMAC, supra note 1, art. 28,
para. 6; In re Chebbah, BG (unpubl.) (Mar. 24, 1984), and is usual in extradition proce-
dure. See IMAC, supra note 1, art. 47, which provides prerequisites under article 2 of the
IMAC. Freedom on bail is seldom allowed unless the suspect is unable to bear the depri-
vation of liberty. See In re Baskaya, BG 109 IV 159 (1983). The exceptions under article
47 of the IMAC are cumulative-both must be shown-one is insufficient. See In re
Ciolini, BG 109 I b 58 (1983).
52. Telegraphic communications may be used in cases of urgency or direct communi-
cations from one Ministry of Justice to another.
53. A translation of the IMAC has not been certified in any unofficial language.,
54. The IMAC includes provisions for liability and for false arrest. IMAC, supra note
1, art. 15.
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rule. The IMAC, however, permits Swiss authorities to "get rid" of
such an offender, if the requesting State guarantees his return.5 5 In the
case of the notorious terrorist Petra Krause, however, Italy never ful-
filled its guarantee to return. At the time of this writing, Petra Krause
is still free, notwithstanding the ECE and the IMAC.
PART Two - LIMITATIONS To EXTRADITION
I. RESTRICTIONS
Apart from the basic prerequisites for extraditing an individual to
another jurisdiction, there are a great number of internationally recog-
nized restrictions adopted in most countries which adhere to a system
of international law. Some of these restrictions have been controversial,
while others are commonly accepted. Some examples of controversial
restrictions are the differing interpretations of the "non bis in idem"
rule, the prescription of an offense (as opposed to dual criminality), the
evaluation of absentia judgments, the problem of extraterritoriality
(and universality) in certain jurisdictions, and the problem a govern-
ment faces in extraditing its own citizens. Other restrictions are gener-
ally accepted by international consensus: the rule of speciality; the
question of surrender to a third country by .the requesting nation; the
objection to capital punishment and special (extraordinary) courts; and
the political offense privilege. These latter noncontroversial rules have
been laid down in the form of a Resolution by the Madrid Interna-
tional Lawyers' Conference of September 28, 1973,"5 and must be con-
sidered when examining requests for extradition. These rules do not
exclude extradition but rather restrict it, so as to protect the funda-
mental rights of the individual suspect.
A. Non Bis in Idem
The rule of non bis in idem (literally "not twice for the same"),
sometimes erroneously characterized as a procedural matter, restricts
extradition when the individual in question claims to have already
been prosecuted for the same offense for which extradition is now be-
ing sought, and, moreover, has been acquitted or convicted, and served
his sentence. This rule is generally accepted by most treaties and do-
mestic laws,5 7 although some countries may distinguish between prose-
55. IMAC, supra note 1, art. 58, para. 2.
56. See 13 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 44) 703 (1972).
57. The ECE considers this principle in two contexts. The first, ius cogens, precludes
surrender if final judgment has been passed in the requested State. The second permits
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cution, acquittal or conviction in the requested, the requesting, or a
third State.s The corresponding rule under Anglo-Saxon law, includ-
the denial of extradition if the authorities in the requested State have decided not to
institute or to terminate proceedings in respect to the same offense. ECE, supra note 4,
art. 9. The ECE does not address the application of res judicata vis-A-vis proceedings in
the requesting State or a third State.
Because extradition is considered an administrative proceeding and not a criminal
matter, there is no absolute rule that requests for surrender cannot be granted because
that very same request had previously been denied. In other words, res judicata does not
exist in extradition matters. In Panamex v. Canton of Zurich, BG 109 I b 160 (1983), the
Supreme Court denied the "portke de foree de chose jug&e des decisions" which allows
previous mistakes in the request to be remedied at a later date by complete information.
This confirmed the decision in Schmidt, BG 107 I b 78 (1981). See In re Bohm, BG 108 I
b 296 (1982) concerning the non bis in idem privilege arising out of res judicata in a
third country.
Note that a specific provision in the ECE, supra note 4, art. 8, enables a denial of
extradition, whereas another provision explicitly excludes extradition, thus protecting
the individual. Id. art. 9. Concerning a stipulation tending to perforate the protection
provided by the non bis in idem rule, see SCHULTZ, supra note 6, at 18.
Austria excludes extradition. Bundesgesetz uber Auslieferung und Reehtshilfe in
Strafsachen, paras. 9(3) & 16(3), 1979 BGBI 529. Accord Deutsches Rechtshilfe Gesetz,
para. 9, 1982 BGBI 2071. This is similar to article 51 of the IMAC, which permits an
exception in case of a new trial-"review" according to article 229 of the Bundesgesetz
Strafpflege, RS 312.3.303.
58. Upon ratifying the ECE, Switzerland reserved the right to deny extradition, in
derogation of article 9 of the ECE, if such refusal has been motivated by a proceeding in
a third State. Swiss Reservations to the ECE, art. 9, 1967 BBI .033. On the other hand,
Switzerland expressed a willingness to grant extradition if the request showed new facts
of evidence justifying review of the case. Id. The IMAC is more precise; the request shall
not be granted (ius cogens) if acquittal, discontinuation or conviction has taken place in
Switzerland or elsewhere (e.g., the place of commission of the act). IMAC, supra note 1,
art. 5. It follows then that Switzerland may grant extradition if judgment has been ren-
dered in a third country only-i.e., neither at the place of commission of the crime, nor
in Switzerland. For example, a Nazi having committed crimes in Poland but acquitted in
Germany may be surrendered to Poland upon being found in Switzerland. The status
similar to acquittal is accorded to discontinuation for material-not personal-reasons or
renunciation, or provisionally abstaining from the imposition of a sentence. Id. art. 5,
para 1(a). The case of conviction refers only to actually having served the sentence by
the wanted person. Id. art. 5, para. 1(b). The IMAC permits the re-opening of a case in
the sense of article 229 of the Swiss Penal Code or cantonal statutes, respectively. Id. art.
5, para. 2.
Apparently the reservation made to article 9 of the ECE influenced the members of
the competent Council of Europe Committee to amend the ECE by an additional proto-
col, Europ. T.S. No. 86, opened for signature October 15, 1975, which under chapter II,
article 2 supplemented the somewhat ambiguous article 9 of the ECE. The additional
protocol states, in brief, that no extradition (ius cogens) of a person shall be allowed
against whom final judgment has been rendered in a third State, in case of acquittal,
enforced judgment, pardon or conviction without the imposition of a prison sentence. Id.
A very controversial exception, contained in paragraph 3, allowed signatories to faculta-
tively grant extradition if, in the discretion of the requested State and irrespective of the
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ing United States law is the doctrine of double jeopardy.59
right of the individual, it was determined that the offense for which the sentence was
imposed, was committed against an individual, an institution or anything having public
status in the requesting State; if the person upon whom sentence was passed had public
status in the requesting State; or if the offense was completed wholly or partially in the
territory of the requesting State. Id. para. 3. Upon ratifying this protocol, a further reser-
vation was made by a number of signatories regarding the potential discriminatory treat-
ment of public status offenders or victims in violation of the principle of equality before
the law. Note that Switzerland, too, has not signed this protocol, because privilege or
discrimination respectively of a "public status" victim or offender appears contestable
(and possibly against ordre publique).
59. The coverage of double jeopardy under the fifth amendment of the United States
Constitution differs from non bis in idem in that double jeopardy extends to the same
offense rather than to a single given act. The "same offense" is not involved in successive
prosecutions if the law underlying each prosecution "requires proof of a fact which the
other does not." Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 303-04 (1932).
The difference in legal concepts between Anglo-Saxon and Roman law arose in
Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1980). In that case, the defendant argued against
extradition because of non bis in idem, whereas the Government representing Italy,
showed that there was no "same offense identity" between the two statutes. Id. at 172.
The question is whether the same act had already been the object of a criminal proceed-
ing in either the requested or, for that matter, a third country. In other words, the previ-
ous proceedings need not have been in Italy but may just as well have taken place in
Switzerland. In Sindona, the court ruled in favor of the Government because the effect
of the crime in Italy appeared to be of a different nature than the one reflected under
United States law. Id. at 179. Hence, there would be no double prosecution if the wanted
suspect were to be surrendered to Italy, notwithstanding the apparent violation of the
non bis in idem rule.
As there is no good reason to assume that upon surrender the suspect would not
have a fair trial in Italy with a good defense of res judicata conforming to the Italian
code, nothing had been done to his detriment by surrendering him. There appears no
doubt however, that in a reversed case, (i.e. on an extradition request by the United
States against a suspect found in continental Europe) the European courts would deny
extradition, and the United States Government could not establish a good case that the
principle of double jeopardy is not applicable. It would probably fail on the firm applica-
tion of the non bis in idem rule in Europe. Although not falling under the same title, the
application of article 8 of the ECE leads practically to the same result, if the competent
judicial authorities of the requested State are proceeding or intend to proceed against
the suspect for the offense or in the request. This pendente lite restriction is self-under-
stood, and is, therefore, not referred to in the extradition law.
The differing view of the Swiss and the Americans with regard to the rule of non bis
in idem is clearly reflected in In re Veronica Nelson, BG 110 I b 185 (1984). The rule is
not specifically mentioned in the United States-Switzerland Mutual Assistance Treaty,
1977 BBI I 17, but it is a rule inherent under Swiss law with or without a treaty. The rule
is limited, however, to the Swiss reservation to article 9 of the ECE or article 5 of the
IMAC. The reason for the reservation and the stipulation in the IMAC is that the re-
questing State should not have the right to request the surrender of a person whom that
requesting State cannot prosecute under its own law. If the United States, for instance,
were to initiate a new trial, because of the differing concepts of non bis in idem and
double jeopardy, its request must show that it could legally do so. Only if the United
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B. Specialty
Because a request for extradition and the granting of such a re-
quest constitute a contract between two States, regardless of whether it
is based upon a commitment or comity, and any condition made under
that contract must be adhered to. This is the legal basis for the most
important restriction on extradition, which is referred to as the rule of
specialty. No treaty or domestic law has failed to adopt this rule."e The
rule provides that the trial in the requesting country, upon the surren-
der of the wanted person, is admissible only as to the offense for which
the request has been made.6 1 The person surrendered always has the
States could legally bring the new case in accordance with United States law would Swit-
zerland extradite, even if a new trial would not be permissible under Swiss law. Thus,
irrespective of the strict Swiss rule, extradition would be granted on the basis of United
States law.
Concerning the application of the non bis in idem rule, see United States-Italy Ex-
tradition Treaty of 1983, supra note 4, art. VI, and the Swiss Reservations to the ECE,
art. 4(1)(b), 1967 BBI 319.
Discharge of the extradited person is considered final if the situation in the request-
ing State enables the suspect to move about freely without violating the conditions of his
custody or other guidelines set down by the competent authority, or if he can leave the
country freely without restriction. The problem of non bis in idem ceases after the expi-
ration of the stipulated period.
60. The doctrine of the contract is not universally accepted. See T. VOGLER, Aus-
LIEFERUNG UND GRUNDGESETZ 34 (1964); DAHM, supra note 9, ULLMAN, VOLKERRECHT 12
(1898); SCHULTZ, supra note 6, at 12 (Schultz does not fully accept the doctrine). It may
be argued that, irrespective of contract, the rule is international in scope. German theory
held that it was, so that even if a relevant treaty is silent on the subject, an accused
party could not be prosecuted for an offense for which he was not extradited. The United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886) arrived at the
same result not by invoking international law but rather by the "weight of authority and
just sound principle." Id. at 430.
61. ECE, supra note 4, art. 14; United States-Switzerland Extradition Treaty of 1900,
supra note 26, art. 19; IMAC, supra note 1, arts. 6 & 9. The United States-Switzerland
Treaty permits the extension of the trial to other offenses only upon consent of the indi-
vidual. The treaty explicitly states that it would not recognize such an extension, "unless
the individual to be surrendered expressly consented to [the extension] in open court,
which consent shall be entered in the record." United States-Switzerland Extradition
Treaty of 1900, supra note 26, art. 6. This rule is known as the "absolute specialty" rule,
which, apart from being an element of Anglo-Saxon law, see British Extradition Act of
1870, 33 & 34 Vict. ch. 52, § 3.2, is also found in the German, Norwegian and Swedish
extradition laws. Deutschse Rechtshilfe, para. 11, Gesetz 1982 BGBI 2071; Norwegian
Extradition Law of 1908, supra note 9, para. 5; Swedish Extradition Law of 1913, supra
note 9, para. 11. Contrary to this "absolute specialty" rule, there is a "modified spe-
cialty" rule in the domestic laws of other States, such as the Netherlands and Belgium.
Netherlands Extradition Act of 1875, Stb. No. 39, art. 6; Holland's extradition law, for
example, allows the extension of a trial at the consent of the requested state. Id. The
Swiss IMAC has also adhered to this "modified specialty" rule. It says that "the state to
which a person has been extradited, may, upon a new request, be permitted to prosecute
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right to invoke the rule of speciality. The rule in Switzerland is that
other offenses." IMAC, supra note 1, art. 39. The Swiss legislature probably had in mind
that an individual ought to be heard by the Swiss authorities, before it would recognize a
new request. There exists some doubt, however, as to whether or not the requesting
State should return the individual to Swiss territory for a hearing of this kind, and the
IMAC does not address this point. The ECE specifies that the extradited individual may
not be prosecuted, sentenced or detained for any offense that was committed prior to his
surrender, other than the one for which he was extradited, unless the requested state
consents (and the consent was given when the offense was itself subject to extradition in
accordance with the provisions of ECE); or when the extradited individual, having had
the opportunity to leave the territory to which he had been surrendered, has not done so
within 45 days of his final discharge; or the individual has returned to that territory after
leaving it. ECE, supra note 4, art. 14. Switzerland ratified the ECE with the reservation
that "Swiss authorities were to regard discharge as Ifinal, within the meaning of Article
14, if it enabled the extradited individual to move about freely, without breaking the
rules of behavior laid down by the proper authorities." Swiss Reservations to the ECE,
1967 BBI 329, art. 14, para. 1. For the Swiss authorities, an extradited individual is in all
cases deemed to be able to leave the territory of a State within the meaning of the arti-
cle, if he is not prevented from leaving due to an illness or some other actual restriction
of his freedom. It may be argued that this reservation (which has precedence over the
IMAC with respect to relations between Switzerland and the co-signatories of the ECE)
requires an additional hearing by competent judicial authorities in Switzerland. The re-
sult of this hearing, for all practical purposes, would be the return of the suspect to Swiss
territory, where he would be free from being pressured by the authorities of the request-
ing State. A test case of this kind has not yet arisen.
A solution to the problem might have been the simple requirement of the consent of
the suspect, rather than the consent of the requested state, because the rule of specialty
is a basic principle under international law, and of all self-executing treaties. A violation
of this rule would affect individual rights, and thus might be construed to affect the
Swiss national interest in accordance with article 2 of the IMAC, which allows for the
denial of judicial assistance. That the application of speciality rules are ex officio condi-
tions to extradition is not controversial per se. See PONCET & NEYROUD, supra note 6, at
40-41 (referring therein to In re Glaser, BG 90 IV 123 (1964)); SCHULTZ, supra note 6, at
389; H. CHING, Du PRINCIPE DE LA SPECiALrIt EN MATIIkRE D'EXTRADITION 12 n.107 (1950).
According to international law, however, the accused can never be subject to further
prosecution regardless of whether the requested state agrees. See In re Arietto, 7 Ann.
Dig. 378 (Italy Corte Cass. 1935); Valerini v. Grandi, 8 Ann. Dig. 378 (Italy Corte Cass.
1935); In re Flesche, 16 Ann. Dig. 266 (Holland High Ct. 1949); Novic v. Public Prosecu-
tor of the Canton of Basel-Stadt, 22 I.L.R. 515 (Switzerland Court of Cassation 1955).
The speciality rule might be further modified by making the offense extraditable
even if there is no connection between the offense for which extradition is requested and
another offense, not asserted and committed prior to the request for extradition. Thus,
speciality could well be interpreted to the detriment of the suspect, and he might
thereby be deprived of the rule's basic protection; the limitation of sovereignty over cer-
tain jurisdictions. See SCHULTZ, supra note 6, at 386; see also PONCET & NEYROUD, supra
note 6, at 41. The protection of an individual's rights is also reduced under article 15 of
the ECE, in which extradition to third countries is involved.
There also appears to be a very unsatisfactory position vis-A-vis the individual in
matters in which the individual's presence is irrelevant, i.e., a prosecution in the request-
ing State. In other words, nothing prevents the requesting State from prosecuting the
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speciality is to be applied ex officio, and to assure the strict adherence
to that rule by the requesting country, all extraditions granted by
Switzerland carry that particular condition, implicitly or expressly. 2
suspect in absentia. See id., at 42 n.91a.
The modified speciality rule has been adopted in the most recent United States-
Italy Extradition Treaty. See supra note 4, art. XVI. The treaty allows prosecution for
offenses for which extradition has been requested, as well as for offenses having the same
elements of fact but which constitute another offense. The documentation for the latter
offense may be presented at a later date, while the suspect is in custody in accordance
with article X.
The Swiss Court in In re Gelli, BG 109 I b 317 (1983) has insisted on a more rigid
application of the rule as against the Italian practice mentioned above. See also Swiss
Reservations to the ECE, art. 2, 1976 BBI 033, concerning discretionary extensions.
According to at least one Swiss scholar, the speciality rule must be embodied in a
treaty. See SCHULTZ, supra note 6, at 370-72.
Under the French and Austrian extradition laws, no extradition may be granted for
an offense not embodied in a request. See Loi relatif i l'extradition des etrangers, art. 7,
1968 BLD 194; Bundesgesetz 5ber Auslieferung und Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen, paras.
23, 70, 1979 BGBI 529.
For a strict application of the speciality rule, see In re Glaser, BG 90 IV 123 (1964).
Contra ECE, supra note 4, art. 2, para. 2, as interpreted by Message of the Federal
Council. 1966 BBI 1 472.
62. The question whether a condition must be expressed or is self-understood accord-
ing to the principles of international law has become quite important. The rigid applica-
tion of the rule means in the first place that the rule restricts the sovereignty of the
requesting country in setting forth rules by which that country must abide if it wishes its
request to be accepted. The French have used the precise terminology of "L'etas limitatif
de l'extradition" which is, so to speak, part of the international treaty. Violating the rule
is, therefore, a breach of contract. When there is no treaty and the requested country
surrenders the wanted person without such a treaty-and only as a matter of com-
ity-the requested country may set forth as one of the conditions of surrender the rule of
speciality. At that moment an international contract is concluded, and one of the provi-
sions stipulated in that contract is speciality. There is absolutely no reason why, then,
from time to time, the requested country cannot decide whether it wishes the rule of
absolute or modified speciality to govern the contract. In the first case, no extension of
prosecution is possible without the freely given consent of the individual. A violation of
the rule in that case is a serious matter, subject to a clear cause of action for damages
sustained by the individual by virtue of that violation.
In recent years, even some American decisions have steered away from the use of the
absolute speciality rule. In Fiocconi v. Attorney General of the United States, 462 F.2d
475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972), the court, while underlining the assur-
ance of avoiding indiscriminate prosecution by the authorities of the requesting country,
reversed the precedent of United States v. Raucher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886). The court noted
that the absence of a foreign protest (Italy might have simply, if not conveniently, for-
gotten about it) might imply consent to an extended trial in the United States. The
court assumed that such an interpretation was correct, although it amounted to a clear
violation of the speciality rule. Fiocconi, 462 F.2d at 481.
Could Switzerland have ever implicitly consented to such an extended trial? The
Swiss Court in In re Jaroud, BG 106 Ib 297 (1980), held that diplomatic steps against
such a violation would be "in order," but it would be exaggerated to refuse future coop-
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C. Adequacy
The principle of adequacy, generally referred to as proportionality,
limits extradition to offenses that are sufficiently grave to warrant judi-
eration because of that violation. This is, of course, a political and not a judicial decision.
Nonetheless, it is sufficient to note here that the obligation to prevent a violation to the
detriment of the individual is a responsibility of the Government vis-h-vis the individual.
That is why consent to an extended trial, under the modified speciality rule, if it were to
prevail, would make the Government liable for whatever damages the individual might
sustain. The IMAC, in article 1, paragraph 2, states that "in the application of this Act,
the sovereignty, security, public order or similar essential interests of Switzerland shall
be taken into account." IMAC, supra note 1, art. 1, para. 2. That means that a violation
of the conditions set forth in one international contract providing for the extradition
might be construed or deemed to be to the detriment of the "interest of the country."
The Mutual Assistance Treaty between the United States and Switzerland, 1977 BBl I
17, in article 37, paragraph 3, provides for a "remedy" by information to the Department
of Justice which must ask the "violating State" for "an explanation". This, of course,
appears insufficient if no one is held liable, only a damage suit might change the picture.
Whether a case would stand up in court, without specific legislation, is doubtful.
The "steering away" of American jurisprudence from the rule of absolute speciality,
apart from the decision in Fiocconi, 462 F.2d at 481, is apparent in United States ex rel.
Donnelly v. Mulligan, 76 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1935), with the argument that it is in the
interest of the extraditing state if the rule is established, but such an interest can be
waived, implying that the accused person has no proper standing in the matter. Trying
to place the matter on the plane of comity, as the Court tried to do, however, is irrele-
vant if we strictly adhere to the theory.
Under German law, consent can be given to prosecute another offense than that in
the request. Such consent, however, must be given by a court that decides on such exten-
sion, not the non-judicial authority, German Extradition and Assistance Law, para. 11,
1982-BGBI 2071. This stipulation might be considered a compromise between the abso-
lute and the modified speciality rule. Judicial authorities tend to withstand political
pressure by the requesting country and to protect individual rights. Still, the more rigid
application would underline the only real legal rational for the rule.
In combatting crime, however, even Switzerland has started to give in. See In re
Schmidt, BG 107 I b 78, in which the terminology "accessory extradition" was used to
grant authority to prosecute another second "minor" offense, which in itself was not
extraditable, provided the "main offense" in the request qualified. A preceeding decision,
In re Kroecher-Tiedemann, BG 105 I b 282 (1979) granted "accessory extradition ...
for every and each crime punishable in Switzerland, irrespective of whether [the] request
had covered them."
See PONCEr & NEYROUD, supra note 6, at 40, 66, referring to the fair trial doctrine,
which states that in order to prosecute a suspect for an offense not contained in a re-
quest, a new request should be brought.
Speciality protection lasts for 30 days, after which the suspect is free to leave the
requesting State. See In re Bogdanovic, BG 111 I b 52 (1985) (if the suspect after the
imposition of sentence does not leave, the old speciality imposed by Switzerland ceases
to have effect).
Recent Swiss decisions differ in their application of the speciality rule. A more rigid
interpretation of the rule is applied to physical extradition, although a more liberal in-
terpretation is applied to matters concerning judicial assistance. There is also a differing
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cial cooperation on an international scale. In short, there is no extradi-
tion for minor offenses.63
approach vis-&-vis the requesting State; when there is a bilateral or multilateral treaty or
when no agreement exists and the system of law in that particular country is less well-
known. Thus, the speciality condition is imposed on foreign authorities, but often a dec-
laration with regard to respecting this condition is not required. See In re Accampora-
Megrelli, BG (unpubl.) (Sept. 18, 1984); In re Franca Amoretti, BG (unpubl.) (Sept. 18,
1984); In re Banque des Depots, BG (unpubl.) (Mar. 7, 1984); In re I.C.C. Management
Services S.A., BG (unpubl.) (Mar. 7, 1984); In re Gutzwiler, BG (unpubl.) (Jan. 11, 1984);
In re Prioil-Capelini, BG 107 I b 261 (Sept. 14, 1984); In re Raytheon, BG 105 I b 418
(Sept. 28, 1979); In re Cloppenburg, BG 104 I a 49 (Jan. 25, 1978) (all requests for assis-
tance by the United States or Western European Countries which are signatories of the
ECE).
The Swiss Court has differentiated between extradition requests by Western Euro-
pean nations, see, In re Steinhauslin, BG (unpubl.) (Oct. 31, 1984); In re Scharbach, BG
(unpubl.) (Oct. 14, 1984), the United States, see In re Oenzel, BG (unpubl.) (May 15,
1985); In re GBD Services, Inc., BG (unpubl.) (Mar. 12, 1984), and African nations. See
In re Chamakhi Toufik, BG (unpubl.) (Oct. 3, 1984) (Swiss supervision of Tunisian re-
spect of speciality rule). The Swiss have demanded special assurances of France. See In
re Grenade, BG (unpubl.) (Oct. 31, 1984) (communication by requesting authority to
fiscal authority in France is a grave violation of speciality). See also In re Tirnovali, BG
(unpubl.) (June 5, 1985) (passing on information received under protection of speciality
to third country constitutes violation of speciality). But see In re Chiaramonte &
Rapaport (Ellis AG), BG (unpubl.) (Oct. 3, 1985) (when tax evasion verdict already ren-
dered, there is no need to insist on speciality, even if the offense (insider trading) also
concerned a tax violation). For examples of extradition conditions, see GUILLAUME &
LEVASSEUR, LEs ASPECTSD REPRESSIFS Du TERRORISME 119 (1976); SCHULTZ, supra note
32, at 313.
63. See supra, II § C. The ECE provides that offenses must be punishable with
imprisonment of at least one year. ECE, supra note 4, art. 2, para. 1. The article also
permits denial of extradition for certain offenses that otherwise meet that requirement,
provided that country transmits to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe such
list of excluded offenses. Id., para. 4. Switzerland has instead listed all offenses extradita-
ble. See supra note 22. This method conformed to the then valid Extradition Law of
1892, supra note 22, abrogated by IMAC. The IMAC provides that a request shall be
rejected if the importance of the offense does not justify carrying out the proceedings.
IMAC, supra note 1, Art. 4. This means that Switzerland is absolutely free vis-h-vis non-
signatories, to deny extradition for whatever act it regards irrelevant, even if that act is
punishable with imprisonment of more than one year. That discretion also applies for
executing a sentence, whereas vis-a-vis ECE partners, Switzerland is bound by the mini-
mum four month prison sentence provided by the ECE. ECE, supra note 4, art. 2.
In an additional protocol the ECE was extended to cover offenses subject to pecuni-
ary sanctions. Article 2, paragraph 2 of the ECE states that if a request for extradition
contains several separate and distinct offenses, each of which satisfies the prerequisites
of dual criminality and extraditability, but one of them is puni3hable by less than the
minimum sanctions, then the requested State could (but was not obligated to) grant
extradition for the minor offenses. ECE, supra note 4, art. 2, para. 2. The second addi-
tional Protocol went one step further: If the minor offense was punishable only by a fine,
the requested State could grant extradition. Second Protocol to ECE, supra note 16, art.
1. Switzerland has not signed the Second Protocol. The Swiss Supreme Court has speci-
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D. Prescription
Extradition shall not be granted when the offender has become
immune from prosecution or punishment due to a "lapse of time," ac-
cording to the laws of the requesting or the requested country."' An
amnesty or pardon will have the same effect. 65
fled that Swiss constitutional law permits compulsory measures only if they are propor-
tional to the nature of the offense. See In re Schlumpf, BG 106 I b 260 (1980). Hence, no
assistance, let alone extradition, will be granted in irrelevant cases. See In re Schulte,
BG (unpubl.) (Nov. 7, 1984). The United States and Switzerland have adhered to the
enumeration of offenses. See United States-Switzerland Extradition Treaty of 1900,
supra note 26, thus implicitly waiving the requirement of adequacy. The German and
Austrian extradition laws are silent on this point.
64. ECE, supra note 4, art. 10; United States-Switzerland Extradition Treaty of 1900
supra note 26, art. VIII. See also United States-Italy Extradition Treaty of 1973, supra
note 4, art. VI, para. 3.
The IMAC provides that a request shall not be granted in so far as its execution
requires compulsory measures, and the prosecution or execution of a sentence were
barred by the statute of limitations. IMAC, supra note 1, art. 5, para. 1(c). Likewise,
amnesty will work in favor of the wanted person.
Switzerland reserved the right to apply Swiss law with regard to prescription and
prescriptability. See Swiss Reservations to the ECE, 1967 BBI 319. This position has
been upheld by the Swiss Court in In re Weiskirchen, BG 107 I b 74 (1981), wherein the
Court determined that Switzerland would decide these matters according to Swiss law.
The Court has shown somewhat more lenient attitudes toward foreign prescription rules,
see In re Schulte, BG (unpubl.) (Jan. 7, 1984); In re Gelbard, BG (unpubl.) (Feb. 20,
1985), by arguing ex contrario to article 5, paragraph 1 of the IMAC, article 35. Surpris-
ingly, however, the Court in In re Bogdanovic, bg 111 I b 52 (1985), held that an exami-
nation of Yugoslavian law regarding prescriptability of an offense would not be relevant,
notwithstanding article 10 of the ECE, which explicitly excludes extradition in case of
prescription.
The 1983 United States-Italy Extradition Treaty, supra not 4, interprets prescrip-
tion according to a State's own penal law. Id. art. VIII. A very strict prescription rule
exists in the Austrian extradition law. Bundesgesetz 4ber Auslicferung und Rechtshilfe
in Strafsachen, para. 18, 1979 BGBI 529.
If a treaty is silent on the question whether a request can be barred by prescription,
a problem may arise regarding the prevalence of either the statute of the requesting or
the requested state. Professor Moore argues in favor of the statute of the State in which
the offense was committed. See MooRE, supra note 3, at 404. This, however, would con-
tradict the rule of double criminality. See supra PART ONE § I, B. The surrender of a
suspect for an offense, which under the law of the requested State is no longer punisha-
ble, would be in conflict with the public order of that State. Therefore, the requested
State will apply its own statute ex officio, while a lapse of time or amnesty in the re-
questing state will be a good defense and would bar extradition. The question of
prescriptability of certain grave crimes is discussed infra PART THREE § II, B. Switzer-
land has adopted article 75 of the IMAC by amending the Penal Code, SR 311.0, to
exclude the statute of limitations for certain grave crimes. Concerning the problem of
double prescription, see PoNcEr & NEYROUD, supra note 6, at 25.
65. The Second Protocol to the ECE extends the right to deny extradition to the
requesting State, when the requesting State has granted amnesty, but only if it could
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E. Juvenile Delinquents
The extradition of juvenile delinquents is generally prohibited, if
their surrender would endanger their mental development or their so-
cial rehabilitation. According to Swiss practice, regular criminal courts
are deemed to be legally incompetent to pass judgment on such delin-
quincy. If a person would normally be subject to extradition, yet is
under the age of eighteen, the requested country may choose instead to
administer a program of social readjustment in accordance with that
country's own local regulations."
F. Capital Punishment
The requested country may generally deny extradition unless as-
surance is given that the death penalty will not be carried out, regard-
less of the sentence pronounced. 7 The same applies to corporal pun-
have prosecuted under its own law. ECE Second Protocol, supra note 20, ch IV, art. 4.
The requested State, for lack of jurisdiction, cannot grant amnesty for offenses commit-
ted in the requesting State. See In re Lazzeri, BG 87 I 195.
66. IMAC supra note 1, art. 33. The ECE does not provide for such special treat-
ment, but an additional treaty supplement between Switzerland and a few other Euro-
pean nations, see, e.g., Supplemental Agreement to the ECE, Switzerland-Germany, 1970
BB! II 197, RS. 353.916.32, permits the denial of a request and provides for the repar-
triation of a delinquent to his country of origin, regardless of where the commission of
the act took place. The United States-Switzerland Extradition Treaty of 1900, supra
note 26, did not consider the juvenile delinquency problem. Later, however, United
States treaties have adopted similar rules. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty, January 18,
1973, United States-Italy, art. Il1, 6 U.S.T. 493, T.I.A.S. No. 8052. The Legal Affairs
Committee of the Consultive Assembly of the Council of Europe have proposed that the
ECE add a protocol open for signature at an early date, permitting the denial of surren-
der when such an action is considered undesirable on humanitarian grounds, most nota-
bly in view of the age and state of physical and mental health of the person claimed. See
TRADITIONAL EXTRADITION LAW, supra note 8, at 92.
With all due respect to the problem of social rehabilitation, the Swiss Supreme
Court nevertheless has held that the interest in prosecuting an offense must prevail over
considerations of social rehabilitation. See In re Marsman, BG 110 1 b 187 (1984). This
interest would also be applicable to cases involving juvenile delinquency.
67. Most signatories to the ECE have abolished the death penalty: Austria, Belgium,
Cyprus, Denmark, France (just recently), Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Israel, Liechtenstein, Finland and Switzerland. No-
table exceptions are Great Britain and Turkey. As against these two countries, article II
of the ECE would apply:
If the offense for which extradition is requested is punishable by death
under the law of the requesting Party, and if in respect of such offense the
death-penalty is not provided for by the law of the requested Party or is not
normally carried out, extradition may be refused unless the requesting Party
gives such assurance as the requested Party considers sufficient that the death-
penalty will not be carried out.
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ishment or any potential sanction against the human dignity of the
ECE, supra note 4, art. 11. Before the French Parliament abolished the death penalty in
1981, Switzerland, upon receiving several French requests for extradition, insisted upon a
French guaranty that such a punishment would not be executed. See In re Ktir, BG 87 I
134 (1961) (guaranty not considered satisfactory. The judgment was later revised for lack
of reciprocity); In re Thareau, BG 100 I a 407 (1974). Note that the strict reservation by
Germany with regard to the death penalty in its ratification of the ECE had not been
accepted by France prior to its abolition of the death penalty. See Extradition Treaty,
Germany-France, Oct. 29, 1951, art. 18, 1953 BGBI II 152; See also 2 H. GRUETZNER,
AUSLIEFERUNGSVERBOT UND ASYLRECHT 2 (1954). Upon the French ratification of the
ECE, however, this point has become moot.
Switzerland has always maintained its right to either refuse extradition of suspects
to countries imposing capital punishment or to surrender suspects on the condition that
such penalty not be carried out. See Switzerland-Brazil Extradition Treaty of 1932,
supra note 26, art. 6; Switzerland- Argentina Extradition Treaty of 1906, supra note 26,
art. 5. See also Switzerland-Poland Extradition Treaty, supra note 26 (implicit denial is
possible).
Requests by Turkey to extradite criminals have also been denied, even though both
Turkey and Switzerland are signatories to the ECE, because Turkish guarantees were
considered insufficient. See In re Sener, BG 109 I b 64 (1983). Although there is hardly a
reason to assume that the criminals sought in Sener would have been put to death, (be-
cause business crimes, including fraudulent bankruptcy were involved) all signatories to
the ECE have a right to demand an assurance on this issue and may deny surrender,
particularly to a military government whose assurances are considered insufficient.
Outside the ECE, existing treaties, if any, will govern. Switzerland cannot invoke
article 37, paragraph 2, of the IMAC stipulating that "[e]xtradition shall be denied if the
requesting State does not guarantee that the person pursued will not be executed in the
requesting State or if he will be subject to a treatment which will impair his physical
integrity." IMAC, supra note 1, art. 37, para. 2, (because treaties take precedence over
the IMAC and Switzerland may preclude by such treaty to ask for such guarantees). In
more recent treaties (such as those between Switzerland and Uganda, Rwanda, Pakistan
and Tanzania, see supra note 26), Switzerland has incorporated the death penalty provi-
sion regarding the necessary guaranty. United States treaties with Western European
countries insert a similar clause, i.e., extradition shall be denied if the requesting State
does not guarantee that the person pursued will not be executed in the requesting coun-
try or will be subject to a treatment liable to impair his physical integrity. See, e.g.,
Extradition Treaty, Jan. 18, 1973, United States-Italy, art. VIII, 26 U.S.T. 493, T.I.A.S.
No. 8052. When there is no treaty, Switzerland will act on the basis of article 37, para-
graph 2 of the IMAC. Switzerland did, in fact, obtain such a guaranty from the United
Arab Emirates, see In re Khetty, BG (unpubl.) (Feb. 22, 1980), and from Sri-Lanka. See
In re Dharmajah, BG 107 I b 72 (1981). The Swiss require that the principles of the U.N.
Declaration on Human Rights be assured in nations with which Switzerland has no
treaty, prohibiting capital or corporal punishment, inhuman treatment or prosecution for
political, extended or constructive political offenses, because all might be in conflict with
Swiss public order and be deemed "procedural defects." See Swiss Reservations to the
ECE, art. 11, 1967 BBI 319; Deutsches rechtshilfe Gesetz, para. 8, 1982 BGBI 2071;
Bundesgesetz dber Auslieferung und Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen, para. 12. Notwithstand-
ing a treaty with Argentina, Switzerland-Argentina Extradition Treaty of 1906, supra
note 26, the Swiss Supreme Federal Court, denied the extradition of five Argentine na-
tionals for murder, extortion, kidnapping and other grave crimes. See In re Bufano, BG
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surrendered person.
G. Special Courts
The requirement of normal judicial process, with an assurance of a
fair trial for the surrendered person in the requesting country, is an
important element of extradition procedure among Western nations.
This means that no extradited person shall be tried by a special court.
This includes summary proceedings in an ordinary court. Switzerland
has gone one step further by stipulating that judicial assistance is
granted, only if the individual involved can appeal to a higher judicial
authority."
108 I b 408 (1982). Again, the motive behind the Court's decision is the political situa-
tion existing in Argentina at the time; a military regime is unable to guarantee that a
suspect will not be executed or otherwise be subject to physical punishment. It is also
worthy of note that Switzerland, in article 11 to its reservation to the ECE, may also
object to corporal punishment and demand a similar guaranty as in the case of the death
penalty, that corporal punishment not be carried out. ECE, supra note 4, art. 11. Corpo-
ral punishment is prohibited under the Swiss Constitution. BV Art. 65, II.
68. The IMAC is applicable to criminal matters when, in accordance with the law in
the requesting State, an appeal to a Judge can be had. IMAC, supra note 1, art 1, para.
3. Extradition is conceded provided the extradited person is not brought and tried before
a Special Court. Id., art 38. The ECE has not established this rule. Switzerland, however,
as well as a few other democracies, made reservations to the ECE asserting its right to
refuse extradition unless the requesting State guarantees that judgment will be rendered
by an ordinary court. Swiss Reservations to the ECE, supra note 16, art. 1. Turkey, on
the other hand, declared upon ratification, that similar to the request for transforming
capital punishment into life imprisonment, such requests for ordinary instead of sum-
mary court proceedings, will be given "favorable consideration," provided the National
Assembly of the Turkish Republic will so decide. This reservation appears to be "passing
the buck" on to Parliament, and to be avoiding government responsibility for not adher-
ing to the request made by the various European cosignatories to the Convention. The
United States-Switzerland Extradition Treaty excludes any extradition of suspects who
will be brought before Special Courts. United States-Switzerland Extradition Treaty of
1900, supra note 26, art. IV. The problem for Switzerland arises again, similar to the
capital punishment restriction, vis-i-vis signatories of older treaties that have not in-
serted the clause, in which Switzerland will be precluded from demanding assurances for
trial in ordinary courts and summary proceedings. It is hard to imagine how this request
would work against the U.S.S.R. or some Latin American countries. No attempt has been
made thus far to renegotiate these treaties. It is noteworthy that both the United States
and Switzerland have adhered to the special court restriction of the Extradition Treaty
of 1900. A question has been raised whether a special court, instituted by the Constitu-
tion or by a statute to judge certain offenses, would be considered a special court in the
sense of the law or the treaty. In Losembe v. FPM, BG 99 I a 547 (1973), the Swiss
Supreme Federal Court ruled that such a court would not be considered a special court
in the negative sense, because such an institution would be just a division of the ordinary
tribunal of the country in question. Similarly, the Swiss reservations to the ECE pro-
vides that:
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H. Judgments in Absentia
Judgments rendered against an offender in his absence are some-
what tainted and do not generally have the same standing as regular
judgments, particularly in foreign countries.0 Although prior treaties
have not specified any such exceptions, it has been the rule in more
recent agreements.7 0
Switzerland reserves the right to refuse extradition (a) if there is a possibil-
ity that the person claimed will be brought before an extraordinary court, and if
the requesting State does not give assurances deemed sufficient, that the judg-
ment will be passed by a court which is generally empowered under the rules of
judicial administration to pronounce on criminal matters; (b) if extradition is
requested to carry out a sentence passed by an extraordinary court.
Swiss Reservation to the ECE, supra note 15, Ad. art. 1. PONCET-NEY OUD, supra note 6,
lists special courts as follows:
a) those established by executive-not legislative-power.
b) those established after offense in question committed.
c) those existing for a limited period.
d) those established for economic policy reasons only.
e) those established according to criteria to discriminate against certain
parts of the population.
f) those that follow a rapid [summary] proceeding.
g) those against which there is no appeal.
Id. at 30. In In re Bufano-Martinez, BG 108 I b 409 (1982), the Swiss Supreme Court
denied extradition because of the special court system under control of the military re-
gime in Argentina. Likewise, in In re Sener, BG 109 I b 65 (1983), the Court denied
extradition because of the Turkish military regime. In both cases, the requesting coun-
try's administration of justice was not trusted to apply the elementary rules of judicial
procedure. Again, it is noteworthy that even though Turkey is a cosignatory of the ECE
and Switzerland is obligated to follow a request by that nation, Switzerland has used its
reservation to the ECE, see supra note 16 art. 1, to deny the request. There is no similar
exclusion in the German Extradition and Assistance Law of 1982, see supra note 10, nor
in the United States-Italian Extradition Treaty of 1983, see supra note 26. Austria, how-
ever, follows the Swiss example.
There are several decisions of the European Human Rights Commission that denied
extradition to countries exposing suspects to inhuman treatment. See PONCET &
NEYROUD, supra note 6, at 31 n.44.
The Swiss Court has required that a guaranty be given that a suspect would not be
prosecuted in a special court. See In re Ameur Chebbah, BG (unpubl.) (Apr. 17, 1985).
69. 1 DAHM, supra note 9, at 163-66; D. DE VABRES, supra note 6, at 256. In the
United States criminal contempt cases usually rest on contumacy. Therefore, the re-
quested country will ask for information on notification of the conviction in absentia,
and of the right of absent convict to reopen the case, if he is to be surrendered. See
United States-Italy Extradition Treaty of 1983, supra note 4, at art. XII. In case the
information requested is not forthcoming, surrender may be denied. Cf. Gallina v. Fra-
ser, 177 F. Supp. 856 (D. Conn.), aff'd 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
851 (1960).
70. The IMAC provides that extradition will be denied if the convict appears to op-
pose execution of a judgment rendered in his absence, and this provision is no longer
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I. Territoriality and Universality
It is debated in international law whether a request can be granted
for offenses committed in a third country, although the offense might
subject to appeal. IMAC, supra note 1, art. 96, para. C. Originally, the ECE did not
contain such a provision. Upon the insistence of a few signatories, including Switzerland,
however, an additional protocol was adopted at Strasbourg, France, on March 17, 1978,
(and is now adhered by most signatories) which specifies under art. 3:
When a Contracting Party requests from another Contracting Party the ex-
tradition of a person for the purpose of carrying out a sentence . . . rendered
against him in absentia, the requested Party may refuse . . . if, in its opinion,
the proceedings leading to the judgment did not satisfy the minimum rights of
defense recognized as due to everyone charged with a criminal offense. However,
extradition shall be granted lius cogens] if the requesting Party gives an assur-
ance considered sufficient to guarantee to the person claimed the right to a re-
trial with safeguards as to the rights of defense. This decision will authorize the
requesting Party either to enforce the judgment in question if the convicted per-
son does not make an opposition or, if he does, to take new proceedings against
the person extradited ....
Second Protocol to the ECE, supra note 16, art. 3, para. 1. This decision will authorize
the requesting party either to enforce the judgment in question, provided the convict
does not oppose, or if the convict does oppose, to take proceedings against the person by
prosecution as if there was no judgment. The article goes on to rule on the procedure in
paragraph 2 stipulating that "when the requested Party informs the person whose ex-
tradiction has been requested, of the judgment rendered against him in absentia, the
requesting Party shall not regard this as a formal notification of the judgment for the
purposes of criminal procedure." Id. art. 3, para. 2. In fact, the judgment in absentia
does not stand in case of opposition by the convict. New extradiction proceedings initi-
ated by the requesting party are based not upon a judgment but upon asserting an of-
fense with a view to starting a trial upon his surrender. This is a great accomplishment
and a step forward to guarantee the rights of defense.
Even before Switzerland ratified the protocol in 1985, extradition was denied on the
basis of a reservation declared in article 2, paragraph 1 of the ECE. The Swiss Supreme
Court, for instance, held that in absentia judgments rendered in Italy required a thor-
ough examination ex officio of the prerequisites of extradition, especially concerning the
question of dual criminality of the offense. See In re Lazzeri, BG 87 1 195 (1961). This
scrutiny, however, does not mean that absentia judgments per se are against Swiss ordre
public.
When signatories of the ECE or treaty partners request extradition from Switzer-
land, a more lenient approach may be assumed; even more so if the foreign law permits a
new trial in case of an absentia judgment. See In re Sadiki Sahit, BG (unpubl.) (Oct. 18,
1984).
If there is a voluntary absence by a suspect, the Swiss Court has recognized a contu-
macy judgment. See In re Bozano, BG 106 I b 403 (1980). In Bozano the Court asserted
that absence is no reason to refuse to recognize a sentence and is no reason to deny
extradition; a potential violation of foreign law cannot be examined. Bozano concerned
the brutal murder of a Swiss girl in Genoa, Italy and the subsequent excape of her mur-
derer to France. France expelled Bozano to Switzerland (probably incorrectly), and Italy
demanded extradition based on the principle of territoriality. The Court held that be-
cause Italy is a country generally respecting the rules of a fair trial, the suspect could not
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well be punishable in the requesting country. A country that, in accor-
dance with its statute, assumes prosecution of offenses that have been
committed outside its territory might not be accorded, per se, the same
status with respect to its extradition request as if the offense in ques-
tion had been committed within its boundaries. This exemplifies the
distinction between the concepts of territoriality and universality."
object to the irregular expulsion proceedings by France. Prior to Switzerland's ratifica-
tion of the Second Protocol, the Swiss Court ruled that an actual reason for denying
extradition did not exist. See In re Broccardi, BG (unpubl.) (June 14, 1985). Therefore,
because the Protocol was not yet enacted, Broccardi's extradition was granted. The sus-
pect, however, was unlucky; shortly after this decision the Political Department an-
nounced that the Swiss Parliament had ratified the protocol, effective as of June 1, 1985.
The Government had succeeded in convincing Parliament that part of the protocol was
worth adopting because it provided protection for the individual against sentences
passed in contumacy. With respect to the more controversial portion of the Protocol
regarding fiscal offenses, however, Switzerland made a firm and unequivocal reservation.
Generally, adherence to the ECE and its protocols regarding absentia judgments fa-
cilitates extradition among signatories. In fact, the Swiss Supreme Court has decided
that France, by virtue of its adherence to the ECE and the U.N. Convention on Human
Rights, could be granted extradition of a suspect on the basis of an absentia judgment,
prior to the ratification of either France or Switzerland of the Second Additional
Protocol.
The United States-Italy Extradition Treaty of 1983, supra note 4, art. X(5), requires
the requesting State to submit with its request a statement regarding appeals or other
available remedies against absentia sentences, that are available under the law of the
requesting State to the individual upon extradition.
For a thorough discussion of the comparative law regarding the execution of contu-
macy judgments in Switzerland, Germany, Austria, Italy and France, see DENZ, ZULRS-
SIGKEIT UND UMFANG DES VERFAHRENS GEGEN ABWESENDE 58-59 (1969).
71. The United States-Switzerland Treaty of 1900, supra note 26, limits extradition
to offenses committed in the territories of one of the contracting states. This conforms to
the Anglo-Saxon rule of territoriality, id., art I, but grants extradition for offenses pun-
ishable in both countries only. Id. art. II. According to the Swiss Penal Code, STGB arts.
4-6, the United States must extradite an offender to Switzerland, because crimes com-
mitted outside its territory are nonetheless punishable under certain conditions. Even if
the act has been committed in a third country, the doctrine of territoriality is aban-
doned. The ECE allows the denial of extradition for offenses committed outside the ter-
ritory of the requesting country, if the law of the requested party does not allow for
prosecution for the same category of offenses when committed outside the latter party's
territory. ECE, supra note 4, art. 7. ECE partners, therefore, may, but are not compelled
to, request the territoriality rule of the requested country. Thus, Switzerland, under
ECE, cannot obtain the same facility from its cosignatories as it can from the United
States. When ratifying ECE, therefore, Switzerland also reserved the right to deny extra-
dition requests if the crime had been committed in a third country, and that third coun-
try had previously denied extradition for the same offense. Swiss Reservations to the
ECE, supra note 16, art. 9. This problem might be relevant to a country's extraditing of
its own citizens. See infra PART Two § I, K.
Crimes committed partly in a one country and partly in Switzerland are treated as
non-extraditable because jurisdiction lies with Switzerland, irrespective of the fact that
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Most European countries punish crimes committed outside their terri-
tories if certain national interests or individual personal interests have
been violated by that offense. Switzerland is one of these nations.72
In contrast, the Anglo-Saxon practice creates a kind of "construc-
tive presence" when an offense violates the law of the requesting State
although the violation has actually been effected somewhere else. In
some cases, both English and United States courts have-possibly as a
compromise solution-adopted an "effect-doctrine" linking the place
the act was committed with the "fugitive character" of the offender. 73
J. Nationals
Each country has discretionary power to deny requests for extradi-
tion of its own citizens. Some countries, such as Germany, have made
it part of their constitutions.7 4 Italy and other European nations will
the predominant part of the crime may have been committed outside of Switzerland. See
In re Veraldi, BG 103 I a 616 (1977). This application of the territoriality rule was made
according to the Switzerland-France Extradition Treaty of 1869, supra note 26, art. 12.
The sale in Zurich of securities stolen in France made the offense nonextraditable. In In
re Fiorini, BG 101 I A 592 (1975), the Swiss Supreme Court, notwithstanding the rule of
territoriality, affirmed extradition when the jurisdiction of the requesting State was
proved according to its domestic law. The Court, however, reversed itself in a case in
which the political offense exception was plead by the accused, see, In re Jaroudi, BG
106 I b 297 (1980). See also United States-Italy Extradition Treaty of 1983, supra note
4, art. III, permitting the extradition of an offender alleged to have committed an offense
in a third country if he happens to be a citizen of the requesting country.
72. Article 4 of the Swiss Penal Code provides in part that the code is applicable to
anyone committing a crime outside Swiss territory directed against the State or the po-
litical and military security thereof. STGB, art. 4. Article 5 provides that the present
code applies to crimes committed against a Swiss citizen outside the territory of Switzer-
land, provided the act is also punishable where it has been committed, and provided also
that the offender found in Switzerland has not been extradited for that act. Id., art. 5.
Article 6 states that the code applies to Swiss citizens having committed a crime outside
of Switzerland and thereupon been surrendered to Switzerland for the offense. Id. art 6.
73. See Gillers v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Chandler v. United
States, 171 F.2d 921 (Ist Cir. 1948).
74. Grundgesetz [GGI art. 16 (W. Ger.). Paragraph 2 of article 16 of the German
Constitution states: "No German may be extradited to a foreign country." That clause
has sometimes resulted in the protection of war criminals. See N. BENTWICH, NAZI SPOLI-
ATION AND GERMAN RESTITUTION 204 (1965). Paragraph 2 of the German Extradition and
Assistance Law of 1982, supra note 10, states explicitly: "A foreign national can be extra-
dited upon request for an offense asserted to have been committed abroad or for a con-
viction by a foreign Court." Judicial assistance, but not extradition, can be granted
against a German citizen if a foreign sentence has been imposed against him for an ex-
traditable offense, and provided that the foreign court rendering the verdict and pro-
nouncing the sentence was acting independently. Id. para. 48.
Concerning the surrender of nationals generally, see PONCET & NEYROUD, supra note
6, at 40.
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grant the extradition of their own nationals, if so stipulated in treaties
or multilateral conventions.7" Anglo-Saxon legal concepts on the other
hand, are entirely different. This is due to different ideas on territorial-
ity and the alleged moral claim of a citizen to be judged by his own
peers.7" Upon the insistence of European states, however, both Great
Britain and the United States have been compelled to insert the re-
striction in most of their treaties.7
Article 6 of the ECE, supra note 4, obligates the requested state to prosecute the
suspect at the request of the requesting state if the suspect is not extradited.
75. Italy-Article 9 of the Italian Penal Code authorizes Italy to try an Italian citizen
for the crimes he committed abroad and for which extradition is requested. C.P. art. 9.
The Italian Government has the option to either surrender or prosecute. In fact, not-
withstanding its treaty with the United States, which did not mention the right to deny
extradition of its citizens, Italy has always refused such extradition. See Refuse, The
Extradition of Nationals, 24 ILLINOIS STUDIES, THE SOCIAL STUDIES (1939).
France-According to the French Law on Extradition, supra note 42, art. 3(1), citi-
zens are not extradited, but can be prosecuted in France. See Code d'Instruction
Criminelle, 1878 J.O. 5255. Originally, even French proteges, such as alien national resi-
dents of France were protected against extradition. See Refuse, supra, at 86.
Holland - The law imposes no obligation to extradite, but might indicate the option
to do so. See id., at 85.
Austria - Paragraph 12 of the Austrian Extradition and Assistance act of 1979,
supra note 57, prohibits the extradition of Austrian citizens.
76. Whether a justified claim so exists among countries of a similar system of law is
debatable. The British concept that a criminal should be tried in the place where the act
was committed is derived from one of the basic tenets of Anglo-Saxon law. See REFUSE,
supra note 75, at 25.
There is an "optional clause" theory which holds that, a bilateral treaty should not
be affected by the municipal law concerning the extradition of a citizen. See id. at 32.
Another doctrine is the "discretionary power" rule, which makes extradition-even in
treaties-a matter of comity. The British have frequently demurred against this concept,
however, because it was in conflict with the rule of reciprocity. The British Extradition
Act of 1870, supra note 14, in fact, does not mention the nondelivery of nationals. It was
frequently argued that there was an advantage in getting rid of the "rascals." Hence,
although treaties authorize Britain to deny the extradition of its nationals, they also
allow discretion. See Switzerland-Great Britain Extradition Treaty of 1880, supra note
26, art. 3. This claim is justified only when the requesting country has a totally different
legal system, owing to immaturity (Third World) or to a totalitarian (or authoritarian)
rule. When criminal systems are comparable and enjoy mutual confidence, this claim
appears unjustified. The Swiss Constitution establishes that Swiss citizens and residents
have a right to be heard, even in civil cases, by the judge having jurisdiction on territo-
rial basis. B. VERF. art. 59 (Switz.). The Swiss law on personal jurisdiction holds that
territoriality is not dispositive in and of itself; a suspect may be tried wherever he is
found. This rule is derived from the refusal to extradite. See Refuse, supra note 75, at
134.
77. The United States-Switzerland Extradition Treaty of 1900, supra note 26, art. I,
provides that there is no obligation to prosecute. Article III of the United States-Italy
Extradition Treaty of 1983, supra note 4, allows the requested State to extradite a sus-
pect for an offense committed outside the requested State only if the offense is punisha-
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The question arises whether, upon denial of extradition because of
citizenship, the offender may go free or whether he must be prosecuted
at home. The maxim "aut dedere, aut judicare" is an accepted rule in
most European codes, but it is not adhered to in grants of asylum.7 8
Switzerland makes extradition of Swiss nationals dependent upon the
consent of the individual concerned 7 and reservations made by Swit-
zerland, upon the ratification of the ECE, follow that rule. In this re-
spect, therefore, international agreements will not prevail over the do-
mestic law.80
It is important to note that the Legal Affairs Committee of the
Consultative Assembly collaborated with legal experts, among them
the Swiss penalist, Professor H. Schultz, in June 1969. At this meeting
the participants discussed the problems raised upon implementation of
the ECE by various signatories and other members invited to adhere to
the ECE. One of the problems analyzed was the position of resident
aliens who sought to have the same standing as citizens have when at-
tempting to avoid extradition. The Assembly's decision to afford
"rooted residents" the same status as citizens, was due to the large
number of foreign workers employed by the European economy and
the large number of employees who reside in the country of their em-
ployment (about ten million workers at the time of that discussion);
even though they are not "rooted" in the sense of having the same
background and cultural standards as the citizens of the country of
ble there-which is consistent with the rule of dual criminality-or if the suspect is a
citizen of the requesting State. In other words, a United States citizen who commits a
crime in a third country can be extradited by Italy to the United States irrespective of
whether the suspected crime is punishable in Italy. The signatory to the treaty thus
assumes jurisdiction over its subjects, notwithstanding the fact that the offense was com-
mitted elsewhere.
78. Asylum is granted, save for political terrorists, under certain conditions set forth
in recent international conventions and the pertinent domestic laws. See infra PART
THREE § II, D. Switzerland must prosecute an offender if it refuses to surrender him. See
STGB, arts. 3-7.
79. IMAC, supra note 1, art. 7 para. 1. An exception is provided for the return of a
citizen temporarily surrendered by a third country to Switzerland, for trial at home. Id.
at art. 7(2).
80. Swiss Reservations to the ECE, supra note 16, art. 6. This reservation concerns
acts committed outside Swiss territory which are prosecuted in accordance with STGB,
arts. 5 & 6, and the Federal law on State responsibility, art. 16, RS. 170.32, and the laws
prohibiting terrorist acts committed on board Swiss aircraft, RS. 747.30 or vessels. RS.
748.0. It is interesting to note that a Swiss national who instigates a crime to be commit-
ted abroad can be prosecuted abroad upon a request by the appropriate foreign author-
ity because the principal crime was committed abroad. In other words, Switzerland
should not assume jurisdiction because of the instigation, but it could do so in the discre-
tion of the courts. See In re Lenzlinger, BG 104 IV 77 (1978).
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their employment."1
There was likewise an extended discussion on applying the princi-
ple "aut dedere aut punire" to nationals. Until the conflict between
territoriality and universality is reconciled in the domestic codes, how-
ever, the request to punish a citizen only when he is surrendered
makes no sense for countries that cannot prosecute acts committed
outside their territorial boundaries.82 Moreover, a society cannot realize
its goal of punishing criminals, if fugitives are granted sanctuary in any
country which does not voluntarily surrender criminal offenders. 83
K. Re-Extradition to Third Countries
This issue arises when the requesting country, upon receiving the
suspect, may itself be in possession of a request from a third country
petitioning for the extradition of the individual for the same or another
act committed. Although no law forces the requesting country to in-
form the requested country of the third country's petition, it is an es-
tablished rule that the requesting country cannot, under any circum-
stances, re-extradite the individual without either the consent of the
requested (and surrendering) country or the individual himself.
Europe and the United States differ on this point. The United
States-Switzerland treaty is quite specific; the consent of the individ-
ual is essential, and that consent must be given voluntarily and under
no trace of force or duress. In addition, only when the individual in
question has been at liberty for a period of at least one month follow-
ing his final release to leave the territory of the requesting country, and
he has failed to make use of such liberty, does the requested country
cease to be interested.8 4 The ECE, in contrast, requires only the con-
sent of the requested State, not the individual himself. It also requires
the production of new documents on the alleged crime by the request-
ing State.85
81. The Dutch Government has included "rooted" aliens. See Duk, Principles Un-
derlying the European Convention on Extradition, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION
AMONG EUROPEAN STATES 27, 32-36 1970). Switzerland has recently followed the Dutch
approach by refusing to surrender a "rooted alien" who had been domiciled in Switzer-
land for a considerable period of time, had his family there, and his children in Swiss
schools. See In re Pasca, BG (unpubl.) (Nov. 15, 1984).
82. Concerning the United States and the Scandanavian countries, see supra note 61
and accompanying text.
83. See United States-Switzerland Extradition Treaty of 1900, supra note 26. This is
a permissive clause and there is no obligation to deny extradition.
84. The United States-Switzerland Extradition Treaty of 1900, supra note 26, states
that having committed an offense elsewhere, should leave the requesting country to qual-
ify in this respect. Id., art. IX(2).
85. ECE, supra note 4, art. 15. The rule does not provide proper protection for the
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The IMAC reflects a much simpler rule. Re-extradition is prohib-
ited for offenses committed prior to the offense for which extradition is
sought. This rule, however, becomes void forty-five days after the dis-
charge of the accused in the requesting country."6 In accord with its
position on the extension of trial (against the speciality rule), Switzer-
land assures the ability of the accused to move around freely and leave
the requesting country at will when the requested country's consent is
given. A new hearing is probably also contemplated because Swiss legal
concepts require it.87
L. Conflicting Requests
Legal theories in the United States tend to recognize the discre-
tionary denial of extradition in a case in which two different treaty
signatories present petitions for the surrender of the same person. The
requested State, in this case, could honor one of the petitions based
upon the seriousness of the offense, the place where the crime was
committed, the offender's nationality, the sequence of the requests
and, of course, the provisions of the treaty. If the petitions were
accused, because there is nothing to prevent the authorities of the requesting state to
which the offender has been surrendered, to ask for the consent of the requesting coun-
try which might give the consent at its discretion. That State may, but is not required to,
request production of documents set forth under the consideration of the normal and
original request. Id. art. 12. In fact, there is an attempt in the ECE to apply the special-
ity rule to reextradition. Id. art. 14. The ECE allows for a lapse of 45 days after final
discharge of the offender in the requesting country. But, even though the speciality rule
prohibits extradition for offenses not mentioned in the petition, the reextradition permit
may delay extradition requests only until production of documents (copy of conviction or
statement of offense). Id., arts. 14 & 15. Article XVI, paragraph 2 of the United States-
Italy Extradition Treaty of 1983, supra note 4, prohibits the extradition of a suspect to a
third country without the consent of the requested state, not the individual. The extra-
dited individual can be surrendered to a third country if he leaves the requesting State
freely and thereafter freely returns; or if the suspect is free to leave the requesting State
but does not do so for 30 days. In either event, the consent of the requested State need
not be obtained.
86. "The pursued may be extradited on condition that the requested State shall...
not reextradite him to a third State for any offense committed prior to his extradition."
IMAC, supra note 1, art. 38. These rules do not apply after 45 days. Id.
87. A restriction on the power to consent, was recommended by the Legal Affairs
Committee of the Council of Europe. See supra PART Two § I.
88. See United States-Italy Extradition Treaty of 1983, supra note 4, art. IX.
The Swiss Court has held that when there are several requests under articles 17-19
of the ECE and article 40, paragraph 2 of the IMAC concerning different crimes in vari-
ous countries, the requesting State may surrender the suspect to a third nation. See In
re Giovanni Torasso, BG (unpubl.) (Aug. 6, 1984).
According to article XV of the United States-Italy Extradition Treaty of 1983, supra
note 4, in the event of multiple requests for extradition of a suspect by more than one
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based upon an identical offense, the exercise of discretionary power
would be more complicated. The United States-Switzerland treaty re-
solves conflicting requests, based on the gravity of the crime, and, con-
sequently, affords preference to the State whose request is based upon
the more serious offense, unless other treaties provide otherwise. In
cases of equal gravity, the first petition submitted prevails.8 9
Europeans grant the requested State less discretion. The ECE sets
forth the considerations of the relative seriousness of the offense, the
place of the commission, the date of the request and citizenship. It also
opens the door to a subsequent re-extradition. 90
Switzerland has enacted a more specific rule. The IMAC also dis-
tinguishes between requests for the same offense and different of-
fenses-not unlike the United States rules. The place of commission
will be determinative in the case of requests for the same offense, irre-
spective of whether jurisdiction may also lie with the other State under
the principle of universality. Only where there are more and different
offenses will the decision be made according to the seriousness, the
chronological order of the requests, the nationality, the better prospect
for social rehabilitation and the possibility of extradition to another,
fourth State.9 1
state, the decision is at the discretion of the requested State, according to the place of
the offense, the gravity and the sequence of the requests.
The French Extradition Law, supra note 42, art. 6, states the relevant factors to be
considered, including the interest of the requesting state, its priority and the gravity of
the offense. The decision is at France's discretion.
89. United States-Switzerland Extradition Treaty of 1900, supra note 26, art. XI.
90. ECE, supra note 4, art. 17. The convention does not make a distinction between a
request for the same and for different offenses. Id. This may in fact be irrelevant because
the degree of seriousness is solely determined by the requested State, in case the individ-
ual is sought by two countries for two different acts.
91. The IMAC provides:
1. If several States request extradition for the same offence, extradition shall
be granted as a rule to the State where the offence was committed or principally
perpetrated.
2. If extradition is requested by more than one State for different offences,
the decision shall be made having due regard to all circumstances, especially the
seriousness of the offences, the place of commission, the chronological order in
which the requests were received, the nationality of the person pursued, the bet-
ter prospect of social rehabilitation and the posibility of extradition to another
State.
IMAC, supra note 1, art. 40. In Jaroudi v. FPM, 106 I b 297, 298 (1980), the Swiss
Supreme Court denied extradition of the accused to Lebanon, although the offense had
been committed there. Instead, the Court granted extradition to France where only one,
less relevant act had been committed. The Court accepted the French definition of polit-
ical offense-reciprocity on the legal qualification-implying also that France would
rather adhere to the condition of non-re-extradition, be it to Lebanon or to a fourth
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II. EXCEPTIONS
Apart from the restrictions on extradition already discussed, there
are three exceptions generally recognized as valid reasons to deny re-
quests for international cooperation. These are the fiscal, military and
political offense exceptions.
A. Fiscal Offenses
Fiscal offenses have almost universally been excluded from extra-
dition and, until recently, from any judicial assistance. The reasons re-
main as obvious as ever; there is not the slightest interest on the part
of one country to assist another country in the collection of contribu-
tions from its citizens. Such contributions may or may not be justi-
fied-it is simply not the requested country's business. Economic inter-
dependence and international collaboration in combatting business
delinquency has changed the legal climate with regard to fiscal duties
toward tax avoidance or evasion arising out of tax shelters and other
methods of withholding contributions. Whether, under these circum-
stances, it can be argued that fiscal privileges in matters concerning
mutual international assistance are on their way out, however, is more
a political question than a legal one. Because prior treaties and munici-
pal laws, which enumerated extraditable offenses, avoided the issue of
tax evasion, the question whether extradition could be requested at all
was never raised.92 More recent treaties and laws, however, had to ex-
clude them expressly, if that was intended. The newest treaties and
most recent municipal laws simply ignore the fiscal exception, and,
country, even if that fourth country claimed the individual concerned. See In re
Donadoni, BG 103 I a 624 (1977) (article 17 of the ECE is a guideline only; the decision
is up to the discretion of the Swiss).
92. The United States-Switzerland Mutual Assistance Treaty of 1973 specifically ex-
cludes extradition when the alleged violations concern fiscal offenses. United States-
Switzerland Mutual Assistance Treaty of 1973, supra note 59, art. 2(5). See also In re
Grandi, BG 60 1 216 (1934); In re Buzzi, BG 57 I 284 (1934); In re Estinger, BG 39 1 228
(1913). A "relative" fiscal offense, one committed in connection with a common crime, is
unknown in Switzerland. See JURISPRUDENCE DES AUTORITts ADMINASTRATIVES DE LA
CONF1DERATION 143 (1932). Extradition could be granted under the specialty rule for the
common crime. See In re Redjoff, BG 79 1 34 (1953). The Mutual Assistance Treaty does
grant judicial assistance, but not extradition, in tax matters involving organized crime.
United States-Switzerland Mutual Assistance Treaty of 1973, supra note 59, art. 2. Like-
wise, it does not apply to cartel and antitrust matters, id. art. 2(1)(C)(4), or violations of
customs, taxes, duties, etc. Id. art. 2(1)(c)(5). Assistance shall be granted, however, if the
request concerns an investigation or proceeding involving one of the offenses enumerated
above if the offense was allegedly committed in furtherance of the purposes of organized
criminal activity. The United States-Switzerland Extradition Treaty of 1900, supra note
26, does not apply to fiscal crimes at all.
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thus, imply that at least mutual assistance can be granted for such
offenses.'"
Although the ECE originally had excluded extradition for fiscal of-
fenses (unless there was a special bilateral agreement), the ECE re-
placed the original exclusion contained in article 5 with an additional
Protocol of March 17, 1978, which obligates the signatories, for the first
time in history, to grant extradition for all such fiscal offenses if the
offense corresponds to an offense of the same nature in the requested
country. In other words, if the offense is punishable in both countries,
extradition is granted. In addition, even if the same kind of taxes are
not imposed in both countries, including securities exchange restric-
tions, extradition shall be granted.9 '
93. Article 5 of the ECE, supra note 4, permits extradition for offenses concerning
taxes, duties, customs or exchange only if the contracting parties have agreed with re-
spect to that offense. The ECE, in effect, invited its signators to conclude bilateral (or
multilateral) agreements among themselves. The ECE could do no more in this respect,
if a large number of countries with different economic systems and concepts was going to
adhere to it. See ECE, supra note 4, art. 28.
94. Article 2 of the Second Additional Protocol to the ECE reads:
Fiscal Offenses:
1. For offenses in connection with taxes, duties, customs, and exchange, ex-
tradition shall take place between the Contracting Parties in accordance with
the provisions of the Convention, if the offense, under the law of the requesting
Party, corresponds to an offense of the same nature.
2. Extradition shall not be refused on the ground that the law of the re-
quested Party does not impose the same kind of tax or duty or does not contain
a tax, duty, customs, or exchange regulation of the same kind as the law of the
requesting Party.
Second Additional Protocol to the ECE, supra note 16, art. 2. A signatory of that Proto-
col would therefore be compelled to extradite an individual for a violation of an exchange
regulation, notwithstanding the fact that such regulation existed in the requested coun-
try which has subscribed-as have most Common Market partners-to the free flow of
capital. Thus far, only a few ECE signatories have ratified this Protocol, and those that
have reserved the right not to extradite for fiscal matters.
Regarding municipal law, note that the German Extradition and Assistance Law of
1982 does not exclude extradition for fiscal offenses; contra, Austrian Extradition and
Assistance Act of 1979, supra note 57, para. 15(2) does explicitly exclude all fiscal mat-
ters. Austria has not enacted a stipulation similar to article 3, paragraph 3 of the IMAC,
supra note 1, for judicial assistance in a case of fiscal fraud.
Swiss business and banking circles have been under the impression, conveyed by
article 3, paragraph 3 of the IMAC, that, although not mandatory, judicial assistance
may be granted on requests from countries with very high or confiscatory taxes that
discriminate against mobile property. In a very recent decision, however, the Swiss Su-
preme Court ruled that Switzerland would be obligated to grant assistance when fiscal
fraud against a foreign country occurred. In re Interclean Trading-Ziegler, A 317/85
(Nov. 27, 1985).
In Interclean, a German importer of certain parts, apparently through a Swiss affili-
ate had obtained goods at higher prices than were really billed by the Spanish manufac-
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Because the Protocol is fairly recent, the limits of its application
are not yet known. It stands to reason, however, that the limits will
remain in full force, and that each fiscal offense must qualify under the
double punishability principle. Moreover, the offense need not be pun-
ishable by deprivation of liberty because pecuniary sanctions are
turer-through the Swiss affiliate. Thus, a certain part of the payment made by the Ger-
man importer allegedly remained in Switzerland and was not really paid for the goods
shipped by the Spanish company. Although it could not be established that the money
thus earned by the Swiss company really belonged to the Germans, suspicion for a fiscal
fraud maneuver remained, and, in fact, the books of the affiliate which might have
proved the case remained blocked and seized according to the IMAC. In June 1985, the
Swiss Parliament was persuaded by a sudden wave of-"willingness to demonstrate collab-
oration" on the part of an overanxious Federal Council to ratify the Protocol with the
reservation, but without agreeing to grant judicial assistance for fiscal matters. In fact,
the German prosecuting authorities were asked to submit further proof regarding the
ownership of the monies that were derived from the transaction for the Swiss company.
Germany, however, had no right to demand assistance. An additional protocol, Europ.
T.S. 99, covering fiscal matters was not yet ratified by Switzerland, and thus the only
legal rationale for assistance in fiscal matters remained the IMAC, which is supposed to
be a voluntary assistance act. Such an interpretation appear appears erroneous, however,
because the Supreme Court held that Article 3, paragraph 3, of the IMAC-although
stating "can" (and not must) should not be interpreted in such a way as to leave it to the
discretion of the Swiss authorities whether assistance may or may not be granted. Such
discretionary powers would lead to insecurity. In internal guidelines established by the
Swiss Government, Finanz (Fi) 2000.1, states:
If the subject of the foreign proceedings is an offense which would be re-
garded in Switzerland as a duty or tax fraud, assistance may be granted. As a
duty or tax fraud is considered any offense punishable under Art. 14(2) of the
Administrative Penal Law (SR 313.0). On the other hand, a foreign request may
not be refused solely on the ground that Swiss law does not know the same du-
ties or taxes or fiscal regulations (Art. 24, para. 2 FD above). A foreign request
which has been made in the context of proceedings for fraud in connection with
the Value Added Tax-unknown to Switzerland-may therefore not be rejected
on the grounds that in Switzerland there is only a sales tax.
The granting of assistance in the cases of duty or tax fraud is subject to the
condition that the description of the matter under investigation leaves no doubt
that the elements of that offense under Swiss law are given. In particular, it
should be evident that there is the element of malice, for example because the
offender used false documents or induced another person to give false confirma-
tions or make false statements in his favor. ...
Id. at 16.
The interpretation of the law is such as to practically confer in cases including the
breach of bank secrecy, if they can prove that taxes have been evaded by methods of
false documents, fictitious entities or both, created for the purpose of withholding a tax
or a part thereof to the foreign government. Even a "confiscatory" tax as had been im-
posed by the Socialists in France on mobile property of certain values could thus qualify.
The Swiss and international community are still looking for guidance as to limits of such
assistance.
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As far as Switzerland is concerned, the IMAC denies any extradi-
tion for any kind of fiscal offense." With all due respect to interna-
tional judicial assistance, it is hardly likely in the foreseeable future
that Switzerland will yield to pressure from its European Convention
partners because Switzerland remains committed to the free flow of
capital. In light of this policy, offenses such as common fraud and for-
gery, if related to tax fraud or currency restriction violations, will prob-
ably not be subject to extradition. The same holds true for false decla-
ration vis-a-vis customs, untrue invoicing and any other maneuvers
intended to evade taxes or exchange controls, as long as the only victim
is the foreign government.'"
95. Article 2 of the ECE has not been modified by the Additional Protocol. It ought
to follow that tax violations, exchange violations or both, must be quite severe to qualify
as extraditable offenses under the Protocol. Apart from the basic prerequisite of dual
criminality, the restrictions regarding adequacy (proportionality), speciality, special
courts-i.e., neither summary proceedings, nor arbitrary decrees by the Financial Ad-
ministration or by the Revenue Service nor judgments in absentia-will still prevail. It
follows that administrative penalties will not be extraditable.
96. The only reference to fiscal crimes states that "[a] request [for assistance] shall
not be granted if the ... offense ... appears to be aimed at reducing fiscal duties or
taxes or which violates regulations concerning currency, trade or economic policy. A re-
quest, however, for judicial assistance under part 3 of this act [thus excluding extradi-
tion] may be granted [for] tax fraud." IMAC, supra note 1, art. 3, para. 3.
Note that the German Extradition and Assistance Law of 1982 does not exclude
fiscal offenses from extradition, it only enumerates a privilege for military and political
offenses. See supra note 10, paras. 6-7. Even the United States-Italy Extradition Treaty
does not mention the fiscal offense exception, and excludes only military and political
crimes from extradition. See supra note 4, art. V(3).
When a fiscal crime and common crime might be connected, Swiss jurisprudence
tends to limit assistance (and extradition) to the speciality clause only. The IMAC states
that the prevailing offense will determine the assistance-and extradition-supra note 1,
art. 6, and speciality will always be imposed as a condition. Swiss Reservations to the
ECE, supra note 16. See Cauchie v. Geneva, BG 107 1 264 (1981); Prioil-Campellini v.
Grisms, BG 107 I 261 (1981).
The determination as to what constitutes a fiscal as opposed to a common offense is
entirely at the discretion of the Swiss authorities. See In re Acampora, BG (unpubl.)
(Sept. 18, 1984). "Fiscal" means a debt owed to the State for taxes, duties, customs, etc.
A debt owed to a state institution, for example a hospital, is not fiscal. Thus, the Court
has held that a physician who withheld part of his income from his services that he was
bound to pass on to the state hospital-a matter punishable in both Germany and Swit-
zerland-committed a common and not a fiscal offense. See In re Klumper, BG (un-
publ.) (Sept. 23, 1985), in which evidence furnished by Switzerland to a foreign authority
concerning a common offense also revealed a fiscal crime, judicial assistance was still
granted by Switzerland because it expressed trust that the foreign state subscribes to a
system of law and would respect the speciality rule. See In re Schlumpf, BG 106 I b 260
(1980).
97. Swiss jurisprudence follows the rule "lex specialis derogat legi generali".This
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B. Military Offenses
Except in wars among allies, military offenses will not be subject
to extradition. The United States-Switzerland treaty did not specifi-
cally exclude these offenses among its enumerated extraditable offenses
nor did it mention the violation of an obligation to perform military
service or any other act against the military strength of the requesting
country. Although the ECE excluded offenses under military law, it
stated that only those military offenses that are not offenses under or-
dinary criminal law are to be excluded."' The IMAC is more specific. It
defines "military offense" as the refusal to perform military duty or
similar service or acts directed against the defense of the State re-
questing extradition."
C. Political Offenses
The most important and unanimously recognized exception to ex-
tradition is the defense that the offense is of a political character. The
rule stands for the proposition that if a tax fraud contains elements of common fraud,
the offender will be prosecuted for the tax fraud only. See A v. Canton of St. Gallen, BG
101 IV 53 (1975). The intent of the accused is relevant (subjective theory), so if a false
document aims at reducing taxes there will be no prosecution for forgery. See B v.
Grisons, BG 106 IV 39 (1980). One may think of applying this rule mutatis mutandis to a
connex act of fiscal fraud and exchange violation in favor of the foreign offender whose
purpose it is to protect his capital. In In re Nesti, BG 92 I 285 (1966), the Court held
that a connex crime of a fiscal and common nature, in one and the same act, is not
extraditable. Prior to the enactment of the IMAC, the Court held that concurrent fiscal
and common crimes were not extraditable. See In re Cicchelero, BG 103 I a 218 (1977);
See also In re Gaessler, BG (unpubl.) (July 4, 1962).
98. The ECE permits signatories to enter into agreements and to surrender military
offenders among themselves. No such agreement presently exists. A deserter who had
committed another crime in order to desert (forged documents, for instance) will proba-
bly not be extradited. See infra PART THREE § I, B & C for an analogous application.
The German Extradition and Assistance Law of 1982, supra note 10, para. 7, follows the
IMAC in that respect. The Austrian Extradition and Assistance Act of 1979, supra note
57, para. 15(1) does as well, but differentiates between purely military and mixed mili-
tary matters, when common crimes are committed by military personnel.
99. Switzerland could surrender a strictly military offender as defined by Article 3 of
the IMAC if he had committed at the same time a common crime, even during military
service, because of the predominance of the common crime. Professor Hans Schultz dis-
tinguishes between these two categories of military offenses, but gives no definite answer,
as to extraditability. TRADMONAL EXTRADITION LAWS, supra note 8, at 17. European laws
make no distinction when extradition is granted for another offense; the specialty rule
demands exclusion of any military part thereto. See In re De Cock, BG 53 I 319 (1927);
In re Canredon, BG 26 I 90 (1906). The United States-Italy Extradition Treaty of 1983,
supra note 4, art. V(3) explicitly excludes military offenses, which are not considered
common crimes. Contra In re Ktir, BG 87 I 134 (1961); In re De Cock, BG 53 1 319
(1927).
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political offense is privileged in most treaties, conventions and domes-
tic laws.100 The definition of "political offense" is left to the requested
country. This is the easiest and least complicated way out of the diffi-
culty in agreeing to define the term. The inability to extradite the po-
litical offender is therefore a rule of domestic law (municipal law in the
English terminology). It follows that the accused, upon surrender, can-
not raise the defense in the court of the requesting State that as a
political offender the court lacks jurisdiction over him.' 1 Interdepen-
100. See, e.g., U.N. International Bill of Human Rights, art. 14, G.A.Res 217 III, U.N.
Doc A/810, at 74 (1948); United States-Switzerland Treaty of 1900, supra note 26, art.
VII; ECE, supra note 4, art. 3(1). IMAC, supra note 1, art. 3, para. 1. See also German
Extradition Act of 1929, supra note 10, art. 3; C.P. art. 8 (Italy).
Concerning political crimes, see United States-Italy Extradition Treaty of 1983,
supra note 4, art. V(1).
The French Extradition Law precludes extradition for crimes of a political character
or with a political aim, supra note 42, art. 5, para. 2, but if the offense is committed
during an insurrection against the State, the acts must not be barbarous, odious or of a
radical-like character so as to destroy the political privilege.
101. See Personal Jurisdiction: Extradiction and Asylum, in DOCTRINE OP INTERNA-
TIONAL PUBLIC LAW 729 (O'Connor ed. 1972). The extension of the definition of "political
offense" to include "reason to believe that extradition requests have been made for the
purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality
or political opinion," has been adopted by the ECE, supra note 4, art. 3(2). The IMAC
distinguishes between "political offenses," IMAC, supra note 1, art. 3, and the "proce-
dural defects." Id., art. 2, para. b. The IMAC states that the "request for assistance shall
not be granted if there are reasons to believe that the foreign proceedings are carried out
so as to prosecute or punish a person on account of political opinion, social group, race,
religion or nationality. ." Id. A recently published article in a leading Ticino newspa-
per by the brilliant and eminent District Attorney Paolo Bernasconi on "New Humanita-
rian Tasks for Swiss Courts" sets forth the legal prerequisites in what appears to the
author as the first commentary to this new law: that the Swiss Court must henceforth
examine ex officio the three prerequisites, to wit:
a) That the foreign proceedings correspond to the European convention on
human rights;
b) That they do not tend to prosecute, punish or aggravate the position of
the suspect because of his political opinion, or his belonging to a certain social
group, race, religion or nationality; and
c) That they don't show any other serious deficiencies.
Corriere del Ticino, Feb. 19, 1983. (emphasis in original).
What the IMAC in article 55, paragraph 2 considers an obvious defect, see supra
note 1, is really the typical case of the extended political offense, as we may call it, which
gives Switzerland as the requested State, the right to deny extradition.
A potential persecution or discrimination of a suspect upon extradition caused the
Court to deny extradition to Turkey. See In re Sener, BG 10 I b 65 (1983); In re Bagci,
BG 108 1 b 301 (1982) (both suspects being Turks of Curdish origin). In both cases it was
successfully argued that the suspects belonged to an ethnic minority that was persecuted
in Turkey and subject to discriminatory practices by Turkish authorities. Hence, surren-
der would possibly have been in conflict with the prerequisites for extradition. See PART
Two § I, F & G. Because article 3, paragraph 2 of the ECE authorized Swiss denial of
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dence among nations, however, will require a more synchronized ap-
proach. The next section will deal with the theoretical underpinnings
of the political offense exception, the modern reasons for conceding
that privileged status and the limitations imposed upon that status.
PART THREE - THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION
I. THEORIES
A. Historical Aspects
The term "political offense" (delit politique) derives from the
ideas of the French Revolution and its liberalistic aftermath. Prior to
that era, political offenses, although not termed as such, were crimes de
lse majest and were normally punished by death under the pretense
of raison d'ktat. Offenders had to be returned to the territory of the
commission of their acts. The French Revolution in its "Declaration of
Human Rights" speaks of "offenses committed for better causes" and
eliminates the practice of punishment without law. France, since the
beginning of the last century, has refused to entertain demands for ex-
tradition of political offenders. The treaty with Switzerland of July 9,
1869, for instance, contained such a clause, notwithstanding the then
prevailing system of enumeration.'
In the nineteenth century, various schools and doctrines developed
in international public law justifying the status of political crime,' 08
extradition, the Court's decisions could not be questioned. Such was not the case in In re
Bufano-Martinez, BG 108 1 b 409 (1982), a case in which the Court denied extradition to
Argentina of kidnappers who sought to collect their ransom money in Geneva. In
Bufano, the application of the ECE probably conflicted with the Switzerland-Argentina
Extradition Treaty of 1906, supra note 26, and because treaties take precedence over the
IMAC, supra note 1, arts. 2-3, the decision is highly contestable. The ECE is of no con-
cern whatsoever to Argentina.
Instead of denying extradition, it might have been more appropriate for the Court to
exact a guaranty from Argentina to prosecute surrendered persons according to the prin-
ciples of the European Human Rights Convention, BGBI 1952 II 685, BGBI 1956 II 1879,
and get an assurance that the suspects would have a "fair trial." See In re Panamex, BG
109 1 b 175 (1983); In re Chebbah, BG (unpubl.) (Apr. 17, 1986) (special guaranties given
by Tunesia, which assured treatment compatible with human rights conventions and in
accordance with article 37, paragraph 2 of the IMAC). For a similar provision to that
contained in the IMAC, see German Extradition and Assistance Law of 1982, supra note
10, para. 6. See also British Extradition Act of 1870, supra note 14, § 3(1) (enacted 100
years earlier).
102. Switzerland-France Extradition Treaty of 1869, supra note 26.
103. The neo-classical school follows the theories of the famous French jurist Fran-
cois Guizot, who had a great influence on the codification of penal laws in Europe. In his
volume, FRAN{oIs GuizoT, DES CONSPIRATIONS ET DE LA JUSTICE POLITIQUE (1821), he ar-
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but definitions have varied ever since that time."" Interpretation has
depended more upon ideology than on law. It is, therefore, quite safe
to say: "Omnis definitio periculosa" ("all definitions are dangerous").
B. Absolute and Relative Offenses
The political offense exception distinguishes between absolute and
relative offenses. An absolute offense is an act aimed directly at the
State or its institutional functions. It also could be directed at certain
individual institutions, like unions or multinational organizations as
long as they enjoy a certain status within the State. Moreover, the act
need not overthrow the existing order, but rather it need only modify
it by reform. 10 5
gued that a political crime is a crime of circumstance, and circumstances can change.
Later, toward the end of the century, the internationally known Enrico Ferri established
the "positivistic doctrine;" arguing for the privilege of political crime upon sociological
views, justifying it because it was a positive result of social conditions. Oppression was
ignored by Ferri, but many other scholars applied the "positive reaction" to such oppres-
sion, dominating nineteenth century Europe. See generally THE POSITIVE SCHOOL OF
CRIMINOLOGY: THREE LECTURES By ENRICO FERRI (S. Grupp ed. 1968) and E. FERRI, LA
ESCUELA CRIMINO LOGICA PosnrivlSTA (1890).
104. The term "political" refers primarily to the form of the state authority within
the human society and distinguishes between the general individualistic or collectivistic
approach, or between the "perpetual power struggle" as defined by the great philosopher
Max Weber. M. WEBER, Politik als Beruf, in GESAMMELTE POLITISCHE SCHRIFTEN 397,
(1921). Weber taught the doctrine of modern liberalism as a perpetual power struggle
between the individual and the State. A later definition, taught by the Collectivists in
the Fascist-Nazi era, tended to emphasize the struggle between "good and bad" or be-
tween "friend and enemy." Its principal legal protagonist was Carl Schmitt. See C.
SCHMIrrr, BEGRIFF DES POLIrISCHEN 7, 16 (1933). More recent German jurists redefined
"political" in connection with "crime" as an attack against the State and its authority, or
in other words, its government, its institutions, and its very functions, including its con-
stitutional and policing authority, the established civil and human rights, and its rela-
tions with other States. See Gruetzner, Auslieferungsverbot und Asylrecht, in 2 DIE
GRUNDRECHTE 604 (Neumann, Nipperdey & Scheuner eds. 1954). The doctrine which had
its codified basis already in the old German Extradition Law of 1929, supra note 10,
para. 3, was delineated by Mettgenberg, DEUTSCHES AUSLIEFERUNGSGESETZ 232 (2d ed.
1953) and Gruetzner supra.
The German theory was called "objective" because it did not require any thought by
the offender that his act was meant, even in his mind, for the betterment of society.
Thus, the intent was irrelevant, as long as an attack took place against the State. The
interpretation of the law, in fact, rests on an extension or a restriction of that basic
delineation. In other words, is the formal (objective) interpretation that fits the facts to
the elements of the crime, more decisive than the motivation?
105. The absolute political crime is based upon an objective approach in that it does
not take into consideration the motivation of the offender. Absolute political offenses are
privileged and thus cannot invoke extradition. The oldest Swiss cases follow that rule.
See In re Jaffe, 27 BG I 67 (1901); In re Camporini, 50 BG I 299 (1924).
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The relative offense on the other hand, is an absolute offense com-
bined with a common one, having the same aim. The relative offense
might be committed by one and the same act (complex) or by separate
acts (connex).'" s
In both categories of offenses there is a political aspect and a com-
mon crime element. In the case of a single act, the well-established rule
is that predominance will decide. As the IMAC stipulates: "a request
shall not be granted if the subject of the proceeding is an act which,
according to the Swiss concept, has predominantly political charac-
ter." ' 0 7 The question is not that easily decided in the case of several
acts. In this situation, the concept of separation has long been adhered
to, which meant that each act would be considered separately and ex-
tradition might thus be granted for the common crime. This is against
the idea of the relative offense, and, therefore, the "predominance the-
ory" prevails. 08
A relevant factor to be considered is whether a common crime, al-
though thought to be necessary to effectuate the political crime in the
mind of the offender, is realistically capable of achieving its aim. Swiss
106. Killing a policeman at the beginning of a rebellion would be one act (complex).
Setting fire to a department store and taking the manager hostage to extort funds for the
rebellion would compromise several acts (connex). Depriving the train's driver and pas-
sengers of their liberty and extorting funds to release the hostages one act (complex).
Threatening during negotiations with the government to shoot hostages or actually
shooting one of them would comprise two acts (connex.).
107. IMAC, supra note 1, art. 3, para. 1.
108. Hans Schultz has criticized the separation concept in the case of connex acts,
because it would follow that the requested State would grant extradition for the common
crime though under the condition that prosecution for the political part be prohibited.
See SCHULTZ, supra note 6. One must consider the fact that frequently, the common
crime has been necessary in order to commit the political one, so that, in the final analy-
sis, the question of preponderance will be raised. According to the German Extradition
Act of 1929, supra note 10, any connex is sufficient and consequently, predominance is
irrelevant, provided that there is a political crime that had followed the one that was
targeted. Id. art. 3(1). The Swiss Supreme Federal Court in In re Jaffei, BG 27 I 52, 63
(1901), considering a typical complex crime, denied extradition because the political act
was predominant. In In re Belenzow, BGI 538 (1906), the Court granted extradition,
separating the common crime from the political act. Concerning more recent decisions
involving political or common crimes in either the complex or connex form, see In re
Kroger, bg 92 I 108 (1966) (predominance of common crime established, accord In re
Ockert, BG 59 1 136 (1933), contra In re Koster, BG 19 1 130 (1893) (a predominantly
political crime). The Supreme Court, in In re Gelli, BG 109 I b 317 (1983), held that the
suspect had committed a predominantly nonpolitical and hence extraditable offense, not
by virtue of his membership in a criminal organization (which is not punishable in Swit-
zerland) but by his role in the fraudulent bankruptcy of Banco Ambrosiano in Milan,
Italy. The Court determined the latter offense to be predominant. The speciality rule
governs, however, and Gelli can never be prosecuted in Italy for his activity in the crimi-
nal organization.
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jurisprudence tends to demand the potential success of the political
offense for extradition to be denied.'0 Traditionally, the mere exis-
tence of a potential for success in the mind of the criminal was consid-
ered sufficient.
An older doctrine considered the existence of the success-potential
in the mind of the criminal quite sufficient to cover the connex." °
Now, more than that is required; blurred imagination or vague halluci-
nations about an immediate collapse of the attacked order upon the
attack will not suffice. The political crime had to exist beyond the im-
agination of the criminal; that is, the term "[p]redominantly political"
had to be objectively interpreted. 1 ' This doctrine leads us to the dis-
109. The connex between common and political crimes can take three different
forms: the common crime prepares or protects the political one (i.e., stealing arms to
prepare a revolt) or it could be committed together with the political crime to facilitate
its execution (e.g., capturing a policeman during a rebellion in order to prevent the police
from protecting the existing order), or finally, the common crime could follow the politi-
cal one with a view towards preventing its prosecution.
The three forms of connex are illustrated by three different decisions of the Swiss
Supreme Federal Court. In In re Kesseleridze, BG 33 I 169 (1907), six members of the
Socialist Party of Georgia-Russia robbed a bank to obtain funds for their party, assisted
in financing the revolution in Russia and then fled to Geneva. Russia demanded extradi-
tion for the robbery. The request was denied because the common crime was committed
to prepare the revolt. In In re Bamberger, BG (unpubl.) (Mar. 25, 1922), during the
communist rebellion of 1921 in Germany, a revolutionary named Bamberger succeeded
in disarming local police officers to keep them from preventing several commando ac-
tions against a post office, banks and the local treasury. Bamberger then fled to Zurich.
Germany requested extradition for deprivation of liberty. Switzerland denied the request
because the crime had been committed to prevent police from maintaining order during
the revolt.
In In re Koester, BG 9 I 122 (1893), the German socialist Koester had committed
perjury in Berlin in order to prevent the prosecution of his comrade for offending the
German Emperor. The Court denied extradition for perjury because the act had been
committed in order to prevent prosecution for a political crime committed by another
party.
110. See SCHULZ, supra note 6, at 420. Swiss and most European jurisprudence has
been greatly influenced by the famous lawyer and statesman Heinrich Lammasch. Lam-
masch's theory is that the criminal must not commit the common crime for it's own sake,
but rather because he believes that the success of the common crime is required to ac-
complish the political crime. The common crime must prepare or materialize or abet the
political crime. The political purpose must not be vague; it must be real, sensible and
achievable. See generally H. LAMMASCH, AUSLIEFERUNGSPFLICHT UND ASYLRECHT (1887).
111. French scholars have criticized the "objective predominance" theory as too
harsh and restrictive. M. TRAVERS, DROIT PENAL INTERNATIONAL, 67 (1921); M. TRAVERS,
L'ENTRAIDE REPRESSIVE INTERNATIONALE, 4 (1928). Travers thought that the Swiss inter-
pretation left the fate of the offender to the discretion of the Swiss judge.
In a few cases, such reproach appeared somewhat justified. In In re Ficorilli, 77 BG I
57 (1951), the Fascist company commander Ficorilli fought the Partisans during the Sec-
ond World War. He did not consider the Partisans to be a legitimate fighting force, and,
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tinction between objective and subjective theories of political offenses.
C. Objective and Subjective Theories
1. The Objective Theory
Both absolute and relative political offenses must be aimed at the
functioning of the State or its institutions. This is called the objective
thesis1 ' because it is the object of the attack that counts, not the moti-
vation. The principles of this theory are generally adopted in most
non-Latin countries.
as a result, upon the capture of the Partisans, he had many of them shot. One of his
lieutenants deserted to the Partisans and fought with them for awhile. Believing that the
War would end in a Fascist victory, however, the lieutenant came back repenitent of his
"misdeeds." Ficorilli, too, had him shot. At the end of the War, Ficorilli escaped to Swit-
zerland, and Italy demanded extradition. The Swiss Court denied extradition because
the common crime of the execution of a deserter was performed in the midst of a politi-
cal struggle. The purpose of the execution was political, therefore, even though the exe-
cution itself was a common offense, it had a predominantly political character. Id. In In
re Nappi, 78 BG 1 134 (1952), the Swiss Court granted extradition of a Neo-Fascist who
had robbed the Banco di Napoli to finance an attempt to overthrough the Italian Gov-
ernment in 1948, long after the end of the War. It might have been imagined by the
Fascist criminal that the bank robbery could, in fact, accomplish a revolution, but it was
for all intents and purposes an unrelated act without any chance of accomplishing its
aim. The Court reasoned that the political character of an offense was predominant, only
if the offense was directly related to the political end sought. Thus, the common crime
and not the poltical crime was predominant in this case.
There are three complex legal offenses in the Swiss Code that are not extraditable
per se: seditious acts for a foreign state in violation of territorial sovereignty, STGB, art.
271, disturbances of interstate organizations by the defamation of a foreign government,
STGB, art. 296, and disturbances of good relations with international organizations hav-
ing a seat in Switzerland by defaming the character of the organization, STGB, art. 296.
(All three offenses have been added to the Penal Code as modified in 1951. 1951 A.S. 1-
16. Common offenses are treated in conjunction with political offenses, when, under nor-
mal circumstances, the political aspect of the offense is predominant). For an extensive
and liberal application of the rule, see In re Kruger, BG 92 1 108 (1966); In re Ockert,
BG 59 I 136 (1933); In re Camporini, BG 50 I 299 (1924); In re Ragni, BG 49 I 267
(1923); In re Koster, BG 19 1 130 (1873). And for a very rigid adherence to the political
crime exclusion, see In re Redjoff, BG 79 I 34 (1953); In re Grandi, BG 60 I 216 (1934);
In re Buzzi, BG 57 I 284 (1931); In re Ouchterlony, BG 39 I 228 (1913).
112. Peter Felchlin suggests that a relative offense, when a common crime has been
committed to support the political one, is already "subjective," in that it compels the
judge to consider what the suspect thinks and aims at. P. Felchlin, The Political Offense,
in ZURICH STUDIES FOR CRIMINAL LAW 92-99 (1979). The Swiss have, however, classified a
relative political crime as objective, if the decision on extradition is based upon the act
and not upon the motivation. Thus, the political character of the victim of the attack is
dispositive irrespective of what was in the mind of the criminal. See Dahm, supra note 9.
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2. The Subjective Theory
The French and Italians, on the other hand, have emphasized the
motives of the individual' 1 3-a view termed the subjective theory. This
doctrine characterizes a political offense simply by the motives of the
offender, that is by his "good intentions" or lack thereof. Non-selfish
motives will qualify for political privilege. The problem with this doc-
trine is that honest motives are easily put forward and are rarely refut-
able. France did add the requirement of "honest political aim or pur-
pose (not thoughts only)," 114 but even an "honest political aim" is
easily invoked to serve as a pretext for ambition, hatred or envy. The
doctrine is also steadily losing ground in the light of international
terrorism."'
113. See German Extradition Act of 1929 supra note 41, arts. 3-6. The Italians con-
sider political offenses with political motivation. C.P. art. 8, Greece followed the non-
Latin line, when it recently surrendered to Germany the leading member of the German
terrorist scene Rolf Pohle. He had been released in exchange for the Berlin conservative
politician Lorenz who had been kidnapped in a spectacular way by the Red Gang. Greece
ignored Pohle's motivation. See 2 EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTE ZEITSCHRIFT, 18 (1977).
Had he gone to Italy instead, the Italian courts would have probably denied the extradi-
tion in accordance with the wording of C.P. art. 8.
114. For a defense of the French practice of denying requests to surrender fugitives
for political crimes, see Circular of 1841 of the French Ministry of Justice, reprinted in
E. CLARKE, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF EXTRADITION 159-60 (2d ed. 1874), which
states:
Les crimes politiques s'accomplissent dans des circonstances si dificiles a
apprecier, ils naissent de passions si ardents, qui souvent sont leur excuse, que
la France mantient le principe que l'extradition ne doit pas avoir lien pour fait
politique. C'est une qu'elle met son honneur a soutenir. Elle a toujours refuse,
depuis 1830, de pareilles extraditions; elle n'en demandera jamais.
Id. at 160; accord Billot, supra note 27, at 102; contra, BURKHARDT, supra note 31, at
622. Some treaties with Switzerland take the doctrine (subjective theory doctrine regard-
ing good intentions of the offender who claims political privilege) into consideration,
such as Switzerland's treaty with France, supra note 26, art. 2, Belgium, supra note 26,
art. 4, Yugoslavia, supra note 26, art. 6, Russia, supra note 26, art. 6. Others do not, such
as England, supra note 26, art. 11, the United States, art. 7(1), and Brasil, supra note 26,
art. 3.
115. In In re Kroeger, BG 92 I 108 (1966) the Swiss Federal Supreme Court rejected
the subjective theory. The case illustrates the difference between Swiss and Italian con-
cepts, prior to the U.N. Convention on Crimes against Humanity. In the 1960's, the for-
mer SS Leader Kroeger was standing trial before an Italian court for an extradition re-
quest by Germany for having ordered the murder of thousands of Jews in Russia. Italy
denied surrender because of political motivation. When Kroeger passed through Switzer-
land to depart to some Latin American country, he was apprehended and, upon a re-
quest by Germany, was surrendered. The Swiss Court did not accept political motivation
because the crime had not been directed against a State or at some political institution.
The criminal had claimed privilege because the Jers played an important part in the
Bolshevic fight against Germany. The Swiss Court, however, regarded the crimes as com-
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3. A Compromise Terminology
At the 1935 Copenhagen Conference for the Unification of Crimi-
nal Law, the foregoing issues were clarified. A modern scholar has sum-
marized the Conference's conclusions in the following manner:
Political offenses are infringements on the organization and op-
eration of the State, as well as those against citizens' rights de-
riving therefrom. Considered political are common crimes con-
stituted by perpetration of the offenses envisaged above, as
well as acts committed in order to favor such perpetration, or
to enable the perpetrator of such crime to escape the applica-
tion of the criminal law. However, offenders who have been
motivated only by selfish or vile reasons, will not be considered
as such. Infractions that could lead to a common danger or a
state of terror, will not be considered political." 11 6
The Copenhagen Conference, therefore, blended the objective and sub-
jective theories into one compromise doctrine.
4. The Swiss Practice
Neither the Anglo-Saxon nor the Swiss practice, however, have fol-
lowed the "Copenhagen compromise." The English doctrine, that an
attack upon the State or its institutions must take place within the
framework of a rebellion or power struggle, has remained firmly estab-
lished. The Swiss have gone one step further; by demanding that a
purposeful effort by the suspect and a reasonable chance of success
exist before an offense may be characterized as political. Motivation,
though not entirely ignored, is considered secondary." 7
mon because they were aimed at revenge or hatred, and the murder was, even in the
mind of the criminal, absolutely inadequate to accomplish any political aim. Id.
The French still employ the motivation theory. Many Basque terrorists enjoy pro-
tection in France. The French conceded political privilege to Messrs. Holder and Kerhov,
two Vietnam War opponents who had hijacked an American plane and flew to France.
Although they had demanded high ransom, their offense was considered "political."
French courts denied extradition of Daoud, the notorious murderer at the Munich Olym-
pics. They conceded extradition, however, of a communist lawyer Croissant who was in-
strumental in aiding criminal acts of the German Red Army Faction.
See generally I DALLoZ, REPERTOIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE (1968); GARCIA &
MORA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ASYLUM AS A HUMAN RIGHT (1956); G. LEVASSEUR, LES
ASPECTS REPRESSIFS DU TERRORISME INTERNATIONAL 119 (1976). French Extradition Law,
supra note 42.
116. P. Riposanu, Paper on the Law of Extradition 16 (presented to the International
Law Association Congress: United States-Italy-Switzerland, 1981).
117. Regarding the theory of the purpose or aim of the offense (le bzt), see In re
Ragni, BG 49 I 266, 275 (1923); In re Kesseleridze, BG 33 1 169, 194 (1907); In re Kilat-
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D. Denial of Defense Arguments
It is worthy of note that in the light of the increasing brutality of
crime and the trend towards harsher law enforcement, there have been
schitski, BG 33 I 406 (1907).
Regarding the application of proper and adequate means in committing the crime,
see In re Belenzow, BG 32 I 538, 542 (1906).
Regarding the good chance for success to achieve the aim behind the crime, see
Ragni, BG 49 I, at 275.
Regarding the necessity of combatting the crime during a rebellious movement
against the State or its institutions, see In re Camporini, BG 50 I 299, 303 (1924); Kes-
seleridze, BG 33 I, at 194.
Regarding the delineation of a political offense according to Swiss legal concepts,
irrespective of the approach by treaty, see In re Jaroudi, BG 106 I b 297 (1980).
In In re Maccara Seamus, BG 110 1 b 280 (1984), the Swiss Supreme Court repeated
the rule it had imposed several times before: To obtain the political offense privilege, the
crime committed must have been directed against the State, it must be directly con-
nected to the cause, and it must be in proportion to the measures and consequences.
This case brought to light, once again, the fact that the IRA often does not care whom it
victimizes; the fact that the allegations of torture in Northern Ireland lack credibility;
and the fact that Amnesty International often magnifies single events and does not prove
that a suspect will be subject to discrimination in the requesting State because of his
political views.
Despite such a situation existing in Tunesia, however, the Court held that the sus-
pect must satisfy the burden of proof in order to get the privilege. See In re Ameur
Chebbah, BG (unpubl.) (Apr. 17, 1985).
In re Ochert, 59 BG I 136 (1933), presented a case in which the Swiss Supreme
Federal Court denied extradition upon request by Nazi Germany for a socialist, who
prior to Hitler's taking power, had shot and killed a Nazi storm trooper. Ochert suc-
ceeded in escaping to Switzerland. The offender proved that his act had been committed
during the power struggle in Germany aimed at the prevention of Nazi accession to
power by Weimar Republicans. In another well known case during the War, In re
Dieckmann, BG (unpubl.) (Sept. 9, 1943), the Court granted extradition to Vichy France
of a Czech soldier who had fought in the French army against Germany and had been
taken prisoner in June of 1940. After the German-French armistice at the end of June,
he was handed over to the French, upon condition of internment until the end of the
War. He succeeded in escaping to Switzerland after having stolen funds and forged docu-
ments. The French successfully argued that larceny and forgery were common crimes,
and that there was no political offense, because the War-at least for Vichy France-had
ended and no struggle for power was taking place. The French guarantied that there
would be no prosecution against the Czech Government for having fought against Ger-
many. (The value of such a promise however appeared dubious). In In re Hoter, BG 76 I
130 (1950), the Swiss Court granted extradition of a Gestapo agent, who in 1933 had
murdered a Jewish physician in Dusseldorf, Germany, a few months after the Nazis had
come to power. He tried to claim political privilege, but to no avail. The Court ruled that
the power struggle in Germany had long ended at the time of the commission of the
felony, and what the Nazis did, was strictly an act of revenge and race hatred.
Likewise in In re Peruzzo, BG 77 I 50 (1951), the Swiss Court granted extradition to
Italy of a partisan who, eight months after the end of the war in Italy, he killed a Fascist
official. The decision was based upon the fact that there was no longer a power struggle
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occasional arguments against the unlimited enjoyment of the privilege
accorded, or, at least, a more rigid interpretation (de lege ferenda) of
the privilege. 1 8 Historically, many scholars have argued in favor of the
extradition of the political criminal. They argue that a common crime
and there was no danger of the Fascist rebirth that the offender claimed to seek to pre-
vent. In one recent case, In re Kavic, BG 78 1 39 (1952), the Court denied extradition of
two Yugoslavian pilots who had hijacked a plane with the aim of escaping Tito's Yugo-
slavia. The Court waived the power struggle doctrine because the Yugoslav regime at
that time did not permit legal emigration. The ideal of personal freedom was considered
superior to a political aim and thereby predominated over the deprivation of liberty of
the crew and passengers. The decision was much criticized because of a potential dis-
criminatory treatment of requests by authoritarian governments, in as much as the Swiss
accept the right of violence "as a last resort." The Court argued that, in a totalitarian
system, all opposition being suppressed, a power struggle had little chance. There was
nothing left but escape, which should enjoy the same privilege as active revolt. Contrary
to that result is In re della Savia, BG 95 I 462 (1969), the Court granted the extradition
of the Italian communist for using explosives in Genoa against the local police authority.
Claiming political privilege, the offender argued that there was a power struggle in Italy
to overthrow the Christian Democratic regime. Although there was admittedly a strike at
that time, the unions were striking for economic improvements for their members with-
out the slightest aim to overthrow the Italian democratic system. Hence, there was no
power struggle and no political privilege. In that decision, the Swiss Court also applied
the rule of adequate means, ascertaining that explosions are senseless acts of terror and
by no means apt to accomplish the purposes of gaining access to power or changing the
system. This "adequate means" rule played an important part in an old English decision
in In re Castioni, [18911 1 Q.B. 149, in which it was held that for an offense to be politi-
cal "it must be shown that the act is done in furtherance of, done with the intention of
assistance, as a sort of overt act in the course of acting in a political matter, a political
rising, or as a dispute between two parties in the State as to which is to have the govern-
ment in its hands, this act being adequate." Id. at 156. Simply being at odds with the
government, as della Savia, had claimed, arguing that the (Italina) State was not acting
in good faith, is not convincing for conceding political privilege. See della Savia, BG 95
I, at 464.
As a matter of fact, Swiss jurisprudence grants political privilege only for political
acts and decided in In re Vogt, 50 BG 1 249, (1924), that a strike for the improvement of
conditions is never a power struggle, and violence committed during a strike deserves no
political offense consideration, (the offender was extradited). In that respect, Switzerland
distinguishes itself from other European concepts, notably Italy, where a strike is consid-
ered a political matter. See P. Nuvolone, Political Offense and Asylum, 7 H.rrE DER
VEREINIGUNG F6R GEDANKENAUSTAUSCH ZWISCHEN DEUTSCHEN UND ITALIENISCHEN JURIS-
TEN 1 (1971) citing some important decisions by the Italian Corte di Cassazione, regard-
ing equal privilege for political and social issues.
The Austrian Extradition and Assistance Act of 1979, supra note 57, para. 14, fol-
lows the Swiss practice of requiring a preponderence of evidence showing a political
rather than a common crime.
118. The question is whether treaties and conventions are ius cogens, or rather only
entitle the requested country to refuse the request. It is normally understood that when
the privilege is conceded, the offender goes free. The ECE provides that extradition
"shall not" (not may not) be granted. ECE, supra note 4, Art. 3(1).
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only affects the rights of a few, whereas a political crime has a much
greater potential for injuring society as a whole. One might answer that
some good may be done, too. If we then start weighing the good effect
against the bad effects of a political crime, we shall have to judge each
case on its merits.119
There are a few sound arguments in favor of extradition of politi-
cal criminals. First, the disturbance of public order is threatened as
long as the criminal is at large. In addition, the refusal to extradite
necessarily implies interference into the internal affairs of another
country. 20 Have we the right to express a lack of confidence in a for-
eign judge's impartiality? That is exactly what we are doing by refus-
ing extradition. 2 '
II. THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST SUSTAINING THE PRIVILEGE OF
THE POLITICAL OFFENSE
A. Justifications for the Defense
The majority of scholars believe that the political offense excep-
tion should be maintained. Many of the reasons espoused, however,
119. A German scholar, Franz Liszt, in his classic text LiSZT, ZsrrscHINFT AR
STR"RECHTSUISSENSCHAFr 66 (1882), taught that the refusal to extradite is based upon
the old opinion that State's power is considered inemical to the rights of citizens. Id. at
65.
120. See supra, notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
121. The French scholar Grivaz argued that the public deserves a great deal more
protection against and from political disturbance by rebels than by common criminals. F.
GRIVAz, L'ExTRADMoN ET DES DELITS POLITIQUES 105 (1894). Because criminals tend to
violate only the life or the property of one or a few individual victims, Saint Aubin
stated that it is the danger to the public that is relevant, and by extraditing the felon, we
secure his punishment and do not any longer interfere with the internal affairs of an-
other country, virtually expressing our complete trust for the competence of our col-
leagues across the border. SAINT AuBmN, L'EXTRADITION ET LE DROIT TH9ORIQUE ET APPLI-
QUE 398 (1913). The issue of whether it is impossible to limit the discussion to the
expediency of extraditing the offender in cases in which the political regime in the states
in question is the same, is a political and not a legal issue. Because political conditions
vary, however, not only from country to country, but also from time to time, it is not
certain at all that nations with the same background and cultural and social concepts
will always be disposed to mutually surrender their opponents. See SCHuLTz, supra note
6, at 16. See also In re Ktir, 87 BG 134 (1961). In this case, the defendant, a French
national, was a member of the Algerian Liberation Movement (F.L.N.). He was responsi-
ble, along with three others, for the killing of an F.L.N. member suspected of treason.
France requested his extradition from Switzerland, where he had fled. He argued against
extradition on the ground that France was at war with the F.L.N. at the time, and that
the act he had committed was paramount to killing an enemy. Thus, he made the chang-
ing political climate in France a basis for his defense.
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cannot withstand close scrutiny. An analysis of these reasons and of
valid justifications for the defense are set forth below.
1. Motive
Many theorists say that there are no selfish reasons when commit-
ting a political crime. Those criminals are altruistic and, from a social
point of view, such crime is less despicable. The offender fights for the
rights of others; self-sacrifice and patriotism justify his acts."2 These
arguments, however, fail to perceive the ambition, the hunger for
power, the destructive anger, the envy for the achievements by others
and the resulting hate of the "establishment" that is almost always un-
derlying such acts. Politics has become a career and the modern Robin
Hood hopes, upon his successful operation, to become a Minister in the
new government. 2 '
2. Bias Against the Foreign Judge
The perception that the judge from the requesting state may be
under an undue public pressure, which prevents a fair application of
the law is indeed a valid argument against extraditing a political of-
fender. When a certain degree of independence of jurisprudence is con-
stitutionally guaranteed, however, and when there are appeals and re-
views of the sentence by higher courts, this argument is not too
convincing. Although it is true that the climate of a political trial is
often dubious and fraught with uncertainty, why is the requested State
better equipped to do a job of administering justice than a foreign
judge? Are we really so free from pressure ourselves, as well as from
bias in light of the committed crime, regardless of where it might have
been perpetrated? 12 4
122. See P. FELCHIN, DAS POLITISHE DELIKT 150 (1979), at 150, in which the author
describes the trend towards "compassion" for acts of "liberation" beginning in the mid-
dle of the last century and lasting until recently. Id.
123. C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIME 375 (1974); 1 J.
ORTOLAN, ELEMENTS DE DROIT P19NAL 303 (1875); 2 J.P. BERNARD, TRAIPE THkORIQUE ET
PRATIQUE DE L'EXTRADITION 252 (1890).
124. See FELCHIN, supra note 122, at 149. Public sentiment and political pressure
played a part in two decisions by the Swiss courts in recent history. In May, 1923, the
Russian expatriate Moritz Conradi shot the Soviet delegate to the Ouchy Peace Confer-
ence. He claimed "political privilege"-which does not exist in the penal code-and was
acquitted. "Exceptional circumstances explained, if not justified the crime," so it is said.
In February, 1936, however, the Jewish student Frankfurter shot and killed the Nazi
Gauleiter Gustloff at Davos. Nazi propaganda, labelling the politically motivated act as a
common crime perpetrated by Bolshevik agents, put enormous pressure on Switzerland,
and, consequently, the Swiss Court sentenced Frankfurter to life imprisonment. The
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3. The Exile
Some scholars have argued that because exile is already such a se-
vere punishment, extradition appears superfluous. There is not the
slightest legal basis, however, for such an argument. Although this ar-
gument seems to be very humanitarian, it does not take into account
the criminal claim upon the felon.1" Forced inactivity, so goes the ar-
gument, and the silencing of the felon in his refuge may mean more to
an idealist than the potential martyrdom in his native land. The au-
thorities, therefore, may just be doing him a favor by extraditing him.
We know too well, however, that exile does not mean silence anymore.
On the contrary, today, political exiles continue their activities from
abroad, undisturbed by the political harassment to which they are nor-
mally subjected in their native land. Many misdeeds have resulted
from exile, as recent history has shown."'
Court concluded that no matter how sound the reasons of the criminal, a "murder re-
mains a murder" which must be punished by the maximum sentence possible under the
law. After the war, when German pressure ceased, the first act of the competent Swiss
authorities was to pardon the offender, and he became a well known writer in Israel. For
further details on the Frankfurter case, see Neue Zfrcher Zeitung, Feb. 4, 1986 (on the
50th anniversary of Frankfurter's act).
The systematic refusal to extradite spares the judge-the delicate task of pronouncing
himself on the independence of the foreign courts in the requesting country, see H.
DOWNEDIEU DE VABRES, LES PRINCIPES MODERIVES DE DROIT PENAL INTERNATIONAL, 269
(1928), but the contrary may just as well be argued. In In re Bodenan, BG (unpubl.)
(Aug. 13, 1973), Bodenan had hijacked a Spanish plane with former Zaire president
Tsombe in order to bring him to Algiers. The hijacker fled to Switzerland, and upon
Spain's request under treaty, he was surrendered with the condition that there would be
no prosecution in Spain for anything but the plane's capture, especially not for assisting
Tsombe to get to Algiers. Doubt was expressed in the impartiality and independence of
the Spanish judge (Algeria granted Tsombe asylum under a Moslem rule).
125. Lammasch has said that a thief or a murderer does not really care. For him no
home exists; he is guided by the rule: "ubi bene, ibi patria". H. LAMMASCH, RECHT DER-
AUSLIEFERUNG WEGEN POLITISCHER VERBRECHEN, 234 (1884). People who have fought for
a cause might feel differently; being torn away from one's home is hard indeed. Switzer-
land, whose concept of criminal law is based upon the society's right and interest in the
punishment of the criminal, does not recognize asylum as a punishment. There are, of
course, other concepts of the purpose of criminal law, but these are becoming subsidiary,
though still relevant.
126. It depends, of course, on the exile country that is selected by the felon. Switzer-
land denies the right to actively engage in political activity to anyone seeking asylum.
Abstaining from such activity is positive Swiss law. See 1855 BB1 1 455. See also SCH-
ULTZ, supra note 6, at 23. The doctrine of "political opportunism in permitting political
activity to exiles" does not mean that the asylum necessarily adheres to the ideology of
the refugee. See 0. KIRCHHEIMER, POLITICAL JUSTICE 563 (1965). The German Imperial
Government supported Lenin's activity in order to overthrow the Czar. What prompted
Giscard d'Estaing to permit Khoumeiny's work from his French shelter against the Shah,
has remained a political mystery. It could have been in the hope that France would
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4. Passed Danger
Some scholars have argued that, once out of the country of the
commission of his act, the political felon ceases to be dangerous to his
community because he is no longer capable of attacking his object. 27
Yet even this argument is no longer valid. Terrorist activity is fre-
quently more effectively continued from a political shelter. Harm to
the public continues-not only in his native land, but also in his asy-
lum-no matter how one restricts the political activity.'2 8
5. Different Concepts of Punishability
The prohibition against double punishability of an extraditable of-
fense makes the argument against extradition superfluous. Of course,
there are always varying interpretations of criminal law which may af-
fect the fate of the suspect to be surrendered, 2 s but normally this vari-
ation of interpretation works in favor of the individual.'2 0 In all trea-
ties, conventions and domestic laws the dual criminality rule appears
to render sufficient protection to the individual notwithstanding the
different concepts of punishability.13 1
6. Interference
Fear of undue interference into the judicial process of another
country is often presented as an argument against extradition. This is
similar, but not identical, to the "bias against the foreign judge" dis-
cussed above. By extraditing upon a request containing nothing more
than the facts which are the elements of a certain crime, we actually
render a positive judgment on what has been requested."2 This is be-
thereby have obtained a secured supply of energy, once Khoumeiny came to power.
127. See LAMMASCH, supra note 125, at 232. Some authors attribute this argument to
a lack of interest in the social climate of the requesting nation. The opposite is true. "We
keep the felon under control and you have peace." FELCHIN, supra note 122, at 168.
128. See LAMMASCH, supra note 125, at 227.
129. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 3, at 324; DAHm, supra note 9, at 281; LAMMASCH, supra
note 125, at 164.
130. In In re Malatesta, BG XVII 450, (1891) extradition to Italy was refused be-
cause of "different concepts." "Conspiracy," however, is not punishable in Switzerland.
131. Identical norms do not assure identical sentences. Lammasch, who was also the
last Prime Minister of the Habsburg Monarchy (with its many different nations, cultures
and concepts), did not see this as a particular problem for extradition. LAMMASCH, supra
note 125, at 230.
132. Refusing extradition to one country and granting it to another on the same
grounds, appears to be abusive interference. H. LAMMASCH, supra note 125, at 236. There
should be no examination of exceptions of fact, e.g. having acted in self-defense or under
duress. The facts are accepted "as is." See In re Ockert, 59 BG 1 136, 144 (1933), In re
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cause, contrary to the Anglo-Saxon doctrine and its statutes, the Euro-
pean judge does not examine the "probable cause" but accepts the
facts as presented.1 3 3 By refusing a request we implicitly interfere, say-
ing "what you request is unacceptable." Hence, non-interference is a




The most valid argument in favor of the political privilege is the
established right to resist oppression. When the requesting country
represents a totalitarian (or an authoritarian) system and when human
rights are violated, resistance is regarded as legitimate. Those resisting
in order to maintain freedom and law in the course of their struggle
deserve protection."3 ' Such protection presupposes that the foreign re-
gime does not permit a proper and legitimate opposition. Defined from
the legal and not from the ideological view, it would mean that when
violent resistance is the ultima ratio (the last resort), then ex-
traditability is excluded.
Violent resistance is manifest in the form of armed rebellion by a
group (or a nation) against an oppressor, national or foreign. It is also
recognized as such when individual acts are committed against tyrants
or leaders of oppressive regimes. It constitutes an act of defense-be it
self-defense or one under duress. Violent resistance can be privileged
only when all other means of resistance of legitimate character have
proved to be of no avail. It is interesting to note that the ultima ratio
thesis is even accepted in socialist regimes.1s
Kavic, 78 BG I 39 (1952).
133. The IMAC, supra note 1, art. 2, permits refusal upon obvious defects. Extradi-
tion may also be refused if "contrary to public order." See In re Hoter, BG 76 1 130, 237
(1950); See also In re Kavic, BG 78 1 39, 243 (1952) (seeking extradition upon revoked
amnesty constituted public order).
134. In In re Ragni, 49 BG I 266 (1923), the Swiss Supreme Federal Court denied
extradition to Facist Italy of an alleged terrorist sentenced in absentia. Arguing that the
sentence had been the result of facist pressure, the Court assumed an "extended political
crime." This provoked a charge by the Italian Government of interference with its
sovereignty.
135. Swiss practice accepts violent resistance only when all other methods fail, i.e.,
only in totalitarian or authoritarian regimes. This is termed the doctrine of ultima ratio.
See, e.g., In re Gilette, BG 911 127 (1965); In re Watin, BG 90 1 298 (1964); In re Nappi,
BG 78 1 139 (1952); In re Rabat-Limoges, BG 43 I 74 (1917). See also In re Pavan, BG
54 I 215 (1928) (necessity of avoiding excessive and inadequate means of violence). A
recent speech by Swiss Justice Minister before Parliament reaffirmed this concept. See
Neue ZOdrcher Zeitung Apr. 19, 1986 ("no right of resistance in a system of law").
136. The old constitution of the German Democratic Republic, which was in force
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D. Asylum and Extended Sets of Political Offenders
Active resistance to political oppression is equivalent to "passive
resistance by evading oppression" with or without committing (or hav-
ing to commit) a relative political offense.' 7 It may simply mean es-
cape, either legally or illegally, for the purpose of finding a shelter.'8 8
The right of staying in and receiving protection from the shelter cre-
ates a perpetual tension with the raison d'etat of the sheltering
State'39-which is given absolute discretionary power to either grant or
refuse the shelter.' "° There is, notwithstanding that discretion, a limit
as to what the refuge State can do. It cannot return the refugee to his
until 1968, contained a clause giving the right to every citizen to resist measures, DME
VERFUSSUNG DER DDR. (E. GER.), that apparently are in conflict with socialism. The new
constitution in force since 1968, following the Czech tragedy, eliminated that right, and
it appears nowhere in the new law.
In the case of refugees from Eastern countries or Cuba who are wanted for counter-
revolutionary activities, but the request is made for ordinary crimes, since no power
struggle is taking place in those countries, the socialist power being well established,
Western Jurisprudence had to construe a "political crime." In an old decision, In re
Castioni, [18911 1 QB 149, 156, the Court held that although political crime must be in
course of disturbance, resistance against oppression must not. The burden of proof shifts
from the accused to the government to show that surrender is sought for a common
crime. See also Schtrake v. Gov't of Israel [1962] All E.R. 529, 534.
137. In re Kavic, BG 78 1 39 (1952).
138. Shooting one's way across borders or killing a Communist People's Policeman at
the Berlin Wall in order to save oneself and assure this passage across the iron curtain,
in both cases there would be no extradition.
139. Asylum in Switzerland is authorized by ASYGESETZ, enacted in 1978, and in
force as of January 1, 1980. BB1.1977 III 120. There must be a valid reason to believe
that the refugee, upon return to his country, could be prosecuted for a political offense
because of his race, religion, nationality or political belief, or he had been or might be the
victim of a violation of human rights or human dignity. Id., art. 3. This corresponds to
the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention. SR.0.142.30. Article 14 of the United Nations In-
ternational Bill of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(111), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 74 (1948), and
the Human Rights Convention of 1950, art. 3 enacted as Swiss law SR.0.101. This com-
mitment to grant asylum has for many years been contrasted with the maxim of discre-
tionary power of the sovereign state. There has been no court decision, as yet, overruling
that power since the law has been in force. In the past, however, it has created problems
for Switzerland, expecially during World War 11-when, under the popular slogan, "The
Boat is Full" and antisemitic pressure, thousands of Jewish refugees from Nazi-occupied
Europe were returned at the border and into certain death.
In In re Teszler, BG 92 I 382 (1966) the Court granted extradition regardless of the
refugee status. Asylum does not confer immunity from extradition unless an evident rea-
son exists for an extended political offense. It is arguable whether nonrefoulment of a
refugee is still valid when a common crime is committed by the suspect after his refugee
status was established and/or asylum was granted.
140. See SCHULTZ. supra note 6, at 23-24.
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native country, under the principle of non-refoulement."' That is why
treaties deny surrender of political offenders threatened by political
persecution." 2 'The IMAC adopted the same rule.1
4 3
141. Kalin, Principle of Non-Refoulement, in 2 EUROPE HOCHSCHULSCHRIFTEN (1982).
The United Nations Convention Relating to the States of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150, 176 [hereinafter the U.N. Convention of 1951], and the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, see supra note 101, have become Swiss law. Refoulement has
therefore been prohibited for the last thirty years, as confirmed by the new law. See
ASYLGESETZ. supra note 139. Non-refoulement is the replacement for the unrecognized
right of the individual to be granted asylum. Consistent with the raison d'&tat allowing
for denial of asylum, the refugee has no established right to shelter; he is only protected
from expulsion to his native country. Kalin asserts that even if the petition for asylum is
dismissed for lack of a concrete state of persecutibility, the refugee cannot be returned.
Id. His thesis is supported by the fact that a petition for asylum conveys the assumption
of potential persecution in the country of origin. Article 33 of the U.N. Convention of
1951, supra, prohibits not only the return of a refugee to territories where his life or
freedom would be in danger, but also the refusal (at the border) to allow the refugee to
enter the country where shelter is sought. Kalin suggests that this practice is consistent
with the position taken by the Council of Europe and the Executive Committee of the
United Nations Commissariat for Refugees, although it undoubtedly affects the status of
a nation's sovereignty. Id. This may, however, lead to abuse, especially if the refugee
presents a political case, but is actually looking for employment or seeking to improve
his economic activity. The problem is even more difficult with refugees from totalitarian
countries.
With its prior bad record, Switzerland might be inclined to be overgenerous in the
iterpretation of persecutability as a sort of "affirmative action." Germany, for similar
reasons, adheres to the same practice. The German Constitutional Court (Judgment of
February 4, 1959, BVerfG BEW 174-80 granted asylum on an indication that proceed-
ings in the foreign country might be somewhat "incorrect." Great Britain required a
more "concrete danger" for Polish sailors, who after committing mutiny and imprisoning
the officers on their "Battory," sought asylum in England [1955] 1 All E.R. 31. (As to the
United States, sl, L-BER, NEW DEVELOPMENT IN THE LAw OF ASYLUM 146 (1973), who
cites the story of the Lithuanian sailor who jumped an American coastal boat, but was
returned to his Soviet captain upon the latter's (allegedly sworn) statement that the
sailor had stolen $2,000 from the purser in order to escape and find a new home in the
United States. The sailor was forcefully surrendered to his homeland and was sentenced
to serve ten years in the Gulag.
142. Article 3 of the ECE requires reason to believe that the potential prejudice, on
account of race, religion, nationality or politial opinion, exists. ECE, supra note 4, art
3(2). Article 2 of the IMAC finds it sufficient if the situation of the pursued might be
aggravated. IMAC, supra note 1, art. 2, paras. b & c. (Reading the original Italian text, I
am inclined to translate it as "if the proceedings abroad create a risk of aggravating the
situation of the pursued."). In In re Losembe, Zaire was denied extradition when the
ECE was erroneously applied. Zaire's treaty left the definition of political offense to the
requested State. See Extradition Treaty, May 13, 1938, Zaire-Switzerland, 200 L.N.T.S.
217, T.I.A.S. No. 4420 (extension of Extradition Treaty, May 13, 1874, Belgium-Switzer-
land, 147 Parry's T.S. 455). In article 2, paragraphs b and c of the IMAC supra note 1, it
is easy to trace the risk potential. See also supra PART Two § II, C.
Concerning other decisions denying extradition for an "extended political offense"
when the potential existed for persecution in the requesting country, see In re Bagci, BG
[Vol. 6
SWISS ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION
III. ABUSIVE APPLICATION OF POLITICAL PRIVILEGE
Although the vast majority of countries favor the political privi-
lege, the protection of a common crime by depicting it as a political
one, or by the seeking of asylum without real political risk of political
prosecution, has led international jurisprudence and legislation to for-
mulate limits to the application of the political privilege.
A. Protection of the Head of State
The first to limit the privilege were the Belgians, who, in 1856,
introduced the "attentat clause" after an attempt had been made upon
the life of Emperor Napoleon III. The French had demanded extradi-
tion of the criminal, who had escaped to Belgium. So the Belgians,
under pressure from its powerful neighbor, enacted the restriction to
the then prevailing political offense exception. This clause has been
incorporated into many European extradition laws including the
ECE. "  Switzerland, upon ratification, raised an exception by
108 I b 301 (1982); In re Gilette, BG 911 127 (1965); In re Kavic, BG 78 I 39 (1952); In
re Nappi, BG 78 1 134 (1952); In re Rabat-Limoges, BG 43 I 74 (1917). More recent
decisions have tended to grant extradition in light of the increase in crime and terrorism,
even though the cases did not necessarily involve terrorism. Thus, the Swiss Supreme
Court in In re Bogdanovic, BG 111 I b 52 (1985), held that the political situation in
another country does not prove in concreto an extended political offense potential when
the suspect is returned to that country, and article 3, paragraph 2 of the ECE would
preclude such a presumption in general, absent special circumstances. The Swiss Court
has ruled that the fact that generally longer sentences are imposed in Italy than in Swit-
zerland is not a sufficient reason to deny extradition. See In re Salah Abdallah, BG (un-
publ.) (Jan. 15, 1985).
The Court has admitted, however, that it is difficult to differentiate between a nor-
mal political offense, according to article 3, paragraph 2 of the ECE or article 55 of the
IMAC, from an extended political offense, when persecution is foreseeable for political or
other reasons. The Federal court must be called upon by the Federal Office of Police to
make a determination if such a potential exists. In such an instance, neither the request-
ing state nor the requested state need prove such a potential exists, the Supreme Court
may still assume it. Regardless, though, more than a general description of the political
situation as it relates to the extended political offense must be shown; the danger to the
individual suspect must be shown in concreto. See In re Veronica Nelson, BG 110 I b
185 (1984) (a mere allegation by a suspect that upon extradition she might be subjected
to mistreatment or torture is insufficient; it must be proven).
The Austrian doctrine regarding the extended political offense is referred to as "ex-
tradition asylum" and prohibits extradition if a potential exists for a discriminatory pol-
icy by the requesting State. See Austrian Extradition Law, supra note 1, para. 19(3).
Austria tends to deny extradition if no contrary proof is submitted, i.e., that no discrimi-
natory treatment would take place; concrete evidence of persecution is not required.
143. IMAC, supra note 1, art. 3, para. 1.
144. The ECE provides that "[t]he taking or attempted taking of the life of a head of
state or a member of his family shall not be deemed to be a political offense for the
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reservation. 145
purpose of this Convention." ECE, supra note 4, art. 3(2). Garcia-Mora feels that the
"attendat clause has been mechanistically incorporated into extradition treaties without
much thought as to whether changing conditions have made it any longer useful." M.
GARCIA-MORA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ASYLUM AS A HUMAN RIGHT 86 (1956). Most crit-
ics say that the murder of a tyrant has always been considered political because it is not
directed at him personally but at the system he represents. When King Umberto I was
killed at Monza in 1900 and his assassin Jaffei fled to Switzerland, the Swiss Supreme
Federal Court granted extradition because the murder had no connection with an ex-
isting struggle for power, nor did it serve a given political aim or purpose, not only be-
cause the victim was a head of state. The Italian Government had not enacted the at-
tentat clause, hence the act remained political. See In re Jaffei, BG 27 I 52 (1901). In
fact, the Torino Court of Appeals refused to surrender to Yugoslavia or France the
assassin of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and Prime Minister Barthou. In re Pavelic,
Ann. Dig. 158 (Torino Ct. App. 1934). Upon ratifying the ECE, Italy made no reservation
in this respect.
145. Switzerland reserved the right to refuse an extradition based upon article 3, par-
agraph 1 of the ECE even if the request has been made because of a crime against the
life of the head of state or a member of his family. Swiss Reservations to the ECE, supra
note 16, at art. 3(3). Prior to the ECE, the Swiss had reserved the decision to the Court
according to circumstances of each case.
In Watin v. FPM, BG 90 I 298 (1964), the Swiss Supreme Federal Court refused to
extradite Watin, an OAS leader who had been sentenced to death in absentia by a
French court for having tried to kill de Gaulle. The decision was criticized because Watin
had other means available to him in democratic France to oppose de Gaulle's policy of
freeing Algeria and ending the rebellion there. The doctrine of ultima ratio, however,
had not as yet been adopted. There is probably no debate when dictatorial governments
have committed acts of atrocity to arouse the indignation of the civilized world. Garcia-
Mora states that "[iun the presence of... incontestable facts, one needs no special ef-
fort to see how offenses against the head of a totalitarian state may appear as the only
alternative to peoples suffering from persecution and oppression . . . ." GARCIA-MORA,
supra note 144, at 85. There is no justifiable reason why such acts should be excluded
from the category of political offenses, and, in fact, the IMAC has not enacted the clause,
nor has any treaty to which Switzerland is a party, which embodies it. Of the European
signatories of the ECE, Sandinavia has made the same reservation as Switzerland. The
decision of the administrative authority in the case of Behir Celenk, took no notice of the
head of state clause in the reservation. The suspect was requested by Italy as an acces-
sory to the attempted assassination of the Pope by the Turk Ali Agca in May of 1980.
Another accessory had previously been surrendered. See supra note 4. Celenk was al-
leged to have purchased a pistol in Zurich and to have given it to Agca in Milan, Italy, on
May 9th, a few days before the assassination attempt. Extradition was sought for illicit
arms transportation, conspiracy and aiding the principal criminal. The first two offenses
failed because of dual criminality. The third offense was denied by the suspect who as-
serted that he had no knowledge of the victim. The Swiss Court, however, defeated his
argument under the doctrine of dolus eventualis: the accused must have known a crime
was to be committed with the pistol, irrespective of who the victim was. In Re Celenk,
Judgment of October 13, 1982 BG (unpublished). Because the Swiss Court did not ex-
amine facts, it took the Italian request as correct. Id. See In Re Jaroudi, BG 106 I B 297
(1980). Any claim of political offense exception would fail also. Although an attempt on a
head of state is not a political offense according to the ECE, it is recognized by Switzer-
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B. War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
1. Public International Law Basis.
Any violation that has been committed against the citizens of a
State by its governing body is not recognized as a political offense.
That will not necessarily mean that such a body or its members must
be surrendered to the territory where their crimes have been perpe-
trated. Practically, this can happen only once the regime has changed
and the previous governmental body-the criminals-have escaped
and are sought for extradition by the new regime. This is a rare occur-
rence. The political offense exception has always been accepted so that
extradition was never even attempted. 46 Matters changed, however,
following World War II. In 1946, the U.N. General Assembly passed a
resolution calling upon members to extradite war criminals.'4 7 Certain
criminals were surrendered by the Allies to the Eastern countries, the
territory of their crimes. Neutrals generally refused, for example, Bra-
zil refused to extradite "quislings" to Denmark and Norway claiming
political privilege. Belgium and France cooperated. A Belgian collabo-
rator with the Nazi enemy was surrendered by the Paris Court of
Appeal. 14 8
A series of Allied and U.N. agreements and resolutions was
adopted to prosecute and punish the following crimes:
1 49
land as such on the basis of the reservation mentioned above. A "political offense" de-
fense requires an act within a power struggle, by adequate means and with an aim effec-
tive to accomplish a political end. None of the aforementioned factors was applicable to
Celenk's actions. Celenk also raised a jurisdiction defense based on Swiss Reservations to
the ECE, supra note 16, arts. 7 & 8. See generally Tani v. FPM, BG 101 I a 402 (1975).
Because part of the crime had been committed in Switzerland, Celenk argued that juris-
diction lay solely in a Swiss Court. Under Swiss law, however, the purchase and posses-
sion of a weapon is not punishable, even as an act of aiding or being an accessory to a
crime. Hence, as far as Switzerland is concerned, the crime was committed entirely in
Italy and extradition was granted. See In re Celenk, supra. See also L.v. Zurich, BG 104
IV 77 (1978); In re Lenzlinger, BG 104 IV 86 (1978).
Article V (2) of the United States-Italy Extradition Treaty of 1983 considers any
attack on a head of state or head of government (in the United States the President
only) or their families as nonpolitical if the crime had grave consequences for the general
public.
146. See the cases of Russian expatriates after the Red revolution, the German Kai-
ser; recently: Iranian Shah Pahlevi and Somoza.
147. U.N. Resolution on the Extradition and Punishment of War Criminals, G.A.
Res. VIII(3), U.N. Doc. A/64, at 9 (1946).
148. In re Coleman, 14 I.L.R. 139 (Court of Appeal of Paris 1947).
149. C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 125, at 419; P. FELCHLIN, supra note 122, at 245;
London Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 472
E.A.S. 3, reprinted in 9 INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 637 (M.O. Hudson ed. 1950). The
Charter was later reaffirmed. See G.A. Res. 95(l), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1, at 188 (1947)
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a) crimes against peace; launching an aggressive war;'5 °
b) war crimes, crimes committed during the war;"
c) crimes against humanity (genocide) in war and peace;"5 2
d) crimes by organizations and members thereof that had the
purpose of committing any one of the crimes above.'""
2. Extradition of War Criminals
Switzerland, although not a member of the U.N., has adhered to
most of U.N. conventions. It has, however, not punished Swiss Nazis
noted in (1946-47) 1 U.N.Y.B. 66 (1946-47), U.N. Sales No. 1947.1.18 (1947).
150. Inter-Allied Declaration on the Punishment of War Crimes, of Jan. 13, 1943,
reprinted in WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, UNITED NATIONS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
WAR CRIMES COMMISSION 91-92 (1948). Tripartite Conference, Oct. 19-30, 1943, Great
Britain-Soviet Union-United States, Declaration on Atrocities, reprinted in 38 AM. J.
INT'L L. 6 (Supp. 1944). Extradition and Punishment of War Criminals. G.A. Res.
VIII(3), U.N. Doc. A/64, at 10 (1946), reprinted in 1946 1 U.N.Y.B. 66.
151. Violations are specified in four Geneva Conventions: Geneva Convention for
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces, 1949, art. 50,
75 U.N.T.S. No. 970; Geneva Convention for Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 1949, art. 51, 75
U.N.T.S. No. 971; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
1949, art. 130, 75 U.N.T.S. No. 972 ; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Citizens in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 147, 75 U.N.T.S. No. 972.
152. See G.A. Res. 96(1), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1, at 188 (1947). Resolution 96(1) de-
clared that genocide is a crime against international law. Id. Genocide denies the exis-
tence of groups of human beings which challenge civilization, but it is a delicate task to
formulate rules for the prevention of genocide including the indication of punishment.
The Convention listed murder, serious assault on physical and mental integrity, inten-
tional subjection to circumstances leading to total destruction, measures preventing
birth, removal of children, all done to a group ethnic, religious, racial, political, including
cultural destruction by denial of the use of books, language, destruction of historical
monuments, and the like. Id. Added was an article on preparatory acts to the crime
which was to include the construction of machinery for the liquidation of the group, as
well as the adoption of legal measure. Id. Likewise, incitation was included. Id. Immu-
nity to heads of state and diplomats was waived. The problem of superior orders was
raised in connection with responsibility imposed on the individual offender, but was left
to domestic interpretation. Id. Jurisdiction is reserved to the State where the crime is
committed, save when the crimes are committed by those in authority in that State. Id.
The Convention reflects the basic disagreements that appeared already shortly after the
War among allies.
153. The organizations that were declared "criminal" by the Nuremberg Interna-
tional War Tribunal were limited to German Nazi Organizations They could not be ex-
tended to more recent organizations which have been declared "criminal" by the United
Nation's Assembly (but without binding the members of the United Nations). Notably,
the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVII), 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (no 30) at 75, U.N. Doc. A/
9030 (1973), specifically provides that persons charged with the crime of apartheid may
be tried by a competent tribunal of any state party to the Convention or by an interna-
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for any of the crimes listed. It has punished Swiss Nazis because of
their service in foreign military forces, and their failure to serve in the
Swiss Service, which is obligatory for all citizens. Switzerland has also
surrendered German nationals for war crimes."" '
Universally, as is well known, the extradition and punishment for
the crimes listed above, has been the exception rather than the rule.
Nazi criminals live free and unpunished all over the world, including
Germany.15 5
On October 15, 1975, the Council of Europe adopted an "Addi-
tional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition" which ex-
cluded the political privilege of article 3 of the ECE for War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity.' Most signatories have adhered with-
out reservation. The IMAC, in article 3, paragraph 2 stipulates that the
plea of a political character shall not be taken into account if the act
was aimed at the extermination or suppression of a population group
on account of nationality, race, religion or ethnic, social or political
relationship.1
5 7
3. Prescriptability of War Crimes
The question as to prescription of these crimes has not been an-
swered unanimously. In fact, there are many legal opinions against any
exception to the general rules of the statutes of limitation. Many coun-
tries have, in fact, denied extradition of Nazi criminals for that rea-
son.'58 The two important international conventions in this matter
tional penal tribunal. See also Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prison-
ers of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 129, 75 U.N.T.S. at 135.
154. Genocide was never considered political. In re Kroeger, 1966, 92 BG I 108.
155. C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, INFRACTION GRAVES AUX CONVENTIONS DE GENIkVE ET A
LEUR PROTOCOLES ADDITIONNELS EN REGARD AUX R19GLES INTERNATIONALES CONERNANT LA
PRESCRIPTION DES CRIMES DE GUERRE ET L'EXTRADITION (1982). See also C. VAN DEN
WIJNGAERT, POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION TO EXTRADITION 7 (1980), which criticized the
violation of the principle aut dedere, aut punire as a grave infringement against the
Hague Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide, December 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. See also Supplementary Convention, U.N. Doc. E/CN 4/906 (re-
garding the prescription of such crimes).
156. Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition, Oct. 15, 1975,
Europ. T.S. 86. Crimes not excluded from the political privilege of Article 3 of the ECE
by this Protocol are: (1)(a) launching aggressive wars, and (1)(d) criminal organizations.
Terrorist groups, however, could not be sentenced under this Protocol and reman unaf-
fected. Id.
157. Contrary to the ECE, the IMAC added a paragraph (b) to the exclusion of polit-
ical plea article, namely if the act "appears particularly reprehensible because the of-
fender jeopardized freedom, life or limb of men.... "IMAC, supra note 1, art. 3, para.
2(b).
158. Opinions favoring non-prescriptability have been reported. See, J. GRAVEN, Les
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have thus far received minimal support from the international commu-
nity. The U.N. Agreement on Non-Prescriptability of crimes against
Humanity15 9 has been ratified by only thirty-nine U.N. members,
mostly from the East,1s0 and in the European Convention by only Ger-
many, Holland and Switzerland."6 ' A few countries have adopted do-
mestic laws.la2 Switzerland enacted article 75 of the Swiss Penal Code,
as well as incorporating it into the IMAC in article 109."6' It also made
a reservation to the European Convention.'"
C. Anarchism and Terrorism
The most important limitation to the plea of political privilege is
anarchism. Anarchism is defined as the resistance to any and all State
power, and the negation of organized society. Lawyers and politicians
have always demanded that anarchist violence be considered non-polit-
ical because it does not come close to the basic definition of a political
crime. 65 The French Statute of 1927, notwithstanding the motivation
(subjective) theory prevailing in France at that time, excluded from the
political exception those "very grave" acts of anarchism even when
they were committed upon apparent unselfish motives."6 6 Switzerland
Crimes Contre L'Humanite Peuvent-Ils Beneficier de la Prescription?, 81 REVUE
P .NALE SUISSE 113, 119 (1965); See also SOMMAiRE, Le Projet de Convention Internatio-
nale sur L'Imprescriptibilitg des Crimes de Guerre et des Crimes Contre L'HumanitO,
37 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL 379 (1966). For cases concerning the denial of
non-prescriptability and hence the extradition of criminals, see In re De Bernonville, 22
I.L.R. 527 (Sup. Ct. Brasil 1955); In re Degrelle, (unpubl.) State Council of Spain 1956).
C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 123, at 424; VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 155, at 144.
159. U.N. Agreement on Non-Prescriptability of Crimes Against Humanity.
160. See, e.g., Cameroon, Gambia, India, Kenya, Philippines, Rwanda, Tunesia and
Yugoslavia.
161. European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, Jan. 25, 1974, 13 I.L.M. 540, open for
signature.
162. Sechzehntes Strafechtsanderungsgesetz, 1 BGB1 1046 (W. Ger. 1979).
163. The IMAC mandates no prescription. IMAC, supra note 1, art. 109. Un-
prescriptable crimes are those aimed at extermination, id., art. 3, para. 2 and terrorist
acts, id. 3, para. 2(b).
164. Additional Protocol to the Swiss Reservation to the ECE, supra note 16, para.
22.
165. H. LAMMASCH, EXTRADITION OF ANARCHISTS 6 (1899); Diena, Les delits
anarchistes du Droit Public, 2 REVUE INT'L DE DRorr PUBLIc 328 (1895); P. FELCHIN,
supra note 122 n.45 (1979). There were some well known lawyers who represented a
"middle position," although non-political, they are not common crimes. GRIVAZ, F.
GraIvAz, LEXTRADITION Er LES DELrrs POLmQtus, 292 (1894).
166. "Les crimes lea plus graves au point de vue de la morale" are extraditable.
England accepted that formulation in Meunier, 11894] 2 Q.B. 415-19 surrendering a no-
torious anarchist to France.
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did not codify an exception for anarchistic crimes because it appeared
self-evident that it related to a common crime.1
7
Although anarchists might have had certain ideas of society, mod-
ern terrorism has no ideas at all. It has neither a political aim nor a
realistic chance to achieve anything, except to call attention to some
underlying injustice. That is why modern terrorism goes way beyond
attacking the representatives of a certain ruling class, of an existing
and established power or of a detested institution. The victims of acts
of anarchy are population groups, minorities, political and religious in-
stitutions, and the like, most of them not involved in the matter they
attack; the means by which these acts are accomplished are brutal
force, spreading terror and creating a general climate of fear. Arbitrari-
ness of injury to the victim is a basic criterion. 68
167. The Swiss Extradition Law of 1892, supra note 22, did not contain any indica-
tion in respect to anarchist activity. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court however, denied
extradition of anarchists in the following cases: In re Pistoles, BG V 226 (1879); In re
Malatesta, BG XVII 450 (1881); FPM v. Bertoni, BG 26 I 227 (1900); In re Jaffei, BG 27
I 52 (1901); della Savia, 95 BG I 462 (1969).
168. The definition of terrorism varies according to one's political concepts. For an
excellent presentation of the various definitions of terrorism, see Pollock, Terrorism as a
Tort in Violation of the Law of Nations, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 236, 238-42 (1982-1983);
see also Note, Terrorism and the Law of Nations, 6 FORDHAM INT'L LAW JOURNAL 238
(1982). In connection with the Tel-Oren case in Israel and the Alien Tort Statute, and
there is very little to add to her presentation of the various definitions of terrorism. It is
interesting to confirm the Swiss approach which corresponds to the cited United States
State Department delineation, with the exception that the word "political" was struck
from the context (wherever it appears). Id. at 240-41. Terrorist activity in recent past
has been typically unpolitical, because it does not even pretend to accomplish anything,
but it is a deliberate system of murder, maiming or menacing innocents, with the sole
purpose of inspiring fear without a social or political end. Thus, in della Savia, BG 95 I
462 (1969), the Swiss Supreme Federal Court stated that there exists no adequate pro-
portion between acts and purpose, nor between gravity of crime and potential accom-
plishment. Similar arguments were used in Castori v. FPM, BG 101 I a 60 (1975), a case
in which two neo-fascists were surrendered upon Italy's request for using explosives in
an attack against a tax office. The offenders claimed political privilege and contended
that their purpose was to restore fascism in Italy. The Court ruled lack of proportional-
ity, without a chance or purpose.
Conceivably, some purpose could be found in committing acts just to provoke re-
pression by the established society in the hope that the masses might revolt against that
repression. Some Latin American guerillas, for example, have achieved governmental re-
pression, but no masses have revolted. Hence, such terrorist acts would be criminal and
not political.
There is no legally relevant distinction between the old idealist anarchism activity in
Europe, prior to World War I, and modern terrorist organizations like the Irish Republi-
can Army (I.R.A.) or the Badder-Meinhoff in Germany. There is a distinction to be
made, however, between the political zealot who fights in Northern Ireland because there
is a rebellion going on and the psychopathic murderer of the Badder-Meinhoff kind. A
distinction is also justified between the PLO and the extremist elements in that group.
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D. Solutions on an International Scale
1. Swiss Legislative Efforts
The invoking of the political offense exception by terrorists has
forced law enforcement authorities to propose remedies, first on a na-
tional, then on an international scale. Jurisprudence in Switzerland has
set clear precedents so there appears to be no particular difficulty in
codifying the elements for new criminal definitions in that respect. In a
message from the Federal Council to the National Council on Decem-
ber 10, 1979, amendments to the Penal Code were proposed and in-
serted into the IMAC. The new codified crimes included qualified rob-
bery, highjacking, kidnapping, and deprivation of liberty with
predictable consequences so as to endanger life or property or both.
These were all extraditable offenses according to article 35 of the
IMAC and would never be classified as political by their very nature.16'
Those offenses that might have a political character in accordance with
article 3 were specified as nonpolitical in article 3, paragraph 2 of the
IMAC.'70 They were still subject to limitation, however, so in order to
make them non-prescriptable, article 109 inserted an amendment to
article 75 of the Penal Code."'
2. International Protection of Aviation
A number of international conventions have been adopted by
countries with respect to protecting aircraft, crew and passengers.
These conventions have eliminated the political offense exception for
When aims are completely unclear and the perpetrators are fighting in anonymity, there
can be no debate whether we are dealing with anything political.
In In re Morlacchi, Judgment of December 12, 1975, BG 101 I a 602 (1975), the
Swiss Supreme Federal Court emphasized the unclear aim of terror excepts terror itself.
Motives for fighting cruel tyranny or even liberating a country from foreign military oc-
cupation (as reprehensible as these environments may be when innocent people are vic-
tims of the means to the end) are different from those attacking a democratic regime of
Western Society. The Zurich disturbances of 1980-81 showed for the first time that even
Switzerland is not immune from aimless terrorist activity. The only consolation lies in
the fact that up to now, modern terrorism has been unable to attack the State's political
and social structure, and even if they resort to bombing temples and cultural institu-
tions, they have achieved nothing. Attempts to place these acts into the category of polit-
ical offenses is the result of ideological bluster without the slightest legal concept.
169. BB1 1980 I 1216.
170. Supplementary Message to the IMAC, BB1. 1977 I 1217.
171. STGB, art. 75, 1951 A.S. 181, 207, 228, 300 (SR. 311.0). Non-prescriptable acts
are listed in article 3, paragraph 2 of the IMAC, supra note 1. Geneva Convention viola-
tions include those acts which jeopardize life and limb of men by means of mass extermi-
nation or the triggering of disasters, or when hostages have been taken.
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these crimes in order to protect travel by air."'2 There is, however, no
indication as to non-prescriptability. Article 75 of the Swiss Penal
Code applies mutatis mutandis in Switzerland.
3. U.N. Conventions
The United Nations, from the beginning of its post-War activities,
approached the problem of international crime based upon its Charter
and its human rights conventions.M The language of these covenants,
however, did not explicitly assert terrorism to be punishable by the
international community.7 4  Consequently, anti-terrorist resolutions
172. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed Onboard Aircraft,
opened for signature Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219,
SR 748.710.1. This Convention empowers an aircraft captain to hold suspects until land-
ing within the territory of a signatory of the Convention. Id., art. 3. This, however, would
also allow a non-signatory nation, when a prior landing occurs there, to hold suspects
and refuse to extradite them, corresponding to the Swiss sovereignty concept. Message of
the Federal Council, Jan. 9, 1970, BB1.1970 I 33.; see also STGB, art. 5.
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Aircraft, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105, SR 748.710.2, specifies the
maxim "aut dedere, aut punire (or judicare)" leaving intact, however, the political of-
fense exception according to each signatory's discretion. Id., art. 5.
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, opened for signature Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 974
U.N.T.S. 177, SR 748.710.3, requires that all signatories extradite, irrespective of any
signatory's internal law making extradition dependent upon a treaty. Id. art. 7. Thus,
Switzerland, which extradites criminals absent a treaty, is obliged to extradite under the
Convention, whereas a signatory with an extradition treaty extradites under the Conven-
tion as a matter of comity. This is illogical, but respects statutes and adheres to the
above noted maxim. A joint statement by the United States, Japan and England made at
Bonn in 1978 urged signatories to cease flights to countries, such as Cuba and Libya, who
fail to extradite hijackers. Many countries adhered while continuing communications
with such countries.
173. Art. 55 of the United Nations Charter provides that the United Nations shall
promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental free-
doms for all without distinction, as to race, sex, language, or religion." U.N. Charter, art.
55, para. 4. Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that
"[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of person," although article 5 states
that "[no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (11), U.N. Doc.
A/64/Add. 2, at 71, 73 (1948). Even more direct language is contained in article 6 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: "Every human being has the inher-
ent right to life." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200
(XXI) 1 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967). This provision does
not in itself confer a right to prosecute terrorists under international law.
174. Cf. Pollock, supra note 168, at 243. Pollock believes that the language of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights "implies that international terrorism would con-
stitute a violation of human rights under international law, because the torts subsumed
under terrorism by definition involve loss of liberty, subjection to torture, and cruel,
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and agreements had to be adopted separately, and, as a result, very
little has been accomplished because of the very different ideological
attitudes of the countries that form the U.N. community.'
4. European Anti-Terrorism Convention
It was much easier for the civilized countries of Western Europe to
come to an inter-European consensus on the remedies to be established
against terrorist acts. Because the ECE left the political offense excep-
tion practically intact leaving wide discretion by the requested coun-
try,"' the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe was called
upon to legislate a more rigid concept. It adopted Recommendation
inhuman and degrading treatment." Id. The implication that violation of these cove-
nants by member states is a crime against the law of nations by the individual commit-
ting it-and hence, punishable and extraditable-is a noble but remote goal.
175. There appears to be in force at this time, five Conventions adopted by the
United Nations referring to terrorism:
a) The four Geneva Conventions of 1949, referred to in detail supra note 151, which
relate to war crimes. (In the fourth Convention, "criminal organizations" refers to Nazi
groups only). The frequent extension of the protection of service personnel and civilians
involved in a civil war or "military measures in hot pursuit of an enemy across borders"
has remained academic.
b) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, G.A. Res. 3166 (XXVIII), 1 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 146, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974). The Convention has been ratified
by 47 States. Switzerland, although not a member of the United Nations, ratified the
convention on Dec. 31, 1974.
c) Resolution of the United Nations Assembly Against Hostage Taking, 34 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 23, U.N. Doc. A.34/39 (1979). The original resolution was
adopted at the initiative of Germany, imposing the maxim "aut dedera, aut judicare."
This resolution was diluted to a nonbinding resolution, however, with two very dubious
compromises in article 9(b)(ii), which permit the denial of extradition if the requested
party had reason to believe that the position of the offender to be surrendered stands a
risk of being prejudiced, because of "the inability of communication between a state that
can protect the suspect and the suspect himself." Id., Art. 9(b)(ii). The application of the
Convention is also precluded when the taking of hostages is part of a fight against "colo-
nial domination, alien occupation or racist regimes in exercising the right of self-determi-
nation." Id. This peculiar insistence, hitherto unknown in international law, practically
allows for intervention by signatories providing protection for terrorist suspects, and, at
the same time, permits denial of extradition because a third country, (interferring for the
the suspect's protection) might be unable to contact the suspect. No State, however, will
recognize the right of a "third protector-country" to interfere with its sovereign right to
extradite or punish.
d) United Nations Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, U.N.
Doc. NPT/Conf. II/6/Add. 1 (June 2, 1980).
e) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, U.N. Doc. A/Res/39/46 (1984).
176. ECE, supra note 4, art. 3, para. 1.
[Vol. 6
SWISS ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION
No. 703 (1973) concerning international terrorism. Condemning acts of
terrorism, it demanded punishment notwithstanding the motivation of
the act, "provided the act constituted murder or kidnapping of inno-
cent persons endangering their life. 1' 77 It also called upon all members
to propose new definitions of "political crime" with a view toward ex-
cluding a political justification for any such crime. Early in 1974, the
Council of Ministers of the European Council also adopted the non-
binding Resolution No. 74, recommending that when considering extra-
dition requests for such acts, the prosecution of the offender must be
assured before denying extradition.The final Convention was presented
for signature on January 22, 1977, and Switzerland was one of the first
signatories. This definitely reaffirmed the Swiss adherence to the prin-
ciple of "aut dedere, aut judicare."17
177. See SCHULTZ, CONVENTION ET D.i'T POLITIQUE 313 (1971).
178. European Convention on Terrorism, Council of Europe, opened for signature
Jan. 22, 1977, Doc. No. i. 16792 [hereinafter ECT]. Other signators include Austria,
Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Luxem-
bourg, Norway, Spain, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Great Britain, Turkey and Italy.
France, Italy, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland made a few reservations. Note the ab-
sence, thus far, of Ireland. Israel is about to sign with some reservations.
Switzerland has no jurisdiction to prosecute a foreigner having committed a crime
abroad against non-Swiss interests or persons. The provision must be amended, there-
fore, so as to enable prosecution if Switzerland cannot extradite. STGB, arts. 6 & 7.
Municipal laws enacted after the ECT have applied exceptions to the political privi-
lege, and have stipulated them in one way or another:
a) The German Extradition and Assistance Law, although recognizing the non-ex-
traditability of the political offender, has excluded from political privilege the individual
sentenced or sought by a foreign prosecuting authority for genocide, murder or man-
slaughter without premeditation, as well as for the instigation or participation in those
crimes. Deutsches Rechtshilfe Gesetz, para. 6(1), 1982 BGBI 2071.
b) The Austrian Federal Extradition and Assistance Act has not gone as far as the
German legislation. Consistent with the Austrian adherence to and ratification of the
ECT, however, and consistent with the doctrine that all treaties are self-executing, the
Austrian law has limited the political privilege to those acts which are not listed as abso-
lutely extraditable crimes under the ECT: for example, genocide, barbarous acts endan-
gering the public, hijacking aircraft, etc. Among Western European nations, Austria
tends more than any other to protect the individual suspect. That approach may change,
however, with the recent acts of terror that have taken place on Austrian soil.
Bundesgesetz uber Auslieferung and Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen, para. 14, 1979 BGBI
529.
c) The IMAC, supra note 1, art. 3, para. 1, stipulates the political privilege as such,
but thereafter sets forth the exception to the exception, that is, crimes directed against
groups for reasons of nationality, race, religion, or for ethnic, social or political origin, or
if the act appears reprehensible because it jeopardizes or threatens to jeopardize life and
limb (e.g., hijacking, the taking of hostages, or using means of mass extermination).
For the different possibilities of approach taken by the various European nations in
both executive and judicial actions against terrorists, see Linke, Internationaler Terror-
ismus als Rechtsproblem, OESTERREICHISCHE JUNSTEN ZErruNd 230 (1976).
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The Convention, which was intended to overcome the political of-
fense loophole, requires the signatories to extradite for acts of a "cer-
tain gravity."'17 It excludes these acts from the category of political
offenses or from offenses inspired by political motives. These exclu-
sions include highjacking aircraft and acts against the safety of civil
aviation; acts against diplomatic personnel; kidnapping, hostage-taking
or grave deprivation of liberty, and the use of bombs, hand grenades,
missiles, automatic weapons and explosives, including the attempt to
commit such acts, or aiding, favoring or abetting such acts. 80
Article 2 of the Convention extends extraditability to all other
crimes involving violence against life, physical integrity or liberty of
any person. It also includes a serious act involving property if such act
creates or is liable to create a collective danger. Unlike article 1, how-
ever, article 2 does not bind the signatories to extradite the suspect. It
only permits them to do so within their discretion. Serious crimes
under article 2, apparently considered less serious than those of article
1, are not ius cogens but rather a matter of comity.'' Article 2 then
provides for the obligation to prosecute if extradition is denied."8 2
179. ECT, supra note 178, art. 1.
180. Whereas the Conventions protecting aircraft, crew and passengers, see supra
note 172 offers a choice to surrender or prosecute, this Convention imposes extradition
for all crimes unless, of course, the offender is a citizen. ECT, supra note 178, Art. 1.
181. ECT, supra note 178, art. 2. For all practical purposes, the determination as to
the gravity of the act is a matter of discretionary decision by the requested State; the
word in itself is vague. The Council of Ministers in its "explanatory report" used the
word "odious" to delineate seriousness; however, this term is just as inexplicit. Because
actual surrender is not binding upon the signatories, the interpretation of gravity, seri-
ousness or odiousness is really secondary. The only progress the article provides for the
public, is that it is considered sufficient if the public is terrorized by such act, without
actual damage to life and liberty. The term "collective danger" again is controversial. It
is uknown in most statutes. See P. LoGoz, COMMENTAIRE DU CODE PENAL SUISSE 425
(1956).
182. ECT, supra note 178, art. 7. Article 6 calls for taking such measures by the
contracting State as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over an offense men-
tioned in Article 1 (i.e., the very serious category of crimes), when the suspect is present
in its territory and does not extradite because the jurisdiction of the requesting State is
based on a rule existing equally in the law of the requested State. Id., art. 6. This is an
extremely complicated formula. When a Swiss citizen who commits a grave crime in Swe-
den is later found in England, Sweden may ask for surrender, but Great Britain may
deny the request on the basis of a reservation made by virtue of article 13 (extended
political offenses) although it cannot punish him for lack of territoriality competence.
Switzerland, on the other hand, could request extradition provided it proves the act by a
Swiss citizen comes under article 6 of the Penal Code, (i.e., if he could be extradited by
Switzerland for such an offense, article 6 of the Convention then obligates the signatories
concerned to adjust their jurisdictional problems by a reciprocity agreement in such a
way that the culprit can be prosecuted in one of the countries involved). One would
plead here for Swiss prosecution under its universality principle as against the restric-
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There remains, however, one large loophole for both categories of of-
fenses. The requested State can still pretend to have reason to believe
that "the request has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or
punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality or polit-
ical opinion, or that that person's position may be prejudiced for any of
these reasons." In other words, the "extended political offense,"'8s as
the above deception is termed, is a powerful method of denying
extradition.
There are three other important provisions of the Convention re-
garding the extraditability of terrorist acts as classified in articles 1
and 2. Article 4, for example, automatically inserts into any treaty or
convention among signatories, the extraditability of the listed terrorist
crimes. 184 Article 8 obligates signatories to furnish to each other the
broadest means of mutual assistance in criminal proceedings brought
in respect to these crimes. Such mutual judicial assistance cannot be
refused on the ground of the political offense exception. This includes
common offenses inspired by political motives. But again, such assis-
tance is not binding upon the signatories in the case of the "extended
political offense" exception. 8 5 Finally, article 13 permits reservations
upon depositing the instrument of acceptance or ratification with the
Convention. Such reservations may deny extradition for crimes under
article 1 if such crime is considered to be a strictly political offense or
one inspired by political motivation.8 8 It stands to reason that crimes
tions imposed by domestic statute upon Swedish and British proceedings because of ter-
ritorial-jurisdictional questions.
183. ECT, supra note 178, art. 5. When surrender is denied for reasons of territorial-
ity or nationality, the contracting State in which the offender is found must prosecute
"without exception whatsoever and without undue delay." Id. art. 7. Nevertheless, the
signatory is not committed to prosecute at all. Id. art. 5. That loophole would probably
justify the recent Swiss nonpublished decision to deny extradition of a Turkish terrorist
because his Kurdish origin might aggravate his situation in Turkey, or of an Argentine
terrorist group because of the story on human rights violations by Argentina. In the
latter case, the Swiss Court ordered the Geneva cantonal authorities to prosecute the
criminal, as called for by the Convention. Id., art. 7.
184. ECT, supra note 178, art. 4. This insertion clause makes it possible for signators
to conclude treaties that recognize political offense exceptions to terrorist crimes or to
acknowledge the reciprocity for each extradition proceeding upon a request for such
crime.
185. The wording of article 8(2) is the same as that of article 5: "substantial grounds
for believing that the request for extradition. . . has been made for the purpose of pros-
ecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality or political
opinion, or that that person's position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons." ECE,
supra note 178, art. 5.
186. Id. art. 13. There is a proviso in article 13 limiting somewhat the range of dis-
cretion conceded in reservations. The party making the reservation must take into con-
sideration when evaluating the character of the offense in question, any particularly seri-
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under article 2 will be treated in the same manner because they are
less serious.
Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention concern procedural matters.
They call for the Committee on Crime Problems to do whatever is pos-
sible to facilitate friendly settlements of any difficulty that may arise
out of the execution of the Convention. It also mandates arbitration in
case of any dispute. If the parties cannot agree on a referee for the
arbitration, the European Court of Human Rights may intervene and
select one.187In the final analysis, the Convention has many flaws. It is
full of compromises that reflect the different ideological and practical
approaches to the political offense and the politically inspired offense.
The contrast between the Latin and Northern ideas on this matter is
apparent. A certain reluctance to injure the interests of the "liberation
movements," which are frequently the source of terrorist crimes, has
had a tendency to wbaken the steady unrelenting position necessary in
the fight against terrorism. Great progress, however, is seen in the en-
actment of statutes mandating prosecution in the case of non-
extradition.
5. Swiss Reservations
In ratifying the Convention, Switzerland made a number of reser-
vations, which were deposited with the Secretary General of the Coun-
cil of Europe:
a) Dual criminality: if not, no surrender and no
prosecution.
b) Citizens: no extradition, but assured prosecution.
c) Death penalty in requesting country; surrender under
condition that death penalty will not be carried out. In the case
of insufficient guaranty, Swiss authorities have absolute discre-
ous aspects of the offense, for instance, that it created a collective danger to the life,
physical integrity or liberty of persons, that it affected persons foreign to the motives
behind it, or that cruel or vicious means were used in the commission of the offense. Id.
This is, in fact, a very wide and ample power. An innocent non-Jewish bystander hurt by
a PLO bomb attack on a temple in Paris was considered "non-involved" by the French
Police Commander, a statement that was, of course, repudiated by the Prime Minister.
Reservations under this article have been made by Norway, Italy, Cyprus, Denmark and
Iceland, to which Sweden added a territoriality clause.
187. The arbitration tribunal consists of three members: two arbitrators, one
nomnated by each party, and the referee. This tribunal lays down its own procedure; its
decisions are made by majority vote, and are final. Id. art. 10. No provision has been
made as to the suspensive effect and/or the detention of the accused pending the arbitra-
tion decision in case of a dispute between the signatories that have made the reservation.
Id., art. 7.
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tion to extradite or prosecute. The quality of the guaranty is a
purely domestic consideration.
d) "Extended political offenses" are strictly legally con-
strued. If not, neither surrender nor prosecution are
permitted.188
The Convention, however imperfect, did influence Swiss legislators
in regard to the enactment of the IMAC and the amendments to the
Penal Code contained therein.' It will still be necessary, however, to
introduce one more measure-allowing the application of article 7 of
the Convention to jurisdiction and territoriality.
The Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism entered into
force on August 4, 1978, after the required minimum number of signa-
tories had ratified it. Thereafter, the Committee of Ministers of the
Council at its sixty-third session, on November 23, 1980, adopted a
declaration on terrorism. The Convention, an organization of demo-
cratic States founded on the rule of law and committed to the protec-
tion of human rights and fundamental freedom reaffirmed its fight
against terrorism. In so doing the Committee decided that the follow-
ing questions should be examined:
a) How can the existing practices of international cooper-
ation be made more expeditious?
b) How can the communication of information concern-
ing crimes committed and measures taken against its perpetra-
tor be improved and accelerated?
c) How can problems arising out of jurisdictional con-
flicts be settled?
Thus far, however, Europe waits for the answers to these questions;
they are now only pious hopes, debate, and resolutions.1'90
E. A Summary of Swiss Jurisprudence
The reasoning which underlies the specification of serious crimes
in articles 1 and 2 of the Convention of 1977 is that there is an ade-
quate nexus between these acts and the political aim these acts are
intended to accomplish. The European Council followed Swiss (and to
a great extent British and United States) judicial concepts, but it also
188. This conclusion is contestable. It may set unwanted precedents. The author
would favor mandatory prosecution instead.
189. See Schmid-Frei-Wyss-Schouwey, L'Entraide Judiciare Internationale en Ma-
tiere Penale, 3 Swiss JumsTs AssocIATION 356, 360 (1981).
190. See The Conference on Tasks and Problems of the Democracy Against Terror-
ism, Strasbourg,France, Nov. 14, 1980.
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took into consideration French and Italian doubts. Hence, each time
the term "political offense" appears, the undoubtedly contestable "in-
stitution" which is called "the common offense inspired by political
motives" follows. Switzerland has never recognized such a term. This is
quite different, as we have seen, from the relative political offense-in
which a common crime is committed to prepare, promote, assist, favor
and abet the political offense. The political offense itself must remain
restricted to:
a) An attack upon the powers of the State or its social
and political institutions or structures, but not including pri-
vate interests, i.e., multinational organizations are not privi-
leged victims. 91
b) The attack must take place during a power struggle or
within the framework of such a struggle. A strike is not such a
struggle.19
2
c) The attack must constitute a serious effort and have a
serious chance to accomplish its aim.19 3
d) A common crime only qualifies if its commission di-
rectly prepares, facilitates, favors or hides the political
offense. 94
e) The political part must always be predominant. 95
f) The attack must be effectively connected to the de-
sired change of the political, social, and economic structure. In
case of the defense thereof, it must be connected to the main-
tenance of the structure. The status quo deserves full
protection.'"
g) There must be adequate means applied. Reprehen-
sable and brutal methods disqualify an otherwise privileged
offense. 19 7
h) There must be no other method available to accom-
plish the end but the means of violence. Crime is the ultima
ratio.19
191. See In re Belenzow, BG 32 1 531 (1906); In re Magaloff-Kresselidze, BG 33 1 169
(1907).
192. See In re Vogt, BG 50 I 249 (1924); In re Ockert, BG 59 I 136 (1933).
193. In re Peruzzo, BG 77 I 50 (1951); In re Nappi, BG 78 1 134 (1952).
194. In re Koester, BG 19 I 122 (1883); In re Magaloff-Kresselidze, BG 33 I 169
(1907).
195. In re Nappi, BG 78 1 134 (1952); In re Ficorrili, BG 77 I 57 (1951).
196. In re Camporini BG 50 I 299 (1924); In re Ockert,BG 59 I 136 (1933).
197. Kroeger v. SB, BG 92 I 208 (1966).
198. In re Watin, BG 90 1 290 (1964); In re Kavic, BG 78 I 139 (1952). The-new
French law enacted on November 10, 1982 gave the Government, irrespective of treaties
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i) The crime must compensate for the potential harm to
life, body, and property because the aim protects a higher
human interest. 199
j) A politically inspired offense is not a political offense if
it does not meet all the above requirements. But a common
crime presented to cover up political prosecution becomes a
political offense; likewise, reason to believe that foreign pro-
ceedings might prejudice the accused if surrendered makes the
alleged crime an "extended political offense." The "extended
political offense" is treated like a normal political offense, ex-
cept for the mandate for prosecution. 0 0
and conventions, the right to extradite murderers, kidnappers and other violent
criminals for crimes committed in a nation State with independent justice and demo-
cratic principles, and resulting in injury or death. The requesting State must be a com-
munity which respects the human rights of its citizens.
The Swiss Supreme Federal Court surrendered an Italian lawyer charged with un-
lawful arms trafficking and suppression of documents in the Bologne Railroad bombing
of August, 1980. In making its decision, the court disregarded political motivation. In re
Bakker, BG (unpubl.) (Mar. 2, 1983).
199. In re Wassilieff, BG 34 I 557 (1908); In re Pavan, BG 54 I 215 (1928); In re
Bodenen, BG (unpubl.) (Aug. 13, 1973) (mercenaries do not qualify).
200. Losembe v. FPM, BG 99 I 547 (1973). In In re Buffano, BG 108 I b 408 (1982),
the Swiss Federal Supreme Court denied surrender of five alleged Argentine terrorists
because of potential human rights violations when extradited. The "extended political
crime" principle was accepted, notwithstanding a treaty with Argentina permitting a po-
litical offense exception and leaving the determination to the requested country. Argen-
tina-Switzerland Extradition Treaty, supra note 26. The Court erred in applying article
3, paragraph 2 of the ECE, and should have applied article 2, paragraph 1, which, how-
ever, is in force only as of January, 1983. Bernasconi, supra note 101, indicates interven-
tion by the Swiss Court into the entire judicial system of Argentina by asserting that
criminal procedure and its application there violates human rights principles and the
prerequisites cited, see id., are not met. Mandatory prosecution in Switzerland of Argen-
tine criminals could be made only by accepting the argument that part of the crime (i.e.,
ransom collection) had been committed in Switzerland, thus establishing jurisdiction.
The decision is unique, and it is not known whether it will stand up in the future be-
cause of the uncertainty it leaves regarding thoughts on foreign regimes.
The French Law Concerning the Extradition of Foreigners, 1927 J.O. 2068, makes
surrender dependent upon:
a) the nature of the legal system in the requested country,
b) the political character of the offense, explicitly exluding sole political motivation
or a common offense politically inspired or both,
c) the potential political motivation of the request (not the criminal act), and
d) the risk of an aggravated position for the suspect on account of political opnion,
race or religion.
The law is somewhat more specific than that which emanates from the Swiss deci-
sion in that an aggravation per se is insufficient; any prosecution aggravates. The defense
must also prove the political motive of the request. The fact that the request originates
from Argentina for example is not sufficient to deny surrender.
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The United States has no comparative judicial decisions on that
matter.
CONCLUSIONS
Attempts to find a compromise between the yearning for public
security and the compassion for the underprivileged who strive to
change our social order have resulted in different interpretations of the
law. The international community, thus, has failed in its fight against
international crime. Yet, because international public law is a service
of civilization, it will capitulate to emotional and irrational behavior.
This, of course, applies to all law, but international law demands the
abandonment of unlimited sovereignty as a guiding principle. Unfortu-
nately, such a demand is not easy to satisfy with regard to something
unknown and subject to emotional and irrational control. That is why
even the civilized world has hesitated in giving up what it has today.
This author believes that, notwithstanding the tears and pain and
bloodshed that terrorism has caused, it appears on the verge of failure,
just as anarchism has failed before. The cause of this optimism is that
reason has returned and retaken its place in the thoughts of people.
Anti-terrorist conventions and treaties might be good, but a
proper and consistent interpretation of the existing law is more desira-
ble. It is the firm opinion of the author that Swiss judicial decisions
American decisions have not accepted this defense. In Ziyad Abu Eain v. Wilkes, 641
F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981), Ramsey Clark, arguing for the
defense, raised the issue of aggravation. The Seventh Circuit, however, did not rule on
this policy determination (i.e., whether there were subsequent disturbances after the al-
leged criminal threw a bomb, killing two children in Tiberias, Israel). The court assumed
that the act was an indiscriminate bombing of the civilian population, and, therefore, did
not fall within the political privilege exception. 641 F.2d at 513. The court also refused to
determine whether this request by Israel amounted to a subterfuge to punish the of-
fender for his politically motivated crime, leaving such a determination to the State De-
partment. Id. In Switzerland, the Swiss Supreme Court decided that question, and
might, assuming that the Arab terrorist's position would be aggravated by being prose-
cuted in Israel, have refused extradition with very uncomfortable consequences to jus-
tice, because Switzerland could not have punished the terrorist criminal for lack of
jurisdiction.
The Swiss Court recently has held that it is not sufficient to show that a prosecution
in a given foreign State might involve certain political groups to which a suspect belongs.
In re Crepas, BG (unpubl.) (Apr. 17, 1984). See also In re della Savia, BG 95 I 468
(1969).
A request for asylum by an allegedly political refugee does not per se result in the
denial of extradition for a common crime. The suspect must show that he especially faces
a danger of political prosecution if he is extradited. General political events are irrele-
vant. See In re Musa Rifat, BG (unpubl.) (Sept. 5, 1984) (proof of personal situation
according to article 3, paragraph 2 of the ECE, supra note 4).
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have shown such a consistency, while maintaining flexibility in the
light of ever-changing circumstances. The concepts of these courts go a
long way toward supporting a conservative society-protection ap-
proach, made necessary by the steady search for better law enforce-
ment. One cannot overlook, however, the restraint exercised in defense
of the accused, especially when confronted with dubious requests. In
this way, society's old ideals have not been shelved; no summary pro-
ceedings have been established which the courts have recognized, and
the writ of habeas corpus, although not known in continental European
countries as such, is still highly respected. In summary, the everlasting
sense for the independence of law and jurisprudence is kept alive to
form the bulwark against political expediency.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
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